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Our actions toward our immediate surroundings should be more important 
than showing ecological consciousness about the global environment. We 
cannot protect the global environment by merely having ecological 
consciousness, but we can protect our local environment by recognizing 
certain values and relations with the place. So, it is equally important what 
kind of self we develop and what gives us motivation for protecting the 
environment. An appropriate worldview could ensure right actions and can 
motivate individuals to protect their environment. Of course, comparative 
environmental philosophy is one of the main sources of articulating an 
appropriate worldview. In this thesis, I will be comparing Western and Asian 
environmental philosophies in order to suggest a proper human-nature 
relationship. I consider, in particular, the common core values which are 
specified in major Asian traditions and by two influential environmental 
philosophers in the West, Arne Naess and John Passmore. Identifying the 
common core values, I argue for a new kind of self which can maintain the 
right attitude toward the environment.  
I begin with Western traditions. The worldview that Western traditions 
suggest generally conflicts with the Asian traditions. But discovering some 
common values among them would produce an integrated approach to address 
the ecological crisis we are currently facing. The Western worldview mainly 
subscribes to anthropocentric values and ends up with an ecological master 
relation to the environment. However, Western traditions also share enough 
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elements of nonanthropocentric values. One of the best examples of Western 
nonanthropocentrism is Naess’s ecosophy. I show that Naess’s ecosophy 
explores three fundamental values, identification, self-realization and 
spirituality. Passmore’s stewardship environmental philosophy, I argue, 
endorses these values as well. In addition to Passmore and Naess, three major 
Asian traditions, namely, Chinese, Indian and Japanese, also highlight these 
three basic values in their human-nature scholarship. I regard identification, 
self-realization and spirituality as common core values.  
Even though these values are commonly held, it is often noticed that 
some Asian traditions suggest adapting an ecological slave relation to the 
environment. The same is true for Naess’s account of the ecological self. In 
principle, human beings then are constrained to accept either an ecological 
master or an ecological slave relationship. Focusing on the common core 
values as a viable solution to the ecological crisis, I argue that a neighborhood 
sense of identification, self-realization and spirituality may lead us to an 
alternative option beyond anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism. This 
alternative option is a neighbor-centric relationship, an outcome of 
comparative environmental philosophy and an embedded worldview of 
indigenous people’s lifestyles in Asia and other parts of the Earth. The 
neighbor-centric environmental philosophy is a comprehensive normative 
guideline to protect ecological neighbors by maintaining one’s “neighboring 






Environmental philosophy and ethics seek to reexamine and discover some 
traditional values which are crucial to protect nature and to maintain a proper 
human-nature relationship. Each tradition has its own ecological wisdom and 
ethics, rooted in its perception of nature. Therefore, environmental philosophy 
and ethics in one tradition is different from those in other traditions. However, 
there are enough commonalities between them. For example, most traditions 
hold that human beings are unique, human beings are identified with their 
surroundings, nature is aesthetically and spiritually rich, human beings are 
dependent on the environment to fulfill their basic needs and necessities, and 
they should follow some ethical principles in using environmental resources.  
Nonetheless, uniqueness may not mean the same in different traditions. 
One tradition may place rationality as the top criterion of uniqueness, while 
the other may give priority to the capacity for realizing cosmic harmony 
through feeling empathy and sympathy for all natural elements. One tradition 
may claim that human beings are personally identified with their surroundings, 
while another may argue that they are cosmologically identified. The notion of 
cosmological identification, which refers to a single unified concept of 
community comprising both living and nonliving entities, gives rise to 
different accounts of the human-nature relation. One tradition may hold that 
nature itself is not sacred but it is the manifestation of a divine sacredness, 
while another may hold nature itself as sacred, and therefore all natural 
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elements deserve our respect and reverence. Accordingly, they may subscribe 
to different types of environmental ethics. 
Comparative environmental philosophy suggests the possibility of 
finding some common core values. Lynn White Jr. in 1967 recommends a 
rethinking of Western value “axioms”, though he did not look into Asian 
traditions for insights and inspiration. The recent focus on Asian 
environmental philosophy is welcome, but it is still limited to general 
discussions of a particular tradition, or its distinctiveness from the Western 
traditions. However, what is more important is to try to find some common 
core values so that a comprehensive environmental ethics can be proposed.  
When comparative environmental philosophers emphasize a radical 
change in self-nature metaphysics and its underlying ethics for overcoming the 
ecological crisis, they prescribe either one or the other of the two approaches: 
the ontological approach (ecosophical approach) or the normative approach 
(ethical approach). In other words, some thinkers argued that we should solve 
the ecological crisis by looking at the ecological wisdom found in different 
traditions, and gradually enlarge our ecological consciousness to a maximum 
level so that it can protect the environment. By contrast, those who are 
doubtful about ecological consciousness are only confident about applying 
established ethical principles or a combination of them. The first, an 
influential and novel approach in contemporary environmental philosophy, is 
demonstrated by Arne Naess and is known as “deep ecology”. The second is 
widely accepted and strongly defended by the prominent environmental 
philosopher John Passmore. The former suggests a deeper inquiry into values 
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and interrelationships between self and nature, while the latter relies on 
scientific data in suggesting the appropriate ethical guidelines. 
However, if we are only concerned about some ethical principles as a 
solution to global ecological crisis, we may lack ecological wisdom and hence 
the long-run aim of overcoming this problem may not be achieved. Similarly, 
if we are only concerned about ecological wisdom or ecological consciousness 
we may lack proper action-guiding principles necessary to formulate 
environmental policies and to guide individuals on how they should behave 
toward their immediate surroundings. So, one has to concentrate equally on 
ecological wisdom and ethical principles to protect the environment. How can 
that be done? Is it possible to suggest a new approach as a solution to this 
controversy? How should self relate to nature? What principle should it follow? 
I have selected particular Western and Asian figures and traditions in 
this study for their theoretical influence in addressing a rich diversity of the 
traditional values. More clearly, two major theoretical contributions to 
Western environmental philosophy and ethics are Passmore’s endorsement of 
respect for nature and Naess’s ecosophy. The former developed an 
anthropocentric position while the latter developed a nonanthropocentric 
position. Together they represent two main theories of environmental 
philosophy and ethics in the West.  
Since environmental philosophy and ethics in Asia, were embedded in 
the traditional practice and values, I focus on three major traditions, Chinese, 
Indian and Japanese. These traditions have been influential in Asian history 
and civilizations. I think selecting them as representatives of Asian traditions 
is justified, especially in presenting diverse Asian traditions in a manageable 
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way. However, I acknowledge that with more time and space, a more detailed 
analysis would have been helpful.  
What I want to do in the next six chapters is to spell out some common 
core values by comparing Western and Asian traditions. This comparison is 
important because we need to know why and how the perceptions of human-
nature relationship differ. In Western traditions, my focus will be on Naess 
and Passmore as stated before, and in the Asian context, I will focus on 
Chinese, Indian and Japanese traditions.  
I believe that beyond their several differences they suggest some 
common core values. I will carry the idea of common core values further to 
show that they actually reflect a different kind of self which I call the 
“neighboring self” and prescribe a guiding principle for a comprehensive 
environmental ethics. I argue that we should abandon Naess’s notion of the 
ecological self and adapt the “neighboring self” because it can successfully 
overcome some of the major limitations of the former. This can also provide a 
solution to the controversy mentioned earlier. So, this thesis will try to answer 
two main questions: Is it possible to find some common core values which 
could underpin a comprehensive environmental ethics? What should be the 
right attitude toward nature in the context of self-nature relationship?  
The first two chapters of my thesis analyze how the human-nature 
relation is perceived in Western traditions and in major Asian traditions. Here, 
I try to identify the fundamental values of these traditions. According to Lynn 
White, Christian theology is responsible for the ecological crisis because 
Christianity allows dominion of human beings or “rightful mastery” over 
nature and is anthropocentric. Western value axioms which are 
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anthropocentric should be replaced by an alternative Christian view, namely, 
the view of Saint Francis of Assisi. In Chapter One, I argue that White’s thesis 
has provoked two kinds of response: some philosophers reject his view that 
anthropocentrism and Christianity are the root causes of the ecological crisis. 
Others accept it and support his suggestion for a reformation of Western value 
axioms. Nonetheless, unlike White, they think that there are many alternative 
ways for this reformation, apart from a revision of Christian doctrines. One of 
these alternatives is looking into other traditions, such as Asian traditions. It 
will significantly help Western people to change their value axioms to a 
deeper level.    
My brief historical survey of Western traditions show that all major 
thinkers considered human beings at the centre of their thoughts, some even 
claim that they are the “closest” creatures to God and therefore deserve special 
value and protection over all other natural elements. Perfecting nature for the 
sake of improving human lives is necessary according to them. In fact, 
Western classical philosophers agreed that imperfect nature was a threat to 
human lives and control over nature is a positive phenomenon.  
I argue that although Western traditions are closer to the 
anthropocentric approach, nature was not ignored. Rather, nature was valued 
for its “use value” and some important criteria, such as rationality, autonomy, 
dignity and personhood, were identified to distinguish between human beings 
and other creatures. Moreover, not all Western environmental philosophers are 
anthropocentric, and some of them think that nature itself has a value apart 
from its use value. Each element in nature is connected and Homo sapiens are 
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dependent on and ecologically related with other species. Arne Naess coins 
this thought with a view of one single community. 
 I argue that Naess’s ecosophical view can prioritize some fundamental 
values. Nonanthropocentric values, such as interrelatedness, diversity, joyful 
living, are very clearly noticeable in Naess’s ecosophy. But despite these, 
there are some other fundamental values in his environmental philosophy. 
Naess explicitly said that his ecosophy T is grounded on “one ultimate norm: 
Self-realization!”. He breaks the centuries-old idea of “self-realization” by 
replacing it with a capital “S”. So, his “Self-realization” means realizing 
oneness-with-nature, rather than self-examination, self-mastery, or self-
perfection.  
Since the final goal of oneness-with-nature is to correct our attitudes, I 
argue that the norm of Self-realization does not function until self-realization 
is regarded as a fundamental value. Naess holds identification as a process by 
which the egoistic self extends and deepens into the comprehensive Self. 
Identification is valuable to gain ecological consciousness or Self. Naess’s 
ecosophy then ultimately leads to a spiritual consciousness which motivates 
awareness about interrelation or oneness-with-nature. I argue that, while 
ecological wisdom or ecological consciousness is Naess’s main concern, three 
fundamental values are evident in his account. These are: identification, self-
realization and spirituality.  
Like Naess, a lot of environmental philosophers have argued that the 
only option to overcome the ecological crisis is to adopt some 
nonanthropoectric values. But the most important person to defend other 
options within the traditional anthropocentric framework is Passmore. He 
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argues that the global ecological problem is a problem of ecology, and urges 
us to solve it with scientific invention, just as we solve any social problem by 
survey, finding cause-effect relation, and taking appropriate policy measures. 
But he suggests further that human beings have to change their current 
attitudes. I argue that Passmore is suggesting a kind of self-realization so that 
we could be aware about our role as human beings. Human beings are God’s 
deputies and therefore they cannot perfect nature without caring for it. The 
nature-human identification is not just that we are here to use natural elements 
for maximizing our own interests, but rather we have a sacred duty to care for 
them. Passmore does not think that nature itself is sacred, but it is God’s 
handiwork. He perceives human-nature relation in the light of divine 
stewardship. It means that his spirituality is quite different from the traditional 
view. He compares human beings with good artists who treat nature far 
beyond just looking and touching it. Human beings can “smell” and even 
“taste” nature through their artistic power. Nonetheless, they, as artists, are 
also obliged to “respect their materials”. Clearly then, I argue, Passmore’s 
environmental philosophy also subscribes to the three fundamental values 
noted earlier.  
However, their senses are philosophically different. Apart from 
personal and cosmological senses of identification, self-realization and 
spirituality, there is a unique sense of neighborhood belongingness that is 
clearly unfolded. I begin this interesting and new viewpoint with a brief 
discussion of the evolutionary history of our planet Earth. It is highly probable 
that our ancestors were maintaining a neighborhood relationship not only with 
their fellow humans, but also with animals and their immediate surroundings 
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for a while. I show that the neighborhood philosophy has contributed to the 
discovery of revolutionary scientific theories. Yet, little or no attention was 
given to it in environmental ethics.   
In Chapter Two, I explain some nonanthropocentric values in three 
major Asian traditions. I examine how nature and self-nature relationships 
were perceived in Chinese, Indian and Japanese traditions throughout the 
centuries. The Chinese traditions, as I show, perceive nature in relation to 
balance and harmony. They emphasize self-cultivation and invoke 
anthropocentrism. However, when the issue of human-nature relation is 
examined a huge element of cosmocentric values dominates the whole 
tradition. For example, the Chinese do not view nature as merely a 
composition of land, trees, rivers, seas, and other natural resources, but include 
all elements in between Heaven and Earth. Human beings have to consider 
themselves in relation to a greater cosmic boundary. Everywhere in nature 
there is a balance of li and chi and every action human beings perform must be 
done by maintaining that balance. Identification with the cosmic balance and 
harmony is the prior condition of sagehood. The Daoist “principle of 
naturalness” involves some crucial elements (such as spirituality) which, if 
ignored, may cause imbalance and lack of harmony. Nature is a “seamless 
whole” and human beings have to fit themselves within this spiritual 
wholeness. This is the Chinese self-nature relationship.  
Nature plays a very important role in Indian cultures and lifestyles. 
Beyond Indian mythology and Hindu theology, nature remarkably dominates 
Indian philosophical traditions. Indian philosophers believe that life and 
philosophy cannot be separated. I discuss briefly Indian religious traditions to 
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show how nature and spirituality were interwoven. Achieving Moksa 
(liberation) through bhakti (devotion), and freeing self from Avidya 
(ignorance), is the main spirit of the Indian religious tradition. Indian 
philosophical traditions discuss the relation of individual self and the Ultimate 
Reality or Universal Self from epistemological as well as ontological 
perspectives. The key point that most Indian schools concentrate on is Self-
realization. In the Indian context, the aim of Self-realization is not just to 
realize the oneness-with-nature, nor merely conceptualize the Supreme Being 
and several deities as identified with nature, but also to emphasize that 
human’s surrender and their devotion to prakrti (nature) is a must for true 
liberation.   
Another key feature of Indian traditions is turning spirituality to divine 
duty. The karma principle discourages all sorts of selfish desires and gains and 
guides its followers to a spiritual salvation of self. Gandhi’s Ahimsa 
(nonviolence) theory retains the teachings of the karma principle by 
maintaining that selfless simple lifestyle is a requirement for political and 
environmental harmony.  
The Japanese view of nature highlights the relationship of human 
beings and some other special elements, such as yama (mountains). This view 
was influenced by Shinto and Buddhist worldviews. Yet, the scientific 
worldview is not completely absent in Japanese perceptions of nature. For 
example, Kinji Imanishi offers an idea of “self-completeness” equally 
recognizable in living and nonliving things. The Japanese even believe that the 
heart can be purified when everything in nature are placed in their right ways. 
Shinto spirit kami does not just supply spiritual elements, but legitimately 
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corrects human’s behavior by identification with its brightness and uprightness. 
The Japanese monk Kukai perceives the universe as the “Indranet”, or a 
macrocosm of infinite microcosm. The view later generates a “relational 
cosmology” with aesthetic implications. 
Noticeably, the Japanese Buddhist traditions emphasize “self-
transformation” through Buddhahood or dharmakaya. The uniqueness of 
Buddhist self-transformation reveals that human beings should act 
compassionately to all sentient and non-sentient elements. Self-transformation 
ends up with bodhi (wisdom) and awareness. This awareness reflects an 
intense identification with the phenomenal world in a highly compassionate 
way. Similarly, wisdom suggests how to behave compassionately towards 
other natural elements. This chapter concludes with an internal comparison of 
Asian traditions and an evaluation of Asian worldviews.         
In Chapter Three, I compare Western and Asian traditions to show 
their differences on some basic issues, such as uniqueness of human beings, 
the importance of dividing living and nonliving elements, and sacredness of 
nature. I claim that in each case they differ in the underlying theoretical 
foundations. For example, in the case of human uniqueness, the Western 
traditions subscribe to two types of theories: the dominion theory and the 
mechanistic theory. The former suggests a hierarchical categorization whereas 
the latter was inspired by Western Enlightenment and Darwinism. Darwinism 
maintains that human beings are unique for their meaningful language 
capacity and complex brain functions. Human’s identity in the mechanistic 
theory derives from the socially constructed ego or self consciousness. By 
contrast, human uniqueness in Asian traditions mostly focuses on a virtuous 
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person, or a person with excellent moral character. In Asian philosophies, the 
concept of personhood was not identified with the individual’s autonomy, 
their ability to make rational decision, awareness about rights, liberty, and 
one’s own dignity. Rather, personhood constructed individuals’ relation with 
their families, their societal relation and ability to sacrifice their own interest. 
So, being selfless is not negative at all. Indeed, selflessness is a positive 
attitude in the Asian traditions which is contrary to the Western traditions. In 
the Western traditions, gaining self through construction and deconstruction of 
selfhood is considered crucial.    
The distinction between living and nonliving elements is important in 
the Western traditions because most Western traditions do not treat some 
natural elements as having moral standing. Human dignity is seen as 
intrinsically valuable. Asian traditions, however, do not support this view. For 
achieving personal as well as social harmony and balance, one has to include 
everything in the moral circle which exists between Heaven and Earth. 
Without paying proper respect and devotion to them liberation is not possible 
to obtain for human beings. A combination of various approaches, such as 
right-based approach, care-based approach, and a relational perspective, 
prevails in the Asian traditions.  
The issue of sacredness may be seen as some kind of special 
consciousness. Thus, sacredness in nature is not more than a kind of ecological 
consciousness according to the Western traditions. This kind of sacredness is 
fundamentally different from the religious sacredness. Asian people like to 
locate sacredness in natural elements and their cosmic powers. So, the 
ecological dependency of human beings could be seen as a means to relate 
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with the Ultimate Reality or motivation to act correctly in preserving greater 
balance and harmony.  
Despite indicating these differences, I find some core values, and 
provide a detailed analysis of them in Chapter Four. I claim that we could 
reasonably deduce identification, self-realization and spirituality as common 
core values since these are emphasized in both traditions. I also explain why 
they should be regarded as core values by proposing some criteria of core 
values. These three common core values are discussed from practical and 
theoretical perspectives because our main goal is to show that they are crucial 
for formulating effective and appropriate environmental policies. In this 
context, I review some basic environmental Declarations, such as The Earth 
Charter, to see whether these values are adopted or at least recommended. At 
the theoretical level, I consider the notion of comprehensive environmental 
ethics and its relation to the common core values. I argue that neither the 
normative approach (environmental ethics) nor the ecosophical approach 
(ontological approach) provides an appropriate solution to the ecological crisis. 
Therefore, a complete theoretical reconstruction should be taken seriously. 
In Chapter Five, I argue that an emotional attachment with our 
surroundings is crucial for a theoretical reconstruction. A place-based 
responsibility will motivate individuals to develop an ecological consciousness, 
and inspire them to live harmoniously, even by sacrificing some of their 
personal interests.  
While I agree that a notion of impartial self, such as Naess’s ecological 
self, is a novel idea in environmental philosophy, it does not provide an 
appropriate solution to the global ecological crisis. I develop three types of 
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criticism in this regard. Firstly, there is no unified consensus about what the 
ecological self really means. For instance, Freya Mathews develops an 
ecological self based on physics and says that the cosmos “qualifies for 
selfhood”. But it seems Naess is not interested in a cosmic selfhood. Instead, 
he wants to enlarge our feelings and identification with nature at the cosmic 
level so that the isolation between us and nature could be removed. Another 
deep ecologist, Warwick Fox, outlines a different ecological self. He thinks 
that the ecological self mainly manifests “impartiality” rather than cosmic 
selfhood. So, he discards all kinds of personal relationships between nature 
and human beings as preconditions for an ecological self. He even moves 
further to claim that we should reject the notion of ecological self because it 
does not represent the idea that Naess originally invoked in his deep ecological 
philosophy. However, Fox does not accurately capture Naess’s notion of 
ecological self. I show that the whole idea of ecological self has not been 
constructed correctly. This is because Naess very often mixed-up several ideas 
rooted in Western and Asian thoughts without considering their traditional 
contexts.  
Secondly, Naess maintains a balance between emotion and intuition in 
his idea of identification. But when he develops the ecological self he 
suddenly moves toward intuition and rejects emotion. He gives examples from 
his own country where emotional attachment with the place is highlighted. 
Nonetheless, he removes all sorts of emotion when he claims that empathy and 
sympathy are not the basic issues for the ecological self. Naess believes that 
the widened and deepened ecological consciousness is enough to feel that if 
we harm the Arctic penguins we actually harm ourselves. This is not because 
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of emotional attachment with the penguins, but because penguins are parts of 
ourselves. However, I believe that our emotional bonding with the place is 
very crucial. It also shows, as Val Plumwood argues, that we are distinct from 
nature but at the same time we are attached to nature.  
Thirdly, the ecological self does not have enough motivational power 
to inspire people to behave in a responsible way toward nature. This is because 
of its lacking a proper action-guiding moral principle and maintaining a highly 
abstract relationship, extremely difficult for ordinary people to grasp. It 
requires another higher faculty, usually found in saints, philosophers, poets, 
and artists. But environmental ethics is for ordinary people who have to deal 
with nature for various purposes in their daily lives. If we want to overcome 
the ecological crisis they should be our focus, not the people with extreme 
imaginative powers.  
Finally, by articulating my own concept of “neighboring self”, a new 
version of ecological ontology is developed in Chapter Six. The neighboring 
self, I argue, is an outcome of comparative analysis of Western and Asian 
environmental philosophies. In other words, the neighboring self is reflected in 
the Western as well as Asian traditions. The neighbor-centric approach 
proposes a guiding principle of comprehensive environmental ethics, the 
Protection Principle. Its specialty may be pointed out as place sensitive, 
intimate, emotional, but at the same time it acknowledges that humans and 
nature have their particular status. A person and his or her neighbors are 
locally-emotionally attached, but they maintain a relationship which does not 
require self surrendering, or dominating each other. 
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I show that the arguments against the neighbor-centric approach for its 
local orientation are not persuasive. In other words, those who argue that a 
local concept is ineffective to solve a global problem, such as the ecological 
crisis, are simply wrong for two reasons. Firstly, their claim cannot be 
supported from evolutionary biology which shows that our ancestors 
maintained a neighboring relation with their surroundings. The Earth at that 
time was environmentally clean, balanced and sound. Secondly, they ignore or 
missed the example of indigenous peoples’ lifestyles where a simple 
metaphysics is followed, that is, the neighbor-centric metaphysics.  
So, I propose to adapt a neighboring self as a viable solution to the 
ecological crisis. The neighboring self holds identification-as-neighborhood, 
neighborhood self-realization and neighborhood spirituality as the most 
appropriate dimensions of common core values, and neither subscribes to a 
dominating worldview nor to a cosmological worldview. It may overcome 
some of the major limitations of the ecological self and fill the action-
guidingness gap in the ecosophical approach, and provide ecological wisdom 
for the normative approach. It may also open an alternative avenue to view 
nature beyond anthropocentric or nonanthropocentric perspectives if 










ENVIRONMENT IN WESTERN TRADITIONS: 




Environmental ethics emerged in the West in 1970s by challenging its 
centuries old philosophical and ethical traditions which was all about 
“humans”. The twentieth century was, thus, the time of reasking and 
rethinking about the value of nonhuman beings, and also relocating values 
which are crucial in the human-nature relationship. A common consensus is 
that the Western traditions misdirected our attitudes toward the environment. 
The ecological crisis, one of the most serious problems currently, is the result 
of misperceived values. However, the ecological crisis opens an opportunity 
for Western philosophers to reconsider environmental values, and to examine 
whether Western traditions are narrow and overspecialized.  
 In 1967, an insightful historical study was conducted by Lynn White Jr. 
where he reviewed most of these questions. His landmark work was published 
in the Science journal and cited widely. His view was criticized as well as 
appreciated. In his paper, White discussed the historical development of 
present civilization and argued that Western science, technology, and 
Christian theology, were the main determining factors. The thesis set forth by 
him is that human dominance over nature lies at the heart of the ecological 
crisis. In other words, human being’s alienation from nature developed a 
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dominant worldview long ago. This dominant worldview, according to White, 
has two different roots: religion, namely Christianity, and the fusion of 
scientific knowledge and technological power.  
These two roots have changed the human-nature relation at the 
medieval age which started at the 7th century. As White puts it, “Formerly man 
had been part of nature; now he was the exploiter of nature”1. The Judeo-
Christian theology, in spite of the creation myth, declares, “...God had created 
Adam...Man named all the animals, thus establishing his dominance over 
them”2. So, the fundamental ground of human’s dominance was Christian 
belief or Christian theology according to White. Human’s approach to nature, 
however, was based on the Baconian axiom, “scientific knowledge means 
technological power over nature”3.    
 White argues that the West traditionally has inherited an erroneous 
human-nature relation whose basic axiom was that human beings are the 
master of nature. This basic axiom allows them to exploit nature for their own 
purposes, treating nature merely as a means to human progress. According to 
White, this anthropocentric value oriented human-nature relation has sparked 
off a great challenge for humankind. However, many environmental 
philosophers do not think that anthropocentrism, and Western traditions as a 
whole, is absolutely problematic. They even asked whether White was fair to 
Western traditions.   
 For example, John Passmore, one of the founding fathers of 
environmental ethics, argues that Western traditions are extremely innovative, 
                                                 
1 Lynn White, Jr., “The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis”, in The Palgrave 
Environmental Reader, ed. Daniel G. Payne and Richard S. Newman (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005), 180.  
2 Ibid., 180. 
3 Ibid., 177. 
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rich, and capable of solving the ecological crisis in their own terms. He 
believes that the West does not need to borrow values from other traditions. 
Instead, finding more options within its own traditions is sufficient. In 
opposition to White, he noticed that science and technology have made 
Western traditions more problem-solving and resourceful. The roots of the 
ecological crisis, according to Passmore, are neither Christianity nor science 
and technology, nor are they anthropocentric values. Rather, they are to be 
found in our short-sightedness. Passmore takes the challenge of Western 
anthropocentric value theory more seriously and runs with it.    
 However, like White, Arne Naess, the most influential environmental 
philosopher of the 20th century, finds the Western perception of the human-
nature relationship extremely problematic. Instead of dominance, he wants to 
maintain a symbiotic relation between human beings and natural elements. 
Naess gets inspiration from ecology, a holistic science, and calls for a 
fundamental change in our lifestyles. He appreciates White’s suggestion to 
“rethink our axioms” and to find a “new set of basic values” to overcome the 
ecological crisis. However, Naess does not seem to believe that there exist a 
close link between Christianity in particular and anthropocentric values. 
Moreover, unlike White, he does not think an alternative Christian view might 
be sufficient to get rid of the ecological crisis. According to him, an ecosophy 
or ecological wisdom is needed to change our shallow ecology and to replace 
it with a deep ecological attitude.   
 So, there are some important questions which need to be addressed: 
What are the anthropocentric environmental values? How are Naess’s and 
Passmore’s values different? Are they arguing for conflicting values? How 
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would Naess and Passmore respond to human uniqueness? Is it possible to 
perceive the environment from a different perspective? These are the questions 
we will deal with in this chapter.                   
 
I. ANTHROPOCENTRIC ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES 
 
According to the Dictionary of World Philosophy, value “denotes the worth of 
something”4. That is, value indicates the “worth” of an object, entity, or a 
system.  How do we measure this worth? In particular, how do we measure the 
worth of the environment? One could measure the value of the environment by 
the amount of utility we get from it. In other words, we can value the 
environment as the source of firewood, furniture, houses, crops, cars, 
ornaments, energy supply, cosmetics, leather goods, and for other means. In 
this case, the environment is valued instrumentally or economically, i.e. the 
environment is a means or instrument to get certain ends (such as utility, 
pleasure, and satisfaction). 
However, one could also value the environment for some other reasons, 
such as inspiration, wonder, contemplation, meditation, learning, aesthetic 
feeling, feeling interconnectedness, realizing the Creator’s art, and much more. 
Human beings may not be the only valuable things, rather, there are other 
equally valuable natural elements. It is therefore possible to maintain that the 
environment is not necessarily a mere means to the fulfillment of human ends. 
One can also value the environment noninstrumentally or noneconomically.      
                                                 
4 A. Pablo Iannone, Dictionary of World Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2001), 539. 
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Thus, when human beings value themselves as superior to the 
environment, and they treat the environment as merely serving human 
purposes, then they have what may be called anthropocentric environmental 
values. By contrast, when human beings value themselves equally with other 
natural elements, and regard themselves as a part of nature, which has an 
intrinsic value, then they subscribe to what may be called nonanthropocentric 
environmental values.   
There are plenty of examples in the history of Western philosophy 
where famous philosophers argued for anthropocentric environmental values. 
For instance, the influential medieval philosopher, Thomas Aquinas, observed 
natural order hierarchically, with God at the top, human beings occupying a 
middle position, and all other creatures, including animals, at the bottom. 
Human beings occupied the highest position in nature since God has given 
them a special quality, i.e. rationality, and bestows on them intrinsic value. 
God has permitted human beings to exercise their rational power in order to 
dominate other creatures, just as God exercises His power on them, as Aquinas 
maintained. In this sense, the natural surroundings of human beings are not 
more than “slaves”.  Aquinas writes,  
Therefore every other creature is naturally under slavery; the 
intellectual nature alone is free...Accordingly divine 
providence makes provision for the intellectual creature for 
its own sake, but for other creatures for the sake of the 
intellectual creature.5  
 
In this statement, we see that the rank for human beings is the highest 
among all creatures in nature, and therefore, their wants, satisfaction, 
happiness, and needs, should get highest priority over other creatures. John 
                                                 
5 Thomas Aquinas, “Humans as Moral Ends”, in Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions, ed. 
David R. Keller (West Sussex: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2010), 63. 
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Locke has established this hierarchical chain and articulated nature simply as 
human’s property. The only value he granted to nature is its “use-value”. 
Similarly, Fransis Bacon described nature as artificial, where physical and 
mathematical laws are applicable. He writes, “And inquiries into nature have 
the best result when they begin with physics and end in mathematics”6. Bacon 
wanted to show that the laws of physics can reasonably be extendable to 
nature. He thinks that human knowledge generates power to command over 
nature, and recommends, “Thus we should consider, for the purpose of 
generating and superinducing any nature on a given body, what precept, 
direction, or procedure someone would most wish for”7. 
Rene Descartes, the most cited anthropocentric philosopher, maintains 
that in the Earth every element has been created by two basic substances, mind 
and body. The difference between human beings and all other natural elements 
is that the latter lacks a mind which is the fundamental criterion of moral 
consideration, according to Descartes. While he is aware that trees, plants, and 
animals, can move, grow, and even, in the case of animals, have sensation like 
human beings, they do not qualify for moral consideration because they lack 
the thinking capacity, “It is much more wonderful that a mind should be found 
in every human body than that one should be lacking in every animal”8. In 
opposition to Aristotle, who observed the Earth according to a principle of 
integration, Descartes supports Baconian mechanical views. Wee illustrates 
Descartes’s position more vividly,  
                                                 
6 Francis Bacon, “The Mastery of Nature”, in Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions, ed. 
David R. Keller (West Sussex: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2010), 68. 
7 Francis Bacon, “The Second Book of Aphorisms Concerning the Interpretation of Nature, Or 
the Kingdom of Man”, in The Instauratio Magna Part II: Novum Organum and Asssociated 
Texts, eds. Graham Rees and Maria Wakely (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 203. 
8 Rene Descartes, “Nonhumans as Machines”, in Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions, ed. 
David R. Keller (West Sussex: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2010), 71. 
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In contrast, Descartes was a supporter of the scientific 
revolution that replaced Aristotle’s views with a conception 
of nature as wholly mechanical in character. Thus, the 
external world reintroduced in his Meditations consists of 
“dead” matter whose behavior can be understood by 
reference to a set of mathematical laws.9    
 
In sum, since the natural elements do not have rationality—the essence of 
mind, Descartes argued that the Earthly elements, such as animals, are nothing 
but “machines”, or “brutes”.  
So, Descartes’s view not only allows mastery over nature but also 
encourages using nature for human purposes and satisfaction. Indeed, one of 
the Descartes’s famous statements is: “...we could use this knowledge—as the 
artisans use theirs—for all the purposes for which it is appropriate, and thus 
make ourselves, as it were, the lords and masters of nature.”10  
Nonetheless, it should be worth noting that in opposition to this 
standard interpretation an alternative interpretation was offered by Wee where 
she evidently argues that Descartes does not necessarily subscribe to the 
“Dominion theory” because human being’s privileged position is not God-
gifted but “self-ascribed”11 . Although this self-ascribed interpretation is a 
refined representation of Descartes’s view it also shares the anthropocentric 
ingredients.     
John Locke considered nature as merely an economic resource for 
human beings and defends property rights by his labor theory: “God and his 
                                                 
9 Cecilia Wee, “Descartes, Rene”, in Encyclopedia of Environmental Ethics and Philosophy, 
vol.1, ed. J. Baird Callicott and Robert Frodeman (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2009), 
213. 
10 Rene Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes vol.1, trans. John Cottingham, 
Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 142, 
quoted in Cecilia Wee, “Cartesian Environmental Ethics”, Environmental Ethics 23, no. 3 
(2001): 276. 
11 Cecilia Wee, “Cartesian Environmental Ethics”, Environmental Ethics 23, no. 3 (2001): 279. 
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reason commanded him to subdue the earth—i.e., improve it for the benefit of 
life and therein lay out something upon it that was his own, his labour”12.  
The great classical utilitarian, John Stuart Mill, advocates mastery over 
nature according to human needs and necessities.  Unlike Kant, who 
considered “humanity” as the end of human beings, Mill thinks that for a 
moral being promoting “happiness” is the end. In a famous statement Mill 
clearly says,  
The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, 
or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are 
right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong 
as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.13  
 
Obviously, Mill takes into account the happiness of human beings. But by 
distinguishing between higher and lower quality of pleasures he has given 
priority to the higher pleasures and introduces the concept of quality of 
happiness.   
According to Mill, we could refer to “nature” in two different senses. 
In the first sense, nature is “the aggregate of the powers and properties of all 
things”, while in the second sense, “Nature stands for that which takes place 
without human intervention”14. The former sense states that nature is simply 
the sum total of everything, including facts and possibilities, which happen or 
will happened. In other words, nature is not supernatural, but rather the sum 
total of natural things. The latter sense states that nature is as it is, without 
human interruption. Put differently, nature is not artificially created, whatever 
                                                 
12 John Locke, “Nature as Economic Resource”, in Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions, 
ed. David R. Keller (West Sussex: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2010), 79. 
13 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, in The Basic Writings of John Stuart Mill: On Liberty, The 
Subjection of Women, and Utilitarianism, ed. F.B. Schneewind and Dale E. Miller (New York: 
The Modern Library, 2002), 239. 
14 John Stuart Mill, “Nature”, in Three Essays on Religion: Nature, The Utility of Religion, 
and Theism (London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1874), 5, 19. 
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we see in nature is created without our interventions. Neither sense provides a 
standard for evaluating human conduct. The first sense, according to Mill, is 
“unmeaning” because, except for unconditional surrender to nature, “man has 
no power to do anything else”15. Similarly, the second sense is “irrational and 
immoral” since all human actions in order to improve nature would be 
unjustified in this sense. So, Mill rejects both of these views and argues that 
nature never provides a moral standard for guiding our conduct.   
Mill observes nature as “gigantic power” that exists imperfectly, and 
should be made perfect by human intelligence. Human civilization cannot 
progress by following nature, but by perfecting and improving nature. Nature 
should be “dispraised” if human beings want to clear up their ignorance and 
wonder regarding it. Following nature cannot improve human conduct as well 
since, nature itself is destructive in Mill’s view. He argues that nature’s 
imperfection is a threat to human lives, and taking nature as a moral guide 
would be irrational to them. In short, Mill regards following nature an obstacle 
to the improvement of human condition and civilization. So, he suggests an 
attitude of correcting nature and not following it. In Mill’s words, “All praise 
of Civilization, or Art, or Contrivance, is so much dispraise of nature; an 
admission of imperfection, which it is man’s business, and merit, to be always 
endeavouring to correct or mitigate”16.  
Mill’s statement shows that he would permit any activity to improve 
nature as long as that activity would maximize Utility or human happiness. 
However, his aim was not to devalue nature but to praise human intelligence. 
He remarkably expanded the moral circle to other sentient beings since, he 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 64. 
16 Ibid., 21. 
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says, “the good of human or other sentient beings”17. Human beings should 
consider the good of other sentient beings in order to achieve greater 
happiness.  
Finally, Immanuel Kant, the prime defender of humanity, maintains 
that there is a “unity” or “system” in nature which is governed according to the 
empirical laws. Empirical laws are scientific laws understandable by reason. 
The understanding of empirical laws helps us to discover the natural system 
and to manage it harmoniously.  Kant says, “...it is quite conceivable that the 
specific variety of the empirical laws of nature with their effects might still be 
so great as to make it impossible for our intellect to discover an intelligible 
order in nature; to divide its products into genera and species...” 18 . It is 
important to note that Kant emphasizes the understanding of intelligible 
ordering in nature, not just the order itself. Reason according to Kant made 
this understanding possible as he says,  
Reason never relates directly to an object, but solely to the 
understanding and by means of it to reason’s own empirical 
use, hence it does not create any concepts (of objects) but 
only orders them and gives them that unity...Thus reason 
really has as object only the understanding and its purposive 
application.19    
    
According to Kant, the purpose or the ultimate end of human beings is 
humanity. Like other major philosophers, Kant also believes that human 
beings are intrinsically valuable. However, his argument is distinct from theirs 
in that he believes only human beings are able to construct “a concept of ends”, 
and “a system of ends” based on scientific understanding of nature. The 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 65. 
18 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment in Basic Writings of Kant, ed. Allen W. Wood (New 
York: The Modern Library, 2001), 285.  
19 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, (A643-4/B671-2), quoted in Paul Guyer, Kant’s 
System of Nature and Freedom: Selected Essays (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 
61. 
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question is, therefore, what is the end purpose of natural elements? Kant 
himself asks this question and replies without any hesitation,  
What is the end and purpose of these and all the preceding 
natural kingdoms? Man, we say, and the multifarious uses to 
which his intelligence teaches him to put all these forms of 
life. He is the ultimate end of creation here upon earth, 
because he is the one and only being upon it that is able to 
form a concept of ends, and from an aggregate of things 
purposively fashioned is able to construct by the aid of his 
reason a system of ends.20    
 
From this statement, we see that Kant would permit any natural 
element to be used for human needs and satisfaction as long as the act is 
performed according to human intelligence and reason. Kant ascribes an 
indirect duty to the animal kingdom: 
Animals are not self-conscious and are there merely as a 
means to an end. That end is man. We can ask, ‘Why do 
animals exist?’ But to ask, ‘Why does man exist?’ is a 
meaningless question. Our duties towards animals are 
merely indirect duties towards humanity.21  
 
Since the unity and system in nature is maintained by empirical laws, using 
nature in accordance with science can be seen a recommendation from Kant 
for better understanding of nature.  
However, beyond this scientific value, Kant holds that nature also has 
an aesthetic value. The aesthetic value depends on the “feeling” of human 
beings and comprises a “positive component”. The positive component was 
illustrated by Budd in this way: “The positive component is a feeling of 
elevation in judging our own worth, a feeling of our supremacy over the 
natural world, the compensatory realization ...a value, infinitely superior to 
                                                 
20 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, in Basic Writings of Kant, ed. Allen W. Wood (New 
York: The Modern Library, 2001), 347. 
21 Immanuel Kant, “Indirect Duties to Nonhumans”, in Environmental Ethics: The Big 
Questions, ed. David R. Keller (West Sussex: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2010), 82. 
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that of nature”22. Although Kant’s view suggests that we should consider all 
natural elements as merely instrumentally valuable, and human beings as 
intrinsically valuable, some recent Kantians argued that we must consider a 
few more issues apart from reason. Brown’s important statement might be 
worth mentioning here, “Rational nature, on his account, entails not only the 
capacity for reason, but also the capacity for principled action, as well as the 
capacity to make practical choices in a way that is completely independent of 
all natural causes”23. The point I would like to mention in this context is that 
understanding nature in accordance with empirical laws would confer 
superiority on human beings over nature since other animals lack it in Kant’s 
sense. 
From the above discussion, we could say that almost all major classical 
thinkers in Western traditions considered human beings at the centre of their 
thoughts. Some of them have gone further by thinking that human beings are 
the “closest” creatures to God and so they are the master of the universe. To 
them, nature, like a machine, functions for human beings. The Western 
philosophers may not under-value nature since they all admit that human 
beings have to depend on nature for various purposes. The value they ascribe 
to nature is its “use-value”. Sometimes nature was seen by them as a barrier or 
obstacle to social progress. Most of their recommendations are to using or 
perfecting nature for the development of human knowledge and for the 
improvement of human lives. Imperfect nature, in their view, is not only 
                                                 
22 Malcolm Budd, “The Sublime in Nature”, in Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment: 
Critical Essays, ed. Paul Guyer (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), 132-133. 
23 Christopher A. Brown, “Kantianism and Mere Means”, Environmental Ethics 32, no. 3 
(2010): 275. 
 28
dangerous for human beings, but also a threat for other animals. So, control 
over nature was regarded as a positive phenomenon.     
As noted earlier, human’s rationality, or rationality with respect to 
seeking the best means to one’s ends, plays a vital role in conceptions of 
nature. After Locke, other theorists, political leaders, and economists were 
inspired to deal with the notion of property ownership. Later, the economists 
focused on the economic value of nature. Accordingly, the anthropocentric 
value theory appeared and justified “...the view in which nonhuman nature is 
valued primarily for its satisfaction of human preferences and/or contribution 
to broader human values and interests”24. 
Western traditions often stress anthropocentric environmental values 
which mainly consider the interests of human beings, or see them at the top of 
a value pyramid, and hold that human beings are intrinsically valuable for 
their capability of rational behavior. Other natural elements are treated as 
instruments, or simply means to human ends. However, we must keep in mind 
that not all environmental philosophers agreed that anthropocentric value 
theory necessarily undermines other species in nature, or endorse the 
destruction of nature. In fact, anthropocentric environmental values recognize 
some important phenomena as vital to distinguishing between human and 
nonhumans. For example, human uniqueness.       
While many classical environmental ethicists and philosophers 
contributed to the battle of intrinsic and instrumental value of natural elements, 
contemporary philosophers seem to turn their attention to the worldviews of 
various cultures and traditions as a way out from this building block. They are 
                                                 
24 Ben A. Minteer, “Anthropocentrism”, in Encyclopedia of Environmental Ethics and 
Philosophy, vol. 1, ed. J. Baird Callicott and Robert Frodeman (Detroit: Macmillan Reference 
USA, 2009), 59. 
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now more interested in examining various life-styles, cultural festivals, 
religious rituals, and traditional customs, in different parts of the Earth where 
human beings clearly value natural elements. For example, indigenous people 
worldwide maintain a kinship relation with nature. Arne Naess is the most 
prominent among these philosophers who develop a deep ecosophy. 
 
II. VALUES IN NAESS’S ECOSOPHY 
 
Arne Naess, who first introduced the term “deep ecology”, argues that we 
have to change our present value theory and lifestyles, and expand some 
fundamental ideas (e.g. community). With George Sessions he has outlined a 
deep ecological platform as a basis of the deep ecological movement. The 
philosophy of the deep ecological movement is “ecosophy”, or “ecowisdom”. 
Naess maintains,  
By an ecosophy I mean a philosophy of ecological harmony 
or equilibrium. A philosophy is a kind of sophia wisdom, is 
openly normative, it contains both norms, rules, postulates, 
value priority announcements and hypotheses concerning the 
state of affairs in our universe.25 
  
Notice that Naess’s ecosophy prioritizes some fundamental values. What are 
these values? 
 Naess is obviously arguing for some nonanthropocentric values. 
Perhaps, deep ecological values would be well-being, flourishing, diversity, 
richness of wilderness, and joyful living. Naess would value diversity or 
wilderness at the cost of reducing economic progress. So, initially diversity or 
wilderness could be the first value. 
                                                 
25 Arne Naess, “The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movements: A Summary”, 
in Deep Ecology for the Twenty-First Century, ed. George Sessions (Boston: Shambhala 
Publications, 1995), 155. 
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 Naess’s nonanthropocentric ideas incorporated deep ecology, not 
shallow ecology, a distinction Naess himself has made. The shallow ecology 
has the central aim to save “people”, and fight against “pollution and resource 
depletion”. Its goal is to save human beings by reducing or controlling 
environmental pollution. The Earth, for shallow ecologists, is a resource. In 
contrast, the deep ecology has the central aim to save all elements in the 
biosphere, and it rejects “man-in-environment” image. It favors an image of 
“relational, total-field”. All elements (human and nonhuman) in this Earth are 
intrinsically related, which means without this relation they are “no longer the 
same thing”. So, interrelatedness or interconnectedness could be another value 
in Naess’s deep ecology. 
 There are some other values, such as respect for all life forms. Naess 
writes, “To the ecological field-worker, the equal right to live and blossom is 
an intuitively clear and obvious value axiom”26. In another place he writes, 
“...but the “hanging together of everything” is nevertheless experienced and 
conceived of as a positive value”27. A closely connected value with our daily 
lives, but quite different from “Newtonian and mechanistic” experience, can 
also be traced. He notes, “Many supporters of the Deep Ecology movement, 
however, are inspired by ways of experiencing reality which clash with this 
dominant way of conceiving reality”28. 
 However, Naess’s ecosophy basically contains only one norm and sets 
forth some priority values beyond those just indicated. He separates norms 
from values by saying “Norms are in general derived from other norms and 
                                                 
26 Ibid., 152. 
27 Arne Naess, “Ecosophy and Gestalt Ontology”, in Deep Ecology for the Twenty-First 
Century, ed. George Sessions (Boston: Shambhala Publications, 1995), 240. 
28 Ibid., 244. 
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hypotheses, rarely only from others norms”29. On the other hand, he integrates 
values by saying “Values are linked together: one thing is good for another 
which in turn is good for a third thing”30. So, Naess deduces that there might 
be some priority values but there should be only one basic norm. Any other 
auxiliary norms are derivable from this basic norm. Of course, the basic norm 
would develop one of the fundamental values or priority values. Yet, no one 
has outlined or specified the fundamental values in Naess’s ecosophical 
thinking and I would like to do so. We will see that the values we have pointed 
out “linked together” with Naess’s fundamental values.  
Naess called his own ecosophy “ecosophy T” and writes, “Ecosophy T 
has only one ultimate norm: “Self-realization”!” 31  So, it is clear that the 
ultimate or basic norm is “Self-realization”. But his notion of “Self-
realization” has a completely different meaning and implication from the 
traditional notion we find from Socrates to Holmes Rolston III.   
I do not use this expression in any narrow, individualistic 
sense. I want to give it an expanded meaning based on the 
distinction between a large comprehensive Self and narrow 
egoistic self as conceived of in certain Eastern traditions of 
atman. 32 
 
Thus, Naess breaks the centuries old idea “self-realization” by replacing it 
with a capital “S”.  
 Not only does Naess borrow the term “Self” from the East and replace 
it in the Western philosophical traditions without considering its Eastern 
cultural context and implication, but he also believes that the egoistic self can 
                                                 
29 Arne Naess, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy, trans. and rev. 
David Rothenberg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 43. 
30 Ibid., 40. 
31 Arne Naess, “The Deep Ecological Movement: Some Philosophical Aspects”, in Deep 
Ecology for the Twenty-First Century, ed. George Sessions (Boston: Shambhala Publications, 
1995), 80. 
32 Ibid., 80. 
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be enlarged, widened, broadened, through a particular process called 
“maximization”. In his words,  
This large comprehensive Self (with a capital “S”) embraces 
all the life forms on the planet (and elsewhere?) together 
with their individual selves (jivas). If I were to express this 
ultimate norm in a few words, I would say: Maximize (long-
range, universal) Self-realization!33  
 
 It might be note worthy that Naess changes “self” but kept 
“realization” as it is in the phrase “self-realization”. Does the term 
“realization” have the same meaning in the West and the East? More precisely, 
does self-realization have the same meaning in both traditions? We will deal 
with these questions later. We should consider first how self-realization is to 
be maximized? What is the process from self to “Self”? 
Naess clearly states the process of gaining Self-realization. He says,  
By identifying with greater wholes, we partake in the 
creation and maintenance of this whole. We thereby share in 
its greatness...egos develop into selves of greater and greater 
dimension, proportional to the extent and depth of our 
processes of identification.34 
  
Hence, identification is the process by which the egoistic self extends and 
deepens into the comprehensive Self. Identification with nature can inspire us 
to find nature intrinsically valuable.  
Certainly, by devaluing identification none can achieve the ultimate 
goal of Self-realization. Identification creates the foundation of Self-
realization. Identification is worthy, valuable as there is no alternative way to 
maximize self, to participate in the ecophilosophical feeling, to realize 
diversity and interdependence, and to perceive nature as intrinsically valuable. 
                                                 
33 Ibid., 80. 
34 Arne Naess, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy, trans. and rev. 
David Rothenberg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 173-174. 
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So, identification must be the first fundamental value in Naess’s ecosophy. Let 
me illustrate this value in more detail.   
Identification is the first step to gain ecological consciousness. 
Through the process of identification, the immature self or egoistic self 
becomes the ecological self or ecologically conscious self. Identification 
implies a feeling, a deep attachment, diminishing of narrow ego. It is a process 
of widening feelings toward the nonhuman world and narrowing alienation. 
Naess defines identification as “...a spontaneous, non-rational, but not 
irrational, process through which the interest or interests of another being are 
reacted to as our own interest or interests”35.  
According to Naess, identification is spontaneous since we want to be 
identified to gain something immaterially valuable. We feel the urge to share 
other beings’ interests as our own interests. Alienation is seen as a burden on 
us. The more identification, the more achievements. Although the motivational 
force behind such spontaneous identification was not clearly mentioned by 
Naess, he seems to emphasize the emotional side of identification.  
Identification is rather non-rational than irrational. For example, if a fly 
sits on the dustbin and takes its food we cannot try to do so because we are 
different, though we might have the same interest to eat our food. By 
identifying with it we could feel its pain or hunger but cannot do the same 
thing as it does. Put differently, when we identify with the fly it is not required 
that we sit on the dustbin and eat the same food in the same way the fly does. 
The reason is that our rationality, food types, body structure, social and 
existing moral norms will not permit us to do so. But what is required from us 
                                                 
35 Arne Naess, “Identification as a Source of Deep Ecological Attitudes”, in Radical 
Environmentalism: Philosophy and Tactics, ed. Peter C. List (California: Wadsworth 
Publishing Company, 1993), 29. 
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is the feeling of commonalities between us and the fly. So, identification is 
non-rational, instead of irrational. Now, what makes identification a value 
rather than a norm might be evident from Naess’s own writings.   
According to Naess, norms are “prescriptions or inducements to think 
or act in certain ways”36. But later he says this definition is “rigid” and 
proposes that norms generally provide “tentative guidelines”. In Naess’s 
theory at least identification cannot be a norm since his only norm is Self-
realization which prescribes deep ecological action. Perhaps, identification is a 
value by which we can achieve Self-realization. Identification does not 
prescribe any particular act. We have just seen that identification could be 
“non-rational”. If identification is “non-rational” then it cannot be a norm. The 
reason is that a norm provides “prescriptions” or at least “tentative guidelines” 
which identification does not fulfill.  
Naess considered identification in at least three ways 37  : 1. 
Identification is “the basic tool” of maturity (widening and deepening) of the 
self, 2. Identification is a “source of active participation” in the natural 
diversity and interdependence, and 3. Identification is a “source of belief in 
intrinsic values”. Naess writes, “The process of identification is the 
prerequisite for feeling the lack of greatness, equanimity in one’s empirical 
self. One ‘sees oneself in the other’ ”38.  These senses are positive as well as 
negative. In the positive sense, identification is the “sharing” of greatness, 
wholeness, interdependence, by spontaneity and internalization. In the 
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negative sense, it is a decrease in our narrow egos or alienation with 
nonhuman beings.   
The standard example of identification is illustrated by Naess’s 
reaction when he saw a dying flea that had suddenly jumped into the acid 
chemicals. Though he was not able to save the flea from dying, he felt deeply 
its painful suffering. Naess felt that this suffering was for him “a painful sense 
of compassion and empathy”39. Hence, psychologically Naess realized the 
similar pain of death and felt deep compassion and empathy by identifying 
with the flea. Identification involves not alienating from others. 
Sessions, the co-founder of the deep ecology movement, illustrates 
identification and its value as follows:  
...human individuals attain personal self-realization, and 
psychological/emotional maturity when they progress from 
an identification with narrow ego, through identification 
with other humans, to a more all-encompassing 
identification of their “self” with nonhuman individuals, 
species, ecosystems, and with the ecosphere itself. This 
process of “wide identification” Naess takes to be a process 
of the development of the “ecological self”.40 
   
Like Naess, Sessions believes that identification plays a crucial role, 
provide a basis, and a move toward self-realization. Human beings, though 
egoistic, can make progress by identification which would reduce their narrow 
egoism. According to this statement, the first stage identification starts from 
human-human relationship, aims at psychological or emotional maturity. But 
in the successive stages, human beings must identify themselves with 
nonhumans, other species, ecosystems, and finally, with the whole ecosphere. 
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So, there is a gradual development in the identification process. Only in the 
final stage, when the individual reaches the highest degree of identification, 
can he or she gain wholeness, totality, and unity. In Naess’s words, “From the 
identification process stems unity, and since the unity is of a gestalt character, 
the wholeness is attained”41.   
However, some worries are: When can one be sure that his or her 
“self” has attained unity or wholeness? How does he or she realize and 
recognize it in him or herself? These are, I believe, the most puzzling and vital 
questions which raise many criticisms against deep ecology. Initially, the 
answer is: when “we see ourselves in others”. But what does this see mean 
here? One can deduce two options from Naess’s texts.  
Firstly, “see” means we can internalize other’s sorrows, pains, 
sufferings, empathically. We could place ourselves in other’s situation and 
share the same feeling with empathy. Most animal rights movements argue for 
animal liberation based on the empathic feeling of animal sufferings. Naess 
himself says in his standard example of identification that what he felt for the 
dying flea was a painful “compassion and empathy”. The empathic 
identification is also recognizable in some religions (especially Buddhism and 
Hinduism), and some Asian cultures. However, Naess immediately rules out 
empathy and says, “But the empathy was not basic, rather it was a process of 
identification: that “I saw myself in the flea””42. So, he includes empathy as 
one of the components rather than the end of identification. But there are 
several overlaps in his ecosophy regarding this view.  
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42 Arne Naess, “Self-realization: An Ecological Approach to Being in the World”, in Deep 
Ecology for the Twenty-First Century, ed. George Sessions (Boston: Shambhala Publications, 
1995), 227. 
 37
Secondly, we can “see” ourselves in others in the sense that we human 
beings and nonhuman beings belong to one community. We are united, 
indivisible, and inseparable. There is an amazing “unity” which can be 
realized by identification. Without identification this unity cannot be 
discovered. We are just the different forms of a united community. We share a 
sense of solidarity or fellow feelings for each other. Thus the foundation of 
this ecological unity, in Naess’s word, is equality or equanimity. “All life 
forms are fundamentally one”, Naess says.  
 
III. DETERMINING SOME OTHER MAIN VALUES 
 
Two famous deep ecologists, Devall and Sessions, perceive Self-
realization “...as the realization of “self-in-Self” where “Self” stands for 
organic wholeness” 43 . Our earlier discussion shows that Naess’s Self-
realization aims to attain a special type of development, what he and other 
deep ecologists called “full mature personhood and uniqueness”. Traditionally, 
self-realization refers to some improvements in human personality. In other 
words, human beings can improve their behavior, passion, uniqueness, by 
controlling their emotions or sensory activities. Self-realization was seen as 
synonymous with self-examination, self-mastery, and self-controlling. But 
Naess believes that this conception only considers “individual salvation”, or 
how a human being as a person can develop his or her own personhood. This 
sounds “narrow” to Naess, and separates or dislocates a human being from his 
or her bigger community. The small self-realization thus can be seen as a way 
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of separation rather than integration. However, the bigger Self-realization is 
integration with nonhuman species through deep meditation according to 
Naess.     
We could easily see that Naess is not rejecting the value of traditional 
self-realization, nor does he construct his idea of self-realization by excluding 
personhood. Both concepts of self-realization are aiming at one single 
phenomenon, “consciousness”. Naess claims that his idea of consciousness is 
wider because it includes trans-personal consciousness, while the traditional 
idea of consciousness is narrower because it is intra-personal. So, he basically 
claims a wide consciousness instead of a narrow one. However, one may ask: 
What ingredient makes the ultimate norm, Self-realization, so valuable?  
Socrates said, “know thyself”, i.e. “know yourself”.  Apparently, this 
implies that one should know himself or herself, which sounds too personal. 
However, does it mean a human being should live alone, completely isolated, 
and then know himself or herself? Is it possible at all to know me without 
knowing others? Will I be able to know the difference and commonality 
between me and others by living a lonely life? I can only know me when I live 
in a family or in a society where I see myself as a part. I might have several 
limitations, for example, I might be self-centred, and always want to benefit 
myself, in comparison to others. I can only know myself when I am with 
others. I am self-realized when I find others having better qualities than me 
and I try to incorporate these in myself. That self is not narrow but much wider 
than my previous one. Socrates also said, “the unexamined life is not worth 
living”. Each and every person should examine their lives in relation to others. 
How can one think that his or her life is worth living without relating to others?  
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Of course, most traditional philosophers consider “other” as other 
human beings. But some of them were exceptions. For example, Aristotle 
includes human beings, animals, and plants, as integrated parts of an organic 
system. Biocentric holism appears in his book Progression of Animals, 
“...nature never produces in vain, but always produces the best among the 
possibilities for the being of each kind of animal.”44 
Naess’s ecosophy maintains a “totality” or “unity”. Naess persistently 
invites us to realize the unity of nature through diversity. The more we realize 
diversity, the more we will realize its internal unity. Like some classical 
philosophers and theologians, Naess also thinks that totality is a sign of 
“reality”. Nature as reality plays a special role in our lives. In the history of 
philosophy, there are philosophers who argued that nature should be the 
Ultimate Reality, God. In the Indian traditions, nature is seen full of 
spirituality.  
 A large number of people believe that we should be identified with 
nature to realize the spirituality of God. Others, who do not believe in God, 
usually find spirituality in matter. However, Naess distinguishes himself from 
both views. The term “ecosophy T”, he says, “...includes personal and 
community self-realization, but is conceived also to refer to an unfolding of 
reality as a totality”45. Unlike others, in order to “unfold” the reality Naess 
does not rely on mysticism. Contrary to them, he solely emphasizes 
“personhood”. 
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 Naess’s concept of spiritual personhood develops gradually. 
Unfoldingness starts when a person discards herself from this “own” thinking. 
Deep ecologists Devall and Sessions’s comment is worth mentioning here. 
They said,  
We are thus robbed of beginning the search for our unique 
spiritual/biological personhood. Spiritual growth, or 
unfolding, begins when we cease to understand or see 
ourselves as isolated and narrow competing egos.46 
 
 According to Devall and Sessions, “unique personhood” thus would 
mean those who have spiritual capacities to identify with nonhuman beings. In 
a slightly different way from them Naess says, “...to believe that how we feel 
nature to be is not how nature really is. Rather, it is that reality is so rich that 
we cannot see everything at once; we see separate parts (or aspects) in 
separate moods”47. 
 Until now, we have seen that identification and self-realization are two 
fundamental values in Naess’s ecosophy. The third one, which seems to be 
“spirituality”, becomes evident from his concept of “spiritual personhood”. It 
might be helpful to note that Naess does not consider spirituality in a religious 
sense, rather in a sense of deep consciousness through which one can perceive 
nature as an unfolding reality. This spiritual personhood would consider nature 
internally connected, having a strong feeling to nonhuman elements, or 
intimate belongingness with them. A religious person would believe that God 
will punish her if she unnecessarily performs a cruel act on animals. In 
contrast, a deep ecologist would hold that she would perform cruelty on 
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herself if she unnecessarily performs a cruel act on animals. Both of them have 
spiritual feelings, however, those feelings originate from two different sources: 
God for a religious person, and Self-realization for a deep ecologist. 
 But there are some deeper questions which were not addressed in this 
simple generalization. For instance, a religious person would get inspiration 
from religious scriptures, from the reward of God, from heavenly peace and 
joy, and from eternal happiness by loving God’s creatures. Moreover, God’s 
command, His permissions and prohibitions, are the sources of moral 
guidelines for her. She firmly believes that the ethical guideline in her religion 
is perfect, enough to live a moral life in this Earth and beyond. What is the 
inspiration or the motivational force for a deep ecologist? What is the moral 
guideline to her? What are the action-guiding principles?     
 For the first question, Naess’s answer is “joy”. He said “The sources of 
joy go deeper and farther”48. He also writes, “Part of the joy stems from the 
consciousness of our intimate relation to something bigger than our ego”49.  So, 
Nature is joyful to a deep ecologist. One finds intense joy when she identifies 
with nature.  Killing animals or cutting trees are not enjoyable for her, rather 
she feels joyous by taking care of them. A question then is whether joy is 
inside the person’s conscious experience or is it inside nature.  
Naess replies, “It is misleading, according to my intuitions, to locate 
joys inside my consciousness...it is an attribute of a reality wider than a 
conscious ego”50. Naess believes that nature itself is joyful, and when one 
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identifies with nature, he or she also becomes joyful. A wet tree in a rainy day 
can no longer be sorrowful. It is similarly joyful when we see it in a sunny day.  
Naess’s ecosophy significantly differs from the traditional views. 
Naess is somewhat reluctant about introducing morality into his ecosophy. He 
sometimes considered moralizing “too narrow”. There are several comments 
in his writings. For example, he writes, “I’m not much interested in ethics or 
morals. I’m interested in how we experience the world...If deep ecology is 
deep it must relate to our fundamental beliefs, not just to ethics”51. In one of 
his early writings he says, “Moralizing is too narrow, too patronizing, and too 
open”52. 
 However, I do not think that Naess completely rules out ethics and just 
argues for ontology, as his fellow deep ecologists claim. Naess himself writes, 
“But one’s ethics in environmental questions are based largely on how one 
sees reality. If the developer could see the wholes, his ethics might change”53. 
Naess is not rejecting ethics, but rather a change in ethics is essential 
according to him. Perhaps, it could be joyful and natural to follow ethics. As 
he says, “our behavior naturally and beautifully follows strict norms of 
environmental ethics” 54 . Naess’s response to the question about action-
guidingness seems very obscure.  Of course, Naess does not state any straight-
forward ethical principle in his ecosophy. Indeed, he finds inclination is more 
vital than moral laws. Therefore, too many action-guiding principles are 
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possible, or different people would have different action-guiding principles 
depending on their inclination power.   
 
IV. VALUES IN PASSMORE’S ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 
 
After White’s revolutionary observations on the ecological crisis, many 
environmental philosophers have tried to show that we should abandon 
Western environmental values, since Western traditions are anthropocentric. 
More and more thinkers started to contribute nonanthrpocentric ethics, and 
their works were well appreciated as a new trend in Western environmental 
thinking. Environmental ethics at these times appears synonymous with 
nonanthropocentrism. However, the first and bold defense of Western values 
is by John Passmore.  
According to the Encyclopedia of Environmental Ethics and 
Philosophy (2009), Passmore was “enormously influential” in drawing 
attention to environmental issues. He is the most important figure in 
suggesting that “environmental ethics might not be synonymous with 
nonanthropocentrism”55. Passmore, therefore, indicates some values in the 
Western traditions which he thinks are relevant to ecological decisions. I will 
first discuss Passmore’s thoughts, and then explain the values he is arguing for.   
 A lot of environmental thinkers hold that in order to overcome the 
ecological crisis we ought to reduce the pollution level, we ought to reduce 
consumption, we ought to preserve resources, we ought to maintain a small 
population, and we ought to preserve animal species as well as wilderness. 
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Since these claims significantly ignore human’s creativity and capability in 
solving ecological problems, they lack strong supporting ground according to 
Passmore. We should not forget, he warns, today’s rich civilization was built 
by human beings.   
 Passmore regards deep ecology as “merely cosmetic”, even “rubbish”. 
Instead of grounding a technological solution, the ecosophy of deep ecology is 
a kind of mysticism. The philosophy of wholeness or mysticism is always 
opposed to rationality, science and technology. Ecosophy, he added, simply 
“complicates” the environmental decision-making process.  
 For instance, one of the major environmental problems is the “energy 
crisis”, which cannot be solved by the philosophy of wholeness. We need 
physical laws, such as “all forms of energy are equivalent”, to solve it. Since, 
according to physics, there cannot be any shortage of energy we just need “to 
develop the existing, harmful or risky, energy-sources as slowly as possible”56. 
Contrary to Naess, Passmore thus supports “shallow ecology”—mainly 
concerned with the health and environment of human beings. He declares, “I 
am proud to call myself ‘shallow’”57.   
 However, this does not imply that Passmore encourages current 
Western lifestyles, people’s attitudes toward the environment, and sees no 
environmental threats. Nor does he think that the Western perception of nature 
is absolutely correct. He admits that there are ecological problems, such as 
pollution, extinction of species, and damage of wilderness. He points out that 
the “ecological problem” and the “problem in ecology” is not the same as 
commonly understood.  
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An ecological problem, he says, is a kind of “social problem” because 
without this problem a society would be “better-off”. In other words, an 
ecological problem can be seen as the social impact of technology. By contrast, 
a problem in ecology occurs when scientists have a naive understanding of any 
ecological phenomenon. This type of problem is a “purely scientific problem”. 
An ecological problem arises from “our dealings with nature”. Global 
warming, for example, does not arise from a wealthy living standard, but 
rather it is the cost of our imperfect dealings or “attitude” toward nature. The 
solution to ecological problems, like other social problems, therefore, would 
be a “satisfactory way of reducing” pollution.   
 What is the satisfactory way that Passmore has in mind? In principle, 
he is arguing that we cannot “abolish” ecological problems. However, we can 
obviously “reduce” them. Pollution, for example, in his view is misplaced 
matter. So, the satisfactory way is to put it in the “right place”. More clearly, a 
kind of pollution might be harmful for a specific kind of natural element, 
while the same could be useful for another. In Passmore’s words, 
“…phosphate fertilisers are beneficial in a potato field but not in a lake or 
river, salt is harmless in the seas but not in irrigated fields”58. The solution of 
the pollution problem requires reducing the flow of pollutants into the wrong 
places, and rearranging pollutants in the right place, which is purely scientific 
and not metaphysical.   
 Passmore urges Western societies to be more “prudent” in using their 
technologies, more “conscious” in using natural resources. We human beings 
are ignorant in many ways about our dealings with nature. We need to know 
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more about various species, plants, and their lifestyles. According to Passmore, 
“...we are proportionally ignorant, proportionally in relation to what we need 
to know”59.  Genesis, the root of Western ecological knowledge, does support 
human beings as the master of the universe. But that is the one-sided view 
which most critics, including White, are highlighting without realizing its 
deeper side. The view “nature is wax in man’s hands”, Passmore agrees, “must 
certainly be rejected”60. 
 Passmore, then, sharply disagrees with the deep ecologists and other 
environmentalists who claim that Western traditions as a whole are despotic 
and should be “abandoned”, and it should be replaced by a “new ethics”. 
Human beings are unique, as Western traditions point out, but that uniqueness 
must be shown in their behavior. They cannot be only “chauvinist”, they are 
also “steward” according to Passmore. The Earth was given to them by God, 
so they cannot destroy God’s gift in whatever way they like. Surely, human 
beings are responsible for their behavior to God. They have responsibility for 
nature instead of to nature, since nature cannot be regarded as a “pseudo-
person”. The conclusion he draws to solve the ecological crisis is that, “...new 
modes of behaviour are much more important than new moral principles”61.    
Hence, the values Passmore is arguing for may not be new. Indeed, 
these values can be found in all anthropocentric traditions. However, he 
provides a different angle for looking at the same values. In some cases, he 
stands completely opposite to White’s thesis. For example, he does not think 
that all Western traditions are despotic. Let me illustrate in more detail. 
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It is generally accepted that Western traditions are utilitarian. That is, 
all actions are focused on the utility for human beings. When cost-benefit 
analysis proves that a policy is beneficial for human beings, that policy is 
morally considerable. Most environmental philosophers believe that the 
dominant ethical view is utilitarianism.  
Passmore supports Western traditions. He is sympathetic to “Cost-
benefit analysis” to solve ecological problems. He thinks that the traditional 
“Cost-benefit analysis” method, which is mainly based on the utilitarian 
principle, is sufficient to solve the ecological crisis. It is consistent with the 
flourishing of Western science and technology. Passmore suggests, 
“Ecologists and economists ought to be friends. They are both interested in the 
allocation of scarce resources in the most effective possible manner”62.  
Passmore’s comments imply that he is more interested in a scientific-
utilitarian worldview where human beings are identified with rational 
capability and maximization of their happiness. His view is more consistent 
with Western anthropocentric traditions. He writes, “In so far as ecological 
problems can be solved only with the help of scientific discovery and 
technological invention, they can be solved only within the Western rational 
tradition”63. 
However, Passmore recognizes utility as a tool, as an instrument, but 
values identification since he does not think that human beings should 
maximize their happiness by any means. But he does not hesitate to consider 
human beings as the masters of the universe in the sense of God’s deputy. His 
sense of identification, therefore, is different from Naess’s who rejects 
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utilitarianism and the higher status of human beings. Passmore’s sense of 
identification admits utilitarianism as well as the higher status of human 
beings. 
Passmore points out that we are most often narrowly interpreting the 
word “usefulness”. The preservation of wilderness and species may not be 
valuable only for economic reasons. But rather, it will provide 
“...opportunities for the pursuit of science, for recreation and retreat, as 
sources of moral renewal and aesthetic delight”64. For instance, preserving 
wilderness could be beneficial for biologists, geographers, agriculturalists, and 
also ecologists. Wilderness can be a place where we find “economically 
valuable” plants and trees, but it can also be the habitat of some extinct species.  
We can even compare wilderness, in Passmore’s view, to a “scientist’s 
laboratory”. Apart from economic value, a science laboratory has some other 
values. When we ride on a small boat, or sit beside a nice lake and watch the 
movements of small fishes, we don’t ask whether it is man-made, or how 
much economic value we are gaining. We are in there simply for aesthetic 
delight. Passmore’s point is that we could preserve wilderness beyond 
mystical reasons. For preserving wilderness, we also do not need to bring 
unseen future generations forward. We could just preserve it for some other 
values, such as aesthetic value.  
Passmore admits that people can achieve self-knowledge through the 
interaction with nature. For example, one can achieve self-knowledge by 
realizing that she is not isolated from nature, she is a part of nature. 
Alternatively, she could also realize that nature is full of mysteries. Human 
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beings should discover or erase these mysteries by their rational endeavor. In 
contrast to Naess, self-realization may not only mean “realizing 
interrelatedness”, but rather realizing that human beings were given enormous 
capacities to redesign nature by creating wilderness, canals, lakes, waterfalls, 
and gardens. Once all these were part of “crude, unformed, inhuman, 
unperfected” nature. Passmore’s sense of self-realization is more consistent 
with conservation rather than preservation of the environment. In other words, 
“adventures with nature” rather than preserving as it is. 
Passmore was encouraged by Christianity and Judaism which holds 
that nature “…exists primarily as a resource rather than as something to be 
contemplated with enjoyment, that man has the right to use it as he will, that it 
is not sacred”65. So, instead of mystical principles, he wants to suggest a 
rational principle to govern human-nature relationship. Let me give an 
example. One version of mysticism is Aldo Leopold’s land ethics, which 
claims that land cannot be “merely soil”, but it is more than that. In his words, 
land is a “fountain of energy”. But Passmore shows that a soil scientist goes to 
a deeper level of land by studying its atoms, molecules, and system. She 
knows the behavior of land well even when heavy rain falls degrade it. She 
knows the perfect land for different crops to grow. 
Another important claim that Passmore rejects is the view that science 
is atomistic. Many ecosophers claim that except for ecology most sciences are 
separate from others. The scientific attitude is too narrow. Science only 
observes a part of nature without observing the whole picture. We should thus 
abandon science to realize our interconnectedness with nature. But Passmore 
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defends science and also points out the ecosopher’s crucial mistake in this 
regard. He argues that science and atomism are not “intrinsically” related. Let 
us consider the hydro-electric science. By analyzing the nature and behavior of 
tides the power is converted to another power, namely electricity. Only 
sometimes does a scientist need to look at the molecular forms that constitute 
the matter. Also only sometimes she needs to look at its activity in a wider 
context.  
But most of the time a scientist looks at the part, for example, the 
genetic form, and also the wider context, for example, the system as a whole. 
When a hydro-electric project works, scientists have to think about the electro-
magnetic particles and also their impact as a whole on nature. Science in this 
sense is not necessarily atomistic, or not necessarily focused only on behavior, 
but rather, it is holistic and focuses on the “cultural” behavior of different 
activities. Passmore thus rules out the ecosophers’ rejection of science as too 
narrow.  
The idea of self-realization is used by Passmore in the sense of 
realizing rationality. A sense of realizing rationality is that human beings have 
enormous capability of rational decision-making. Human beings, like other 
creatures, should not surrender themselves to nature. Conversely, their rational 
activities can help them to realize nature scientifically. To study nature in a 
systematic way requires rational observation, not worshipping nature blindly 
as sacred. The rejection of mysticism in nature is one of the fundamental 
features of Western traditions, and Passmore’s solution to the ecological crisis 
is to go back to the “greatest of man’s achievements”.   
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However, Passmore’s rejection of sacredness in nature does not entail 
that he is disvaluing spirituality. Rather, he invokes a special sense of 
spirituality uncommon in Western traditions. His final goal was to turn 
humanity into stewards. Human beings can preserve their mastery over nature, 
and at the same time care for nature. Many great religions hold that everything 
in nature is created for human beings. Christianity is the most notable of them. 
Passmore agrees with White that “Christianity has encouraged man to think of 
himself as nature’s absolute master, for whom everything that exists was 
designed”66. However, does it mean that nature is merely a resource for human 
beings? A machine to use for human purposes? Nature certainly is “God’s 
handiwork” for one who believes in God, and she must believe that the world 
was “perfect until Adam sinned”. Who can dare to destroy God’s perfect 
handiwork? 
Passmore grants that the human-nature relationship goes far, even at a 
spiritual level. However, the sense of spirituality is quite different from the 
traditional one. Human beings, like good artists, should “respect their 
material”. A good artist uses her materials to draw a picture, but at the same 
time she respects and takes care of them, even though these are paints, brushes, 
papers, bronzes, and marbles. Human beings, he added, should look at their 
world “sensuously”, and only then could they be caring for it. Passmore goes 
to a further level of spirituality by saying, “Not only to look at it, but to touch 
it, smell it, taste it”67.   
Passmore does not think that Christianity, or Western traditions in 
particular, is responsible for the ecological crisis. The Greek Enlightenment 
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which rejects hubris—a view that considers human beings as gods—was 
responsible for thinking of nature as a machine. Later, Bacon and Descartes, 
who considered this view as consistent with Christianity, created a 
misperception about Christianity and the Western traditions. But Passmore 
shows that not all Western traditions are despotic. There are, according to him, 
two minor traditions in the West which encourages stewardship to nature. 
Passmore adopted their views and claimed that the right attitude toward nature 
is when man (human being) “...sees him [self] as a ‘steward’, a farm-manager, 
actively responsible as God’s deputy for the care of the world, and...co-
operating with nature in an attempt to perfect it”68. In sum, human beings are 
those stewards who “manage and protect” nature for their own purposes. 
Respecting and protecting nature, in Passmore’s view, does not encourage 
either being a slave of nature, or regarding nature as a slave. 
We have seen that Naess’s three main values, i.e. identification, self-
realization and spirituality, appeared in Passmore’s environmental philosophy 
in a quite different sense. In the next section we will concentrate on the 
different senses of three main values.  
 
V. DIFFERENT SENSES OF MAIN VALUES 
 
Warwick Fox has distinguished three senses of identification: personal 
identification, ontological identification, and cosmological identification 69 . 
Personally based identification requires “personal involvement” to experience 
the commonality of two entities. This is the most general form of 
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identification according to Fox. Two other forms of identification, ontological 
identification and cosmological identification, on the other hand, are 
transpersonal where transpersonal means impersonal. In short, transpersonal 
identification simply includes “all forms of identification” except the personal 
one 70.  
The experience of ontological identification is extremely hard to 
convey and even to express in language. Generally, ontological identification 
admits that things exist, but one can experience them as they are absent. 
Sometimes, people in the meditative stage are able to establish a fine tune 
communication with the things around them, also the things far away. Zen 
Buddhism is the most appropriate example to understand ontological 
identification.    
Cosmology based identification is a deep realization of the 
commonality that “we and all other entities are aspects of a single unfolding 
reality”71.  This experience of identification does not stick to a particular 
cosmology, but any type of cosmology which sees the universe as a single 
unfolding unity, e.g. the worldviews of Taoism.  
The distinction between personally based identification and 
cosmologically based identification is that the former proceeds from inward to 
outward, while the latter proceeds in the opposite direction, i.e. from outward 
to inward. In Fox’s language, “...we can think of personally based 
identification as an “inside-out” approach and cosmologically based 
identification as an “outside-in” approach”72. “Inside-out” approach states that 
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Environmentalism (Boston: Shambhala Publications, 1990), 258. 
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identification develops from the person and then it proceeds to other entities 
which are physically or mentally nearest to him or her. But “outside-in” 
approach states that identification develops from a unified sense of cosmos 
and then it proceeds to the individual entity through a realization of 
commonality.  
Consider Fox’s example of a tree and its leaves. Suppose that all leaves 
are conscious and have a sense of commonality. They are all the same and 
belong to a single tree. This is an example of “inside-out” approach. However, 
the tree as a whole could be seen as an image of consciousness, and that 
consciousness could proceed to individual leaves. This is an example of 
“outside-in” approach.   
Fox admits several significant advantages of cosmology based 
identification. The most important of them is that “cosmologically based 
identification tends to be more impartial than personally based 
identification”73. The impartial characteristics are opposed to any destruction 
or oppression of other entities, and manifest friendliness. Naess, Gandhi, 
Spinoza, and even Einstein’s worldviews embrace cosmological identification 
according to Fox.  
However, remember Naess’s “standard example” of identification 
which was about a dying flea, and his comment, 
Naturally, what I felt was a painful sense of compassion and 
empathy...it was a process of identification: that “I saw 
myself in the flea”. If I had been alienated from the flea, not 
seeing intuitively anything even resembling myself, the 
death struggle would have left me feeling indifferent. So 
                                                 
73 Ibid., 256. 
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there must be identification in order for there to be 
compassion and, among humans, solidarity.74 
 
Note that Naess in this statement is not talking about cosmological 
identification, simply because any “aspects of single unfolding reality” is 
absent here.  Even his involvement with that flea is not merely “personal” 
because he felt deep empathy and compassion for the flea. So, we cannot call 
this identification either personal or transpersonal.  
Christian Diehm, in his interesting and well argued paper, 
“Identification with Nature: What it is and Why it Matters?”, noticed a rare 
form of identification in the ecosophy of Arne Naess which he calls 
“identification-as-kinship”75. Unlike “identification-as-belonging” that refers 
to “interconnectedness” or “interrelatedness”, “identification-as-kinship” 
signifies something as a “like” sense. For instance, without realizing our 
connections with Antarctic penguins we can see that they are like us. They can 
also suffer in a poisonous environment. So, identification-as-kinship functions 
as if we realize others as “enough like” us. 
Nonetheless, the most commonly expressed identification according to 
Diehm is “identification-as-belonging”. Identification-as-belonging holds that 
the self can attain such awareness that we are part of nature, and the 
destruction of nature means the destruction of ourselves. Fox’s three types of 
identification, namely, personal identification, ontological identification, and 
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cosmological identification, are therefore, simply “identification-as-
belonging” for Diehm76. 
But when Naess says in the previous example “what I felt was a 
painful sense of compassion and empathy”, and “I saw myself in the flea”, the 
sense of identification is very different than identification-as-belonging.  As 
Diehm notes, “Here, the term “identification” does not signify 
“interconnectedness” or “belonging”, but rather something along the lines of 
“kinship” ”77 . A feeling of empathy rather than interconnectedness is the 
precondition for identification-as-kinship. Of course, similar examples can be 
found in Naess’s book Ecology, Community and Lifestyle: Outline of an 
Ecosophy (1989).  
However, my view significantly differs from Deihm’s in that when we 
think someone or something is like us, we should not use the term “kinship”, 
in particular for the environmental context. The reason is that if the pronoun us 
denotes human beings, then the phrase like us would denote like human beings, 
which is absolutely anthropocentric and narrow. Moreover, kinship may refer 
to some sort of blood connection. But actually, we do not have any blood 
connection with the environmental elements. So, Deihm has chosen the wrong 
connotation to refer to the distinct and rare sense of identification.   
In my view, the words like us most likely denote our neighbors. 
Moreover, when he uses the term enough, it becomes almost obvious that the 
attitude is neighbor-centric since only our neighbors could be enough like us, 
rather than our family members or relatives. Perhaps, very often we maintain a 
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hierarchical relationship and practice different values in our family 
relationship. 
To be impartial and more correct I will call this rare kind of 
identification “identification-as-neighborhood”. It also broadens the concept 
and applies well to the environmental context.  
 
VI. CAN WE PERCEIVE THE ENVIRONMENT FROM A 
DIFFERENT VIEWPOINT? 
 
The environment exists prior to human history. It is and was full of 
secrets and thrills, and human beings at all times were eager to know these. 
The environment is still amazing. Human beings—the owners of some special 
qualities—succeeded in knowing very little about the environment since their 
arrival on this Earth. Surprisingly, they were not capable of creating any 
natural elements ever. Meanwhile, whenever they knew anything about the 
environment they used it for further modification, positively or negatively. 
Enough modifications have already been done. These modifications 
sometimes could be extremely dangerous and may bring catastrophe for all 
members of the Earth. Moreover, the environment also has its own evolution 
process. The situation is going to worsen day by day through human actions 
rather than the process of evolution.  
The major cause of our ecological crisis, in my view, is misguidedness. 
Human beings were misguided by poets, theologians, dramatists, historians, 
movie makers, novelists, economists, philosophers, and most notably scientists. 
As most elements in nature, including species and plants, and natural laws, 
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were unknown to human beings, these intellectuals misguided the common 
people. They did this intentionally or experimentally (in the form of testing 
alternative policies), but common people trusted them and made their 
decisions. Policy-makers, whose decisions significantly matter, were also 
misguided. As Katherine Richardson et al., when commenting on the policy of 
fossil fuels, pointed out,  
Today, the burning of fossil fuels has become accepted by 
many as a prerequisite for economic stability and growth. 
Now, science is confronting us with the insight that the 
burning of these fossil fuels is altering the functioning of 
Earth’s climate system. In essence, humans are threatening 
the viability of their own life support system.78           
 
As this statement shows, once burning fossil fuels was invented and 
considered safe for Earth’s habitants to meet the huge demand for power, but 
nowadays it is considered a threat. Meanwhile, we have already burned 
millions of tons of fossil fuels relying on its economic value.    
The real value of human-nature relations either changed or was lost. 
The real value, however, can be recovered. Believers in religion seek to learn 
from their religious scriptures. Nonbelievers seek to learn from nature or from 
the scientific study of nature. But there are major disagreements between 
religion and science. Religion says our Creator has created this Earth. Science 
says this Earth was created by an evolutionary process. Religion holds that 
human beings have duties to take care of other creatures. Science focuses on 
the modification of nature for more comfortable human lives and indirectly 
claims mastery over nature.  
                                                 
78 Katherine Richardson et al., Climate Change: Global Risks, Challenges and Decisions 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 474. 
 59
However, there is an important meeting point between science and 
religion regarding human-nature relationship. In order to find that we should 
know the history of Earth and the origin of human beings. I would like to start 
from the beginning of the Earth’s history available in science rather than 
religion. One of the reasons is that many people believe that science is 
universal, while religions are not. To them, science is more reliable than 
religion.   
Stephen Hawking, a contemporary supporter of the Big Bang theory 
and one of the most influential scientists after Einstein, writes, “...the 
beginning of the universe couldn’t have been just a few thousand years ago”79. 
Hawking’s comment sounds very simple. But it took a hundred years to 
discover. It is only in the 1930s that Edwin Hubble remarkably observed “the 
universe is expanding”. How did he recognize it? It was possible by analyzing 
and measuring the light coming from other galaxies. Hubble, with his 
colleague Slipher, found that there is one “blue-shifted” nebula closer to our 
galaxy, while all other nebulae are “red-shifted”. A further closer observation 
showed surprisingly that the blue-shifted nebula, named Andromeda, “is 
moving toward us while the other nebulae move away from us”80. Hawking 
called this blue-shifted nebula “our galactic neighbor” which has challenged 
all the previous conceptions of the origin of the universe.   
The expanding universe was Hawking’s starting point. According to 
him, it was one of the “great intellectual revolutions”. The expanding universe 
view leads him to discover that “...the universe and time itself must have had a 
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beginning in a tremendous explosion”81. According to the Big Bang theory, 
there was a tremendous explosion at the origin of the universe, “If general 
relativity were correct, the universe started with an infinite temperature and 
density at the big bang singularity. As the universe expanded, the temperature 
of the radiation decreased”82.   
Thus, the universe was too hot at the beginning and its temperature 
was then more than 100 billion degrees. Scientists believe that radiation 
started from this densely hot stage of the universe, and is still continuing today. 
However, it takes billions of years for the universe to cool down and become 
livable, even for single-celled bacteria.  
Hawking’s explanation of time appears in the “Black hole” principle. 
In his view, time has started since the big bang and will end up in the black 
hole. He writes, “Time will come to an end for an astronaut who falls into a 
black hole and hits the singularity”83. Interestingly, the black hole principle 
works in a very unique way. That is, the black hole cannot function alone. As 
Hawking himself states, “...a black hole still exerts the same gravitational pull 
on neighboring objects as did the body that collapsed”84. Thus, we have learnt 
that our blue-shifted neighbor galaxy Andromeda changes all of our previous 
observations about the origin of the universe, and the black hole, in principle, 
functions with its neighboring objects. Why is it that such remarkable findings 
have not inspired environmental philosophers yet?  
Our planet Earth was formed approximately 4.7 billion years ago, and 
is in many ways unique from other planets. The most important feature of our 
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planet is that its atmosphere is life-supporting. Its position is also favorable for 
life because if it were closer to or farther away from the Sun, it would have 
been too hot or too cold. Life on Earth began approximately 3.5 to 4.0 billion 
years ago. The early organic matter, Amino acids, developed from gases like 
Carbon dioxide, Nitrogen, Ammonia, and Methane. Most scientists believe 
that, “The organic matter gradually acquired the characteristics of living 
cells”85. This new formation became possible as “a result of a “cooperative” or 
constructive type of interaction”86.      
Although it is difficult to specify the exact time intervals in the Earth’s 
evolutionary process, and different scientists have different views regarding 
this, a general picture is common and presented clearly in Graham-Smith’s 
interesting book, What? On Earth: Making Sense of a Creative World (1987). 
The single-celled blue-green algae, and the equally simple bacteria, the first 
living components, developed 1000-3000 million years ago. These living cells 
became complex and multi-celled creatures, such as fish, gradually formed 
about 500 million years ago. Within a further 100 million years trees and 
plants have formed. The evolutionary process then produced reptiles, such as 
snakes, approximately 200 million years ago.  200 million later years were for 
mammals, such as tigers, to join the evolution process.  
The story of primates, such as monkeys, began about 65 million years 
ago. Apart from family life, primates were able to use their eye power, brains, 
and hands. They maintained a very slow learning process. The fossil evidence 
found in Ethiopia and Tanzania showed that pre-humans, such as baboons or 
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chimpanzees, have evolved in this Earth about three million years ago. The 
basic features of primates were very similar to human beings. For example, 
their brain sizes were 600-1000 c.c., while human’s brain size was normally 
between 1200-1600 c.c.   
Finally, the emergence of Homo sapiens was not any special event in 
the creation process. About 60000-100000 years ago human beings evolved in 
this Earth. A high level of communication skill through speech and language, 
organized thinking ability, complex brain activities, sharp memory capacity, 
and making rational choice, made human beings special. The ancient human 
beings kept themselves busy with tending fires, and collecting food, by using 
simple means like stone. It is strongly believed that they were maintaining a 
unique co-operative relation with natural elements, such as plants, trees, rivers, 
and animals. Human being’s dominion was less possible since they were 
comparatively new in joining an established community. Hunting and 
agriculture were not unfamiliar because other animals already knew this. 
Monkeys, birds, and other species, possibly gained the sense that fruits are 
enjoyable but not the seeds. So, they threw seeds to grow.   
But human beings obviously had the ability to do these in a more 
organized way, which started merely 10000 years ago. Nonetheless that 
organization was not always rational. Graham-Smith nicely writes,  
For hundreds of millions of years mutual interactions 
between the plants, the animals and the physical conditions 
had resulted in stable ecosystems that were, overall, evolving 
very slowly. Now human beings were replacing these by 
intrinsically unstable systems, created for their own benefit 
and sustained by their own endeavours.87  
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From the above historical background some issues became clearer. 
Firstly, like Graham-Smith, many scientists believe that there were “mutual 
interactions” and “co-operation” among other community members before 
human beings came along. Secondly, human beings since their origin lived in 
this community composed of numerous biotic and abiotic members, such as 
plants, trees, lakes, rivers, oceans, mountains, animals, and bacteria. Finally, 
and most importantly, there was mutual co-operation between humans and 
other community members. But what type of “mutual interaction” or “co-
operation” existed in this ancient community?  
On the basis of our analysis we could confidently say that there can 
only exist neighboring relationships. Since there were a few humans they had 
to live with other neighbors who were plants, trees, rivers, rocks, stones, and 
animals. Moreover, as soon as the human family settled there was no vital 
change in neighborhood attitude for quite a few thousand years. When the 
concept of civilization developed, human beings started to separate themselves 
from their neighbors. Gradually, they changed this conception of 
neighborhood and redefined “neighbor” strictly from the social perspective, 
not from the environmental perspective. The neighboring self was lost.   
The concept of neighbor is the meeting point between science and 
religion. Both agreed that this Earth was livable before human beings appeared. 
The first human beings found nonhumans as neighbors. All were creatures as 
no hierarchy was recorded in science.  
To sum up, I have discussed how the environment was perceived in the 
Western traditions. I have argued that although Naess and Passmore support 
different attitudes toward the environment, they share the same fundamental 
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values at a deeper level. Moreover, the environment can also be discussed 
from a different point of view beyond anthropocentrism and 
nonanthropocentrism. This different viewpoint, I believe, can be even more 
promising. In the next chapter, we will concentrate on how nature was 




























Nature, directly or indirectly, controls Asian people’s lifestyles, religions, 
emotions, joys, sorrows, romance, success, failure, rituals, rites, socio-political 
and economic lives, and almost everything which is possible to imagine. Even 
marriage, birth, and death, take place in Asian people’s minds in relation to 
nature. They love nature, respect nature, worship nature, fear nature, care for 
nature, get purified by nature, and also use nature to survive.  
Western traditions used science to control nature, to claim mastery 
over nature, to make nature more hospitable, comfortable, and safe for human 
beings. The Asian traditions, on the other hand, inspire human beings to be 
controlled by nature, not to act against nature, and also not to be adversely 
affected by nature. Science is hidden inside nature, only reasonable people can 
realize it. Reasonable people do not mean only scientists or highly intellectual 
people, but rather, people who have refined wisdom, whose knowledge cannot 
be framed in the traditional way. Traditionally, a person who is capable of 
expressing his or her thoughts clearly and systemically through skills, acquired 
by academic learning and training is called a learned person.  
However, an Asian mindset would allow that one could realize the 
internal science of nature even without academic training. The meaning of 
internal science should be understood from an interrelated or interconnected 
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perspective, and not from a physical perspective. In physical science, medicine 
is enough to recover bodily weakness, while for internal science bodily 
weakness is a breakdown of nutritional, psychological, emotional and nervous 
systems, and hence, for proper recovery these systems should be improved 
first. Interestingly, science in Asia seeks harmony with nature. Those sciences 
which are contra nature were not regarded as true sciences in Asian culture. 
Clarke has observed the Eastern and Western encounter as a long 
“ambivalence” and writes about the East,  
On the one hand it has been a source of inspiration, fount of 
an ancient wisdom, a culturally rich civilisation which is far 
superior to, and can be used to reflect on the inadequacies of, 
our own. On the other,...It is a place which invites 
imaginative flights and exaggerations of all kinds.88 
 
Asia is the largest continent on Earth and has diverse ideologies, 
cultures, and traditions. For example, the Chinese have the most continuous 
civilization and thousand years old historical-political background. The 
classical philosophers in China are mainly humanistic, but they maintain a 
unique harmony with nature by their heart-mind principle. The heart-mind 
principle states that a human being, through self-cultivation or cultivating self-
transformation, balancing between emotion and rationality (or desire), can 
achieve an ideal character. He is someone who has an ability to blend both 
reason and emotions and maintain a harmony between these two opposite 
faculties. This harmony with reference to the ecological balance has been 
discussed by Confucian and non-Confucian traditions.    
India—the most naturalistic religious nation—celebrates her numerous 
rites and rituals toward nature, and reflects an exceptional spiritual philosophy 
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toward it. Almost all Indian philosophical traditions concentrated on liberation 
from ignorance. This liberation should be attained in this Earth through 
knowledge and devotion. The Japanese may be regarded as the most sensitive 
nation to mountains and animals in this region. Although nature worship 
hardly takes place in Japan, the Japanese view nature as aesthetically rich and 
plentiful. Their aesthetic attitudes toward nature developed a concrete 
philosophy of empathy and sympathy rooted in Buddhism and Shintoism.  
Middle Eastern Asian environmental philosophy was historically 
human-centred. Water management and irrigation policies dominate the 
Middle Eastern states before oil resources were discovered. Agricultural goods, 
such as rice, wheat, and corn, were exported to other parts of the world, 
including Africa, Europe, some parts of Asia and America, and were the main 
sources of revenue. Environmental policies concentrated on ensuring fertility 
of land and sufficiency of water. Environmental values were based on the 
religious teachings of Islam, Christianity and Judaism. An intimate human-
nature relation, especially the Nile River and local farmers’ deep bonding with 
it, is found in historical literature. Two other rivers, Tigris and Euphrates, 
contributed to irrigation, farming and exporting the agricultural goods to the 
Western world. Later, cotton production was implemented in agriculture. 
However, the attachment of humans and nature becomes weak after the 
discovery of oil resources and emerging regional conflicts among the Middle 
Eastern countries. Massive establishment of oil refineries and increasing oil 
export made human-nature relation vulnerable. On the one hand, new roads, 
dams, cars, buses, buildings, and defense structures, have accelerated pressure 
on the environment. On the other hand, weapons and chemicals used for war 
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have rapidly contaminated the land and water. Air pollution after several 
Western operations and wars between Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Syria and Israel 
creates a health and environmental challenge for the whole population of the 
region. Although governments of all Middle Eastern countries are aware about 
these environmental challenges and water crisis is recently reduced by 
implementing recycling technology, it may take a long time to achieve a 
harmonious environment in this region. Meanwhile, some Arabian countries 
(such as Saudi Arabia) are preserving lands and wildlife through Islamic 
environmental policies and inspiring people to follow environmental 
guidelines. The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and 
Islamic environmentalists are working closely to protect the environment. In 
short, Middle Eastern Asian traditional views of human-nature relation 
justified “human intervention” but also maintained an intimate relation with 
nature through agriculture 89. I will leave this tradition at this point. 
Of course, there are other traditions in Asia, for instance, Southeast 
Asian traditions. In fact, Southeast Asia is the habitat of most of the existing 
flora and fauna occupying thousands of islands. The people living in these 
islands might have a more intimate relationship with nature, and surely profess 
a radical environmental ethic. However, it is not possible to discuss all of 
these traditions, and so we will limit our discussion to three major traditions, 
namely, Chinese, Indian and Japanese.     
We will concentrate on some vital questions in this chapter, such as 
which values can be regarded as nonanthropocentric? How is nature perceived 
                                                 
89 Edmund Burke III, “The Transformation of the Middle Eastern Environment, 1500 B.C.E. - 
2000 C.E.”, in The Environment and World History, ed. Edmund Burke III and Kenneth 
Pomeranz (California: University of California Press, 2009), 110.  
 69
in Asian traditions, in particular, Chinese, Indian and Japanese traditions? 
How do Asian worldviews address human-nature relations? 
 
I. NONANTHROPOCENTRIC ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES 
 
According to nonanthropocentic environmental value theory, human beings 
are not at the centre of the environmental system since all natural elements 
have equal value irrespective of their uses. The nonanthropocentric value 
theory can be seen as a holistic approach which emphasizes wholeness, 
interconnectedness, and interdependence. O’Neill et al. have illustrated 
nonanthropocentric value theory more vividly. They write, “Accordingly the 
new non-anthropocentric ethic has been built around two claims: first that the 
class of beings to whom moral consideration is owed needs to be extended 
beyond human persons; second that nature has intrinsic value”90. 
Although this statement shows that nonanthropocentrism argues for the 
extension of the “class of beings” there are many nonanthropocentric 
philosophers who go far beyond the circle of beings or living entities. In 
principle, these philosophers argue that rivers, mountains, gardens, stones, 
even the whole cosmic system, should be taken into ethical consideration. One 
notable example of this view is Naess’s ecosophy. Scherer has indicated some 
basic characteristics of nonanthropocentric environmental values. Firstly, 
nonanthropocentrism means valuing interdependence, i.e. the value of a flora 
cannot be “denied” or “mitigated” by some other values. Secondly, it means 
valuing the potentiality of development of all natural elements with equal 
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emphasis. Finally and most importantly, nonanthropocentrism comprises a set 
of values“...designed to enhance the harmony of the environment and the 
possibilities of creatures’ [creatures] flourishing within it”91.  
Nonanthropocentric environmental value theory assigns equal 
consideration to all natural elements. It attributes intrinsic value to animals, 
lands, grass, stones, lakes, even to the whole biosphere. Often, a wide 
definition of nonanthropocentrism and its undefined principles may create 
problems for environmental policies. A workable definition of 
nonanthropocentrism does not acknowledge any special position for human 
beings. It regards nature as intrinsically valuable, and demands a total revision 
of present ethical theories. However, it would be incorrect to think that all 
environmental theories are either anthropocentric or nonanthropocentric. 
There are a number of issues in between which can create enough possibilities 
to develop a mixed-view. If one claims that human beings have special status 
on Earth, but that status requires them to perceive nature as integrated, 
balanced and harmonious, then this view does not endorse absolute 
anthropocentrism.  
Similarly, if one claims that nature has intrinsic value, but human 
beings have special duties since only they are capable of caring for nature, 
then this is not absolute nonanthropocentrism either. Eminent environmental 
philosophers sometimes call their views as anthropocosmic or anthropogengic 
to distinguish them from anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism.     
Perhaps, there is no standard nonantropocentric ethical principle 
available to guide ethical decisions. Without such a principle, human beings 
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may adapt the attitude of worship nature. They may consider nature as a moral 
guide. In nature, very often we find that the stronger dominates the weaker, or 
acts cruelly towards them. But it is highly debatable whether nature could be 
our moral guide. For example, John Stuart Mill and Holmes Rolston III do not 
think that nature should be followed for moral guidelines. Thus, lacking 
standard ethical principles, nonatnthropocentrism may be less action-guiding. 
In the next successive sections, we will see that nature is perceived in Chinese, 
Indian and Japanese traditions mainly from nonanthropocentric perspectives. 
Nonetheless, anthropocentrism is not fully absent there.     
 
II. NATURE IN CHINESE TRADITIONS 
 
The Chinese traditionally perceive nature as the source of harmony and 
balance. Chinese traditions are unique since, on the one hand, they hold that 
there is no God, while on the other hand, nature possesses enough spiritual 
elements for them. A key issue of Chinese traditions is to achieve harmonious 
human societies through moral self-cultivation, which sounds anthropocentric. 
However, an important point is that not only ordinary human beings but also 
the sage kings must maintain a harmonious relation with nature. In other 
words, harmony starts from the continuous or inseparable attachment with 
nature. One who wants to achieve perfection in either personal or political life 
should achieve it through the harmonious or balanced interaction with Heaven 
and Earth. Chinese traditions do not view nature as merely a compound of 
trees, rivers, plants, lands, and other natural elements, but all elements 
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between Heaven and Earth are treated as nature. That is, the whole cosmic 
boundary should be considered as nature. 
According to Chinese traditions, there is no Creator of nature. Nature 
was created by itself and evolved through construction and destruction. 
Human beings are simply elements of nature who are made of the same 
cosmic primal elements li and chi. All natural elements have only one source 
of origin, Heaven. Nature in Chinese traditions is thus unified, united, and 
balanced. Human beings once unbalanced would experience chaos, unhappy 
personal, social and political lives. In short, an extremely poor, painful, and 
unsuccessful life which every one wants to avoid.     
Confucius or Kongzi is regarded as the founder of “Ru-ism” in China. 
Like Socrates, his main aim was to establish morality in society. He 
recognizes harmony as the basic ends of social, political, and moral lives. He 
perceives the human-nature relation in terms of harmony. In the Analects, 
Confucius emphasizes moral self-cultivation. His view is also shared by two 
famous disciples, Mencius and Xunzi. In general, their views are grounded on 
some human virtues, such as humanity, loyalty, and empathy. Human being’s 
role to achieve social and political harmony is mainly explored, but nature is 
also given an exceptional priority. 
For instance, Confucius has an uncommon worldview where human 
beings are seen in relation to Heaven and Earth. Liu writes, “Ideally, human 
beings subsist between Heaven and Earth, playing the same roles that Heaven 
and Earth play”92.  
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So, we could easily assume that Confucian cosmology has enough 
spiritual resources. Indeed, Tucker and Berthrong maintain, “Confucianism 
has significant intellectual and spiritual resources to offer in the emerging 
discussions regarding attitudes toward nature, the role of the human, and 
environmental ethics”93 . We will discuss here Confucian attitudes toward 
nature, human being’s relation to nature, and the ethical norms governing the 
relationships between Heaven, Earth, and Humans.  
Confucianism holds nature as organic and spontaneous. The Confucian 
vision of nature is reflected in the comments of Tucker and Brethrong, 
“Nature is seen as unified, interconnected, and interpenetrating, constantly 
relating microcosm and macrocosm”94. Nature, according to Confucianism, 
was not created by a Creator. Rather, nature is self-generating through an 
organismic process. In spite of the “creation myth” which is common in other 
Asian traditions, Confucian traditions offer a more dynamic and ever changing 
view of nature. Julia Tao writes, “Nature as a life force is dynamic and 
ceaseless, consistent and forever changing, transforming and unfolding new 
contours, new forms and new lives”95. 
Thus, all life forms and physical objects arise by nature. However, 
nature itself is not the Creator. Unlike other Asian traditions which sometimes 
perceive nature as a “person”, Confucians perceive nature as an impersonal 
dynamic whole. It is therefore most likely that human beings, myriad creatures, 
and physical objects, all belong to one single category without any hierarchical 
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order. The ideal human beings must realize this great unity and be identified 
with the balanced condition of Earth and Heaven. Tu Weiming outlines the 
Confucian notion of ideal human beings by highlighting the realization of 
humanity,  
The highest Confucian ideal is the “unity of man and 
Heaven”, which defines humanity not only in 
anthropological terms but also in cosmological terms. In the 
Doctrine of the Mean (Chung yung), the most authentic 
manifestation of humanity is characterized as “forming a 
trinity with Heaven and Earth.”96  
 
As reflected in this statement, human beings are not merely rational, 
social, or political animals, but they also have the capability of “self-
transformation” to be identified with other elements in Heaven and Earth. This 
capability of self-transformation is embedded in human nature. Their 
enormous capabilities of communication with other natural elements would 
lead them to maintain a harmonious relationship with nature. Indeed, we could 
consider this capability as the capability of self-realization. If human beings 
can realize their appropriate relationship with the cosmic world, then they 
would become more responsible beings. 
Forming “One body” with all elements in the Heaven and Earth is 
essentially a spiritual consciousness. Confucian philosopher Chang Tsai 
presented this view in a famous paragraph, 
  
Heaven is my father and earth is my mother, and even such a 
small creature as I finds an intimate place in their midst. 
Therefore that which extends throughout the universe I 
regard as my body and that which directs the universe I 
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consider as my nature. All people are my brothers and sisters, 
and all things are my companions.97   
   
From this paragraph we could assume that there is no ontological divide 
between human beings and all myriad things in Heaven and Earth. Moreover, 
this relation does not simply dissolve the categorical division between them 
but rather invokes a more intimate companionship or family relationship, such 
as father, mother, and children. Taylor’s comments might be note worthy here. 
He writes,  
Through the identification of the commonality of material 
force and the nature of all things as a description of the 
nature of the universe, there is a call to treat all people as 
brothers and sisters and a call to see all things as companions, 
a prescription to act upon the basis of the knowledge of the 
nature of things.98      
 
The underlying moral principle regarding Heaven, Earth and human 
relationship is easily deducible if we concentrate on the call for “identification 
of the commonality” as stated in Taylor’s comments. The moral principle 
would be the same one which we practice in our family life. In other words, 
we respect our parents, love our brothers and sisters, and also do not harm 
anyone of them. Of course, without self-realization this moral principle may 
not be effective at all, and therefore, Confucianism develops a more consistent 
view of self-realization. Callicott indicates this point very clearly when he 
observes,  
Among Asian traditions of thought, Confucianism provides a 
worldview much more consonant with ecology for 
grounding Arne Naess’s Deep Ecological “Self-[with a 
capital ‘S’] realization” than is the Vedantic worldview...The 
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Confucian self is neither a discrete entity, a social atom, nor 
a playful manifestation of atman-brahman.99      
 
Like other early Confucians, Mencius also developed a kind of ethical 
principle which does not separate human beings and other natural elements. 
Put differently, Mencius holds that what is good for the flourishing of human 
beings would be good for the flourishing of other natural elements. Cecilia 
Wee emphasizes the equal status of human beings and other natural elements 
in Mencian ethics and writes,  
The Mencian would conclude that, insofar as we ought to 
promote the good of humans (i.e., ethical development), we 
ought to similarly promote the good of these other kinds. 
Thus, the Mencian would try to keep mountains in their state 
of natural luxuriance, ensure that rice plants receive their 
requisite moisture, air and sunlight, and so on.100   
 
Two Daoist philosophers, Lao Tzu (Laozi) and Chuang Tzu (Zhuangzi), 
gave more attention to nature. Instead of moral cultivation or human virtue, 
Daoism directly develops their moral guidelines from nature. Koller and 
Koller have noted that “...instead of emphasizing human relationships, Taoism 
emphasizes the way of nature”101. The way of nature is referred to as Dao. 
There are several interpretations of the word Dao. One of these interpretations 
is “Oneness”. In the Dao-De-Jing (or Tao-Te-Ching) Lao Tzu says, “Dao 
produced the One (sheng-yi), the One produced the two, the two produced the 
three, and the three produced the ten thousand things”102. 
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The One denotes nature and ten thousand things are the myriad things 
in it. The evolution process of nature is described here in a metaphorical 
language but the origin of all natural elements from one single source is also 
reflected. The sense becomes clearer in another verse of chapter 51 in the 
Dao-De-Jing: “Dao produces [10,000 things], and de rears them. Things take 
shape, and vessels are formed. This is why the ten-thousand things all revere 
Dao and honor de”103. 
The Daoist view of nature is articulated by two terms: Zi-ran and Wu-
wei. Zi-ran is commonly translated as “nature”. However, there are also 
several translations of this word and so we may consider its literal meaning. 
According to Liu, “Zi denotes ‘self’, ran denotes ‘so’; thus, zi-ran literally 
indicates ‘self-so’ or ‘so-of-itself’, suggesting that something or some state of 
affairs develops naturally”104. So, Zi-ran means something which is natural, i.e. 
develops without any interruption. Liu calls it “naturalness”. Heaven and Earth 
also integrate Dao and Zi-ran by a strong bond. Lao Tzu says, “People model 
themselves on the earth (ren-fa-di), the earth models itself on Heaven (di-fa-
tian), Heaven models itself on Dao (tian-fa-dao), and Dao models itself on zi-
ran (dao-fa-zi-ran)”105. 
This statement clearly suggests that Zi-ran is an unfolding activity of 
developing natural interrelationships of human beings, Heaven, Earth, and the 
Dao. The activity is rather important because it can yield an alternative to 
anthropocentrism. On the one hand, human beings are seen here as the vital 
forces or main parts of nature. On the other hand, considering their interests 
would make them interdependent with other natural elements. They can 
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maintain a perfect balance. As Lai notes, “These two features—integrity of the 
individual (de) and its conditioning locus (dao)—are held in a finely tuned 
balance”106.  
One may ask whether this can be a completely nonanthropocentric 
viewpoint. Apparently, it is true that the nonanthropocentric viewpoint does 
consider “balance” as one of the key features, and the realization of cosmic 
integrity and balance is given special importance. However, this may 
sometimes encourage human beings to submit to nature because respecting 
nature may also mean placing nature above us. Here, this submission is 
completely rejected and a concept of harmony is highlighted. A traditional 
Chinese illustration is “cooking soup”, where all ingredients have specific 
contributions without losing their own identities. Unlike the 
nonanthropocentric view where values of natural elements are intrinsic, values 
should be taken here in its proper context. Lai called Daoist insights of 
valuation “context-interdependence nexus” and writes, 
According to this interpretation, value derives from the 
context-interdependence nexus. As with all other beings and 
entities, humanity must be understood within its larger 
environmental context, together with the relations that 
hold.107 
 
The main point to be noted here is interdependence. However, one 
could be misguided that the principle hinted here is the law of nature. Since 
laws of nature are those laws which human beings only experience by 
observation, and are unable to do anything except experiencing. The Daoist 
principle is not one of these laws. For example, one fact that human beings are 
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dependent on vegetables as they are sources of many vitamins which cannot 
be found in animal bodies, may be considered a natural law. In this case, 
human beings have nothing to do except eating vegetables by destroying some 
plants. But the Daoist principle seems much broader than natural laws. This 
“principle of naturalness” involves some crucial elements that if ignored may 
cause imbalance and lack of Harmony between human beings, Heaven, Earth, 
and the Dao. The major Daoist scholar Liu I-Ming writes, “The Tao is 
completely balanced in the center, not leaning to one side at all. Who can go 
all the way through on this Way?”108 
We could easily assume that this ever lasting balance may not be 
realized very soon. It would require deep identification. Moreover, the balance 
may not be the balance in an ordinary sense. This is a spiritual balance which 
must be realized in accordance with the basic principle. I-Ming writes,  
The Tao connects with the spiritual. Once understood, it 
applies to everything, going beyond the dust of the ordinary 
world...This is most sacred, most spiritual—the three 
poisons of greed, aggression, and stupidity die out, there are 
no calamities, no difficulties, all reasons are spring.109      
 
As Miller notices below, this Daoist basic principle is Wu-wei which is 
not difficult to extract from the Daoist tradition and from the Dao-De-Jing, 
“Since the nature of the Dao is to be self-actualizing, creative and 
spontaneous...the way in which one arrives at this state of naturalness is 
through the principle of ‘wuwei’ ” 110 .However, the exact meaning and 
implication of the term Wu-wei is very difficult to understand and complex. 
Indeed, Chinese scholars are still offering new interpretations of the term. But 
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many of them have agreed that Wu-wei is the most important principle in 
Daoism, equally applicable to human-human and human-nature relations. Liu 
calls it “The most emphasized negative moral principle”111. 
The negative connotation may be deducible from the literal meaning of 
the term. Wu-wei is a combination of two different Chinese terms. “Wu” 
generally means “negation”, and “wei” means “action”. So, the term Wu-wei 
commonly denotes “no-action” or “non-action”. Koller and Koller have 
provided a simple but interesting explanation of the term,  
Nonaction (wu-wei) is an important Taoist concept. It means 
doing nothing except what proceeds freely and 
spontaneously from one’s own nature. Snakes should not 
attempt to walk or fly; their wu-wei is to crawl. A bird’s wu-
wei is to fly; attempting to crawl would be forced action for 
a bird.112     
 
This comment suggests that “Wu-wei” should be considered in the sense of 
“acting naturally”. But some other senses were also developed in Chinese texts. 
For instance, Xiaogan Liu writes, “Wu-wei has also been rendered as 
‘effortless action’... ‘acting naturally’, and ‘non-purposive action’, each of 
which reflects an aspect of the term’s connotations”113. 
Therefore, the term “Wu-wei” could have various meanings. However, 
all of these meanings share the same moral principle as our guideline for 
actions. As we have stated before, Wu-wei is a combination of two terms; this 
combination itself signals one of the basic guidelines. Liu writes, “This 
combination seems to signal the cancellation of all acts and behaviors with no 
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discrimination made among them” 114 . Of course, the value of 
“nondiscrimination” stated here is not a common practice to all traditions. 
Rather, many traditions prize discrimination as a necessary criterion for 
environmental policy-making. Liu adds, “All these phrases imply an attitude 
that apparently runs contrary to common knowledge, customs, values, and 
methods, but motivates one toward higher values and better results that can be 
approached only through an extraordinary manner and method”115.    
Surprisingly, few scholars have paid attention to these “higher values” 
pointed out by Liu. One of the exceptions is Miller who writes, “...in fact this 
‘action as non-action’ is really a form of spiritual technology by means of 
which humans cultivate their own natures and the nature around them”116. As 
hinted in Miller’s comment, the Wu-wei is spiritual, a self-identified 
consciousness for human beings to realize nature “...weaving together the 
seemingly disparate elements of their existence into a seamless whole: the 
fabric of the Dao”117. Nature cannot be interfered with for fulfilling greedy 
and selfish human wants and desires by interrupting any of ten-thousand 
elements in it. In contrast to interruption or intervention, human beings should 
be identified with the Dao to realize the action-guiding principle Wu-wei in 
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III. NATURE IN INDIAN TRADITIONS 
 
Nature plays a crucial role in Indian mythology, Hindu theology, philosophy, 
and cultures. Many stories in Indian mythology and Hindu religion regarded 
nature as a single ecological community consisting of both organic and 
inorganic members. Indian philosophy respects this religious spirit and 
develops a distinct analysis, rare in world philosophical traditions. Many 
philosophers in Indian traditions admit that philosophy cannot be separated 
from life. Rather, life has to be led with a synthesis of religion and philosophy. 
The religious traditions in India are diverse but mainly Hindu dominated. In 
spite of a majority of Hindus, there are Muslims, Christians, Buddhists, Sikhs, 
and Jains. The word Hindu originates from the Persian vocabulary and refers 
to Vedic people who lived in the bank of the Indus river118. So, it is easily 
inferable that Hindus have a very close relationship with nature.  
A significant number of great Indian philosophers, poets, writers, and 
novelists, marvelously drew the emotional aspects of human-nature 
relationship in their works. In order to get a full picture of the Indian attitude 
toward nature we should survey religious as well as philosophical resources. 
The main religious scriptures for Hindus are the Vedas, the Upanishads, and 
the Bhagavad Gita. Among them the oldest is the Vedas. Hindus believe that 
the knowledge and authority of the Vedas are self-evident and do not 
necessarily require any external recognition. According to a Hindu spiritualist 
and direct disciple of the Saint Sri Ramakrishna, verses in the Vedas 
“...themselves are authority, being the knowledge of God. And...their truth is 
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verifiable by any spiritual aspirant in transcendental consciousness” 119 . 
Elimination of ignorance and acquiring knowledge are Vedic commands to its 
followers. Without knowledge moksa (liberation) cannot be achieved. The 
liberation has to be gained in this Earth by bhakti (devotion), samarpon 
(surrender), prathas (practicing rituals), and puja (worship gods and 
goddesses). These are the true ways for enrichment or purification of soul. 
According to the Vedas, the Supreme Being or the Supreme God has 
created prakrti (nature) by some bhutas (primal material elements), for 
example, agni (fire), apah (water), vayu (air), and prithivi (earth). However, 
these primal elements also have the power of deities. According to the 
established knowledge, what is sentient cannot be non-sentient at the same 
time. The case here may not be the same. One normal proof of sentience is 
immediate reaction from the being. Similarly, the primal elements could react 
and that is why we get floods, cyclones, and earthquakes. However, one can 
point out that the reaction may not be as quick as we usually expect.  
Instead of reacting quickly, they may react slowly with massive power, 
while for a long time they may be calm and quiet. One might think that they 
are non-sentient. For instance, a dead body is non-sentient to us, but for the 
Vedic people, his or her spirit could exist in this Earth through the unification 
with natural elements. So, a concept of super human being has been created. 
They are sentient and at the same time non-sentient. Sentient because they are 
like super human beings, and non-sentient because they are natural objects. 
Nature, according to the Vedic literature, is anthropomorphic. An 
anthropomorphic view of nature treats natural elements as beings who have 
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super human powers. In other words, all natural elements are beings who 
possess different powers of deities. They are benevolent but can be aggressive 
too if disturbed or harmed. Chakraborty explained the Vedic view of natural 
elements in a straight-forward way, “They are powerful, benevolent, but at 
times can be destructive. They are the objects of our reverence and prayer. 
Each natural object has been looked upon as a deity”120.  
The Vedas explained nature as a fraction or part of the Supreme God. 
From His body all gods, goddesses, human beings, animals, plants, even the 
whole Earth were created. One of the principal verses of Rg-Veda is “All 
beings of the universe form, as it were, a fraction of his being...universe 
appears as sentient and insentient beings. From a part of him was born the 
body of the universe, and out of this body were born the gods, the earth, and 
men”121. 
The major Hindu religious scripture after the Vedas is the Upanishads. 
These are the “last part” of the Vedas and literally mean “sitting near 
devotedly, and so brings concretely to mind an earnest disciple learning from 
his guru, his spiritual master”122. The Upanishads are called the “knowledge” 
or “philosophical” portion of the Vedas. As its literal meaning and traditional 
recognition suggest, the Upanishads tell more about the relation between the 
Supreme Realities and nature. The Upanishads are all about learning real 
knowledge or liberation and getting rid of ignorance. Koller and Koller nicely 
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note, “The key question of the Upanishads is, What is the true nature of 
ultimate reality?”123  
Koller and Koller’s question hints that there might be some “false” 
nature of ultimate reality that are simply appearances but are perceived as real. 
For example, the flash of the lighting may be falsely understood as the power 
of light, but actually, this is the power of the Ultimate Reality. The Ultimate 
Reality, according to the Upanishads, is Brahman or Atman or Self. The Kena 
Upanishads says, “This is the truth of Brahman in relation to nature: whether 
in the flash of the lighting, or in the wink of the eyes, the power that is shown 
is the power of Brahman”124. 
According to the Upanishads, Brahman is the existence, knowledge, 
essence of the universe. Nature begins and ends with the Brahman. He is the 
One, and only One. The diversities in nature are merely apparent and illusory. 
Nature is the manifestation of one single reality, the Brahman. Chakraborty 
writes, “The Upanisads are well-known for their monistic metaphysics. 
Reality is one, they declare. The diversity that our robust common sense 
teaches us is only apparent and illusory”125. When the individual perceives 
nature as real she only misperceives the Brahman. She is in ignorance. She 
does not have knowledge of Brahman. However, as soon as she realizes nature 
as the manifestation of Brahman she achieves self-consciousness, the 
knowledge of Brahman. Sri Ramakrishna’s statement should be worth while 
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here: “When one attains samadhi [transcendental consciousness] then only 
comes to him the knowledge of Brahman”126.     
Ignorance is common to all individual selves. But some of them can 
overcome it. Those self-conscious selves have the ability to realize Earthly 
elements as the manifestation of Brahman. Earth was in the Brahman and He 
wishes to create it as the spider’s web is created. The spider’s web is 
temporary, like the Earth. Nature, similar to the individual self, has multiple 
powers, two of them are dynamism and staticness. All elements in nature were 
created by dynamic and static characteristics. The static characteristics are the 
three gunas (qualities), such as Satya, Rajas and Tamas, and the dynamic 
characteristic is the evolution process associated with these three gunas. 
However, these are only the dark side while Brahman is the light side. The 
individual self or jiva, when observing the dark side, feels pain and bondage. 
But that perception is changeable by the knowledge of the Self. All the pains 
and bondages are destroyed by Brahman’s knowledge. He is one, and in this 
way His knowledge omits all types of dualism. Theoretically, that would be 
the immediate experience of liberation.  
Nonetheless, as Sharma mentions, “Self-realisation is the only means 
of liberation. But in the evolution towards perfect self-realisation many other 
means have to be utilised”127. There are several conditions in Indian traditions 
for perfect realization of Self. Without these conditions realization cannot 
happen. 
For instance, initiation and devotion to the teacher, free from the 
experience of birth and death, are some of the necessary conditions which 
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must be fulfilled. Only a teacher can bring the enquirer to the final stage of 
self-realization, turiya. This would require absolute surrender and devotion of 
the disciple to Brahman and also to a teacher. In case of proper practice under 
the teacher, experience of birth and death disappear since the individual self 
identifies with the Supreme Self. The Supreme Self has no beginning and end, 
no birth and death. So, the individual self does not experience these once the 
stage of turiya is achieved. In Prabhavananada’s words, “Conceived as 
liberation-moksa-turiya is the state which results when the bonds of ignorance 
have been burst asunder, and implies freedom not only from all imperfections 
and limitations, but also from birth and death”128. Moksa, therefore, is freeing 
from all kinds of bondage, limitations, physical experiences which can be 
gained in the whole life-time or at the time of death. In other words, this is 
Self-realization that the Upanishads have asked to achieve for their followers.   
So, the Upanishadic view of human-nature relation can be seen as 
spiritual. Nonetheless, that spirituality is based on a concrete philosophy. This 
philosophy seems to be realizing “Oneness”. But that oneness presupposes 
identification of individual self and the Supreme Self, God. The dualism, Self 
and individual self, originates only by false identification, i.e. 
misunderstanding or ignorance of the Self. Thus, the fusion of self and 
individuality creates Indian spirituality. In this regard we could mention 
Prabhavananda’s comment, “This so—vaunted individuality of ours—what is 
it, after all? Born as it is of the false identification of the Self with the non-Self, 
it is but the illusory product of a radical misunderstanding”129. 
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The Bhagavad Gita, or the essence of Upanishads is a part of the great 
Indian epic Mahabharata. The Vedas outlines the Hindu anthropomorphic 
view toward nature, the Upanisads explores the realization of Self through 
knowledge and freedom from ignorance, the Gita developed the final moral 
principle, the Karma yoga (renunciation through action), which is very 
different from other traditions. Perhaps, the Karma theory manifests the whole 
Indian moral vision. Gita’s main attempt is to “combine knowledge, devotion 
and action”130. 
Mere knowledge has no value in Indian thought. Knowledge has to be 
integrated with devotion and action since knowledge could develop a one-
sided view of nature. But when it combines with morality, and finally, 
spirituality, then that would be the comprehensive development. The Gita thus 
maintains, “integral perfectionism, refutes one-sided development, and 
preaches “renunciation through activism” ”131. 
The Gita invites self-surrender to God who belongs to all beings, 
“Self-surrender, knowingly ‘to live, move, and have our being in God’, is 
central”132. Self-surrender requires meditation. But meditation alone cannot 
validate this self surrender. Performing one’s own duties toward natural 
elements, unselfish work, and specific personal sacrifices are also required. 
There are four principal paths for performing duties: Jnana yoga (renunciation 
through knowledge), raja yoga (renunciation through psychic control), bhakti 
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yoga (renunciation through love and devotion) and karma yoga (renunciation 
through work)133.    
Knowledge, self- control, love, devotion can make human beings truly 
admirable. The Gita says, “The truly admirable man controls his senses by the 
power of his will. All his actions are disinterested. All are directed along the 
path to union with Brahman”134. More interestingly, Krishna, the Hindu Lord, 
says in the Gita, “A man should not hate any living creature. Let him be 
friendly and compassionate to all. He must free himself from the delusion of 
‘I’ and ‘mine’ ”135. 
The teachings of karma yoga theory have a broader impact. If one does 
not obey her duties, or escape from her duties, or perform duties for some 
selfish gains then one must be prepared for equal sufferings and punishment. 
Suppose that one treated animals, say a rat, badly and then he or she died. 
Generally, in other religions or cultural traditions God will punish him or her. 
But very interestingly, in the Indian traditions, he or she has to come back 
again to this Earth as a rat and will be treated similarly. This rebirth cannot be 
avoided since it is God’s wish. 
However, again, the goal of karma yoga theory is not action. Rather, 
spirituality or bhakti toward all natural events in the Earth is the goal. In other 
words, Prabhavananda nicely comments, “...unless they are spiritualized they 
have no relation to karma yoga. Not karma, mere action, but karma yoga, 
union with God through action, is the essence of the teaching of the Gita on 
this subject”136. 
                                                 





Indian philosophical systems, generally known as “darsana”, were 
developed through the construction, reconstruction or reactions to, the 
teachings of Hindu religious scriptures. Indian philosophy has its own 
epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics, but all these are focused on 
establishing or refuting religious ideas. Interestingly, Carvaka, Buddhism, and 
Jainism, hold a conflicting view with Indian religious traditions. Nonetheless, 
they all developed a kind of spiritual philosophy which made Indian 
philosophy distinct from the West, as well as other philosophical traditions. 
Radhakrishnan, a major Indian philosopher in modern times, puts it clearly, 
“Philosophy in India is essentially spiritual”137. He also comments, “Spiritual 
experience is the foundation of Indian’s rich cultural history”138. 
The Sanskrit word “darsana”, however, literally demonstrates a very 
pragmatic attitude toward life, mentioning seeing or observing critically or 
logically. But what is to be seen or observed? The answer is human’s 
mysterious surroundings or nature. Meditation in a calm quiet place through 
identification with nature can produce true philosophy and thus ashrams 
(teacher’s house) and tapovanas (forest) were regarded as the source of all 
philosophical knowledge. The Vedas and Upanishads (the last part of the 
Vedas) were considered great books of all knowledge for Hindus since the 
ancient times. Indian philosophical systems are often distinguished in relation 
to the interpretation of the Vedas.  
Broadly, they can be divided into two groups: Vedic and nonVedic. 
The Vedic systems, Samkhya, Yoga, Mimamsa, Vedanta, Vaisesika, and 
Nyaya, acknowledge the authority of the Vedas and support its views. In 
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contrast, the nonVedic systems, Carvaka, Buddha, and Jaina, do not 
acknowledge the authority of the Vedas and develop an anti-Vedic philosophy. 
Each philosophical school may not deal with the same issues. However, 
human-nature relation was vital for all of them. Let me discuss two most 
prominent Indian philosophies briefly. The first is Buddhism, developed by 
Gautam Buddha or Sidhartha. The second, a Vedic philosophy called Vedanta. 
Buddha denies the existence of God but he admits “consciousness” 
rather than soul. Meditation or discard of selfishness through identification 
with higher paths plays a vital role in Buddha’s thought. Buddha perceives 
nature as usual without discussing its creation or end. The most important 
things to him are natural elements and human beings. He observes nature as 
full of sorrows, miseries, and sufferings. Nature is also painful. All beings 
must die and death can only bring pain for them. So, Buhhda investigates the 
causes of sufferings, which are sensual pleasure, enjoyment, and desire. The 
main cause, however, is ignorance. 
Of course, cessation of sufferings is possible by the destruction of ego 
and by loving all beings. Diminishing of ego and feeling love for all beings 
can develop gradually by meditation. The liberation is Nirvana which can be 
attained by contemplating Sunya (Nothing) in accordance with a special path 
called the “eight fold path”. The noble eight fold path is a path of self-
development through dhyana or identification with unselfishness.  
Buddha’s most important term “Nirvana” can be interpreted as a 
spiritual development through self-realization. Self-realization is a kind of 
perfection, a kind of positive development of one’s own self. Nirvana in its 
literal meaning is “cooling” or “blowing out” from long passion, also 
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extinction from all sorts of evil qualities in human life139. Buddha notes, “The 
mind released is like the extinction of a flame”140. At the final stage, Nirvana 
implies a deep spiritual consciousness which is not obsession with nature, but 
rather is integrated with nature peacefully and harmoniously. Radhakrishnan’s 
comment exposes the great philosophical insights of Nirvana, “The 
suppression of the evil tendencies is accompanied by a simultaneous spiritual 
progress. Nirvana, which is the consummation of the spiritual struggle, is a 
positive blessedness”141. 
The Vedanta philosophical system is considered as the highest 
flourishing of Indian thoughts. Vedanta philosophy was systematically 
illustrated and interpreted by the great Indian philosopher, Samkaracharya. 
Samkara’s philosophy is an identification of individual self with the universal 
Self or Brahman. This non-separation enables him to develop a monistic 
philosophy, as Radhakrishnan notes from Sutra of Badarayana, “Samkara 
takes it to mean a complete identification with the universal self, while 
Ramanuja interprets it as a partial assimilation to God”142. The philosophy of 
Advaita (non-dual) Vedanta is all about realization, the realization of Atman 
(Self). But that realization also aims at self-knowledge, as Deutsch nicely 
observes, “...that he who knows himself knows reality and overcomes all pain, 
misery, ignorance, and bondage”143. The Advaita Vedanta philosophy enables 
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the individual self “to acquire a fuller realization of who or what we 
essentially are”144.  
Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, the key political reformer and pioneer 
environmentalist in India, not only perceived human-nature relation from an 
integrated viewpoint but also practiced the simple way of living by making his 
own clothes through Charka (hand mill) and maintains his daily nutrition from 
a goat’s milk. His life styles give one important message to people in the 
whole world that by maintaining selfless simple life styles humans could 
preserve harmony in nature. But in order to achieve such a mentality they first 
need Self-realization and strict commitment to Ahimsa (nonviolence). Gandhi 
himself writes, “What I want to achieve—what I have been striving and pining 
to achieve these thirty years—is self-realization, to see God face to face, to 
attain Moksha [Salvation-oneness with God and freedom from later 
incarnations]” 145 . Rabindranath Tagore writes about the importance of 
identification, 
The man whose acquaintance with the world does not lead 
him deeper than science leads him, will never understand 
what it is that the man with the spiritual vision finds in these 
natural phenomena. The water does not merely cleanse his 
limbs, but it purifies his heart; for it touches his soul.146           
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IV. NATURE IN JAPANESE TRADITIONS 
 
In Japanese traditions, naturalness is denoted by the term “Shizen”. Shizen is 
considered also as the synonym of nature. Like the Chinese word “Ziran”, 
Shizen is a combination of two Japanese words “shi” and “zen”. Tucker notes 
that shi often means “spontaneously or naturally so” and zen means “it does”. 
So, literally Shizen means something which originates naturally as it does147. 
According to Tucker, the literal meaning of Shizen is “from itself (shi/ji) thus 
it does (zen/nen)”148. So, we could assert that Shizen captures the Chinese 
sense of spontaneity of nature with a considerable modification.   
The Japanese perceive spontaneous characteristics of nature in relation 
to Heaven and Earth, and also other encompassing natural elements, especially 
yama (mountains). As a result, the word Shizen differs from the modern 
Japanese word kankyo, meaning environment. The word “environment”, 
though used interchangeably with nature in the West, generally implies 
scientific understanding of nature. By the word kankyo the Japanese refer to 
their surroundings rather than to the broader concept of nature. In the Japanese 
view of nature, humanity and nature are not only integrated but also humans 
are identified with the natural forces. As Tucker puts it,  
Like Saigusa, the philosopher Sakamaki Shunzo has 
suggested that Japanese did not coin any single word for 
nature signifying something apart and distinct from 
humanity precisely because they considered themselves to 
be integral parts of the whole, closely identified with the 
elements and forces of the world around them.149 
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The idea of an integrated nature has also appeared in the writings of 
many Japanese philosophers, monks, and even scientists. For instance, an 
influential Japanese scientist and founding ecologist, Kinji Imanishi, had a 
unique view which he calls “self-completeness”, equally recognizable in living 
things and matter. In his famous book, Seibutsu no Sekai (The World of 
Living Things), Imanishi writes, “All living things and the societies they form 
through this self-completeness must always be connected with the principle of 
this world, with the self-completeness of this world”150.  
Imanishi’s view suggests that all myriad things, whether living or 
nonliving, have the same origins, and human beings need to be connected with 
this principle of self-completeness. Noted Neo-Confucian Japanese 
philosopher, Kaibara Ekken, called the common principle between human 
beings and myriad things qi (or chi) and writes, “There is only one material 
force between Heaven and Earth, and when there is movement and tranquility, 
we call it yin and yang. The virtue of ceaseless production we call life 
[creativity]...it is actually all one reality”151. 
Shinto and Buddhist worldviews in the Japanese traditions manifest the 
commonality of human beings and other natural elements and the basic 
principle of a unified natural system. Shintoism is the most distinguished 
feature in Japanese traditions. “Shinto” originates from the word “Kami” 
which means “scared objects” which can be found in Heaven, Earth, and 
human beings themselves. The term “Shintoism” refers to the “Way of Kami”. 
Sometimes it may also mean Shen-tao or the “law of Heaven and Earth” as 
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expressed in Taoism. Tsunetnugu has identified three basic characteristics of 
Shinto. 
The first and second characteristics are related to Imperialism and 
Realism respectively, but the third one is the most interesting and spiritual 
which “refers to the reverence for brightness and purity in all matter and 
thought”152. Note that the brightness and purity should not be understood as 
common usage. Brightness and purity are synonymous with goodness. 
Tsunetsugu writes, “At the heart of the Shinto theology of the Outer Shine a 
spiritual meijo shugi existed in diverse forms”153. However, all forms have 
focused on “correctness and uprightness”. 
This correctness and uprightness belongs to the heart of human beings. 
In other words, the correctness and uprightness may appear as a response by 
the heart through self-realization. The heart can be purified when everything in 
nature is placed in its proper place: “Fast and prepare yourself purely and 
fairly with a bright, red heart and not a dirty, black heart. Serve the Great 
Kami by treating left as left and right as right, without shifting things on the 
right to the left”154. 
Clearly, Shintoism maintains realization in practicing some great 
virtues. However, just realization or worship of Kami may not be enough. 
These may supply the spiritual elements but the correctness of behavior comes 
from the identification of brightness and uprightness. As Tsunetsugu puts it, 
“...“kami” is thought to have been identical with...the natural objects of heaven 
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and earth (such as heavenly bodies, mountains, rivers, fields, seas, rain, and 
wind), but also of birds, beasts, insects, trees, wood, grass, and minerals”155. 
Like Confucianism and Daoism in China, Buddhism has developed in 
Japan not only as a religion but also as a way of being connected with nature. 
For example, the Japanese holds the conception of “Buddhahood” or 
“Buddha-nature” as the vital force which exists in all entities in the world. 
Despite the Buddhist text Sutras there are several individual monks’ poetry 
and their conceptual resources in Japan. For instance, the Monk Kukai writes, 
“Both this space and these plants-and-trees are the dharmakaya”156. The two 
Buddhist terms “Buddhahood” and “Dharmakaya” are discussed below to 
present a clearer Japanese worldview. 
At the time of transplantation of Buddhism from India to China it was 
believed, particularly in Mahayana Buddhism, that “Buddhahood belongs to 
all sentient beings”. After a long debate, the Chinese Tien-tai school claimed 
that Mahayana Buddhist logic requires universalism, i.e. having sentience is 
not necessary for a being to be respected. In other words, everything should be 
respected. Their influential comment was, “Buddha-nature be ascribed not 
only to plants, trees, and earth, but even to particles of dust”157. 
When Buddhism entered Japan, this view was absorbed by the 
Japanese indigenous religion Shinto. According to Shinto, nature and human 
beings are equally divine. As Parkes notes, “In Shinto the whole world is 
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understood to be inhabited by shin (kami), or divine spirits”158. The divine 
spirits are present in anything which deserves our respect and reverence. This 
atmospheric set-up was suitable for Buddhism. The Tendai School at first 
elaborates this idea in Japan and makes it as a central theme of Buddhism. The 
medieval monk Kukai regards this issue as very important.       
Kukai summarized his worldview as, “The Four Mandalas are 
inseparably related to one another...Infinitely interrelated like the meshes of 
Indra’s net are those we call existence”159. According to traditional Buddhism 
in Japan, when people got enlightenment they manifest “Dharmakaya” 
(teaching body). So, Dharmakaya was seen as a form of Absolute Reality. But 
Kukai explains it by asking, “Where is the Dharmakaya? It is not far away; it 
is in our own body”160. This conceptual transformation implies that there is no 
significant difference between Absolute Reality, human beings, and natural 
entities. This is the cosmic identification or cosmic harmony which can be 
attained by mandalas (mind), mantras (speech), and mudras (body)161.  
When Kukai monks refer to the “Indra net” they mean a total 
interdependence. As Ingram writes, “Kukai’s universe is a universe of 
nondual-identity-in-difference”162. Steve Odin explains the metaphor of “Indra 
net” in the paradigm of microcosm and macrocosm. The cosmic web, like 
Daoism, has a dynamic causal interrelationship. Everything in nature arises by 
an inter-fusion of one and many. The universe can be illustrated as a 
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macrocosm of infinite microcosm. Odin describes this view as “relational 
cosmology” which has aesthetic implications163.  
The relational cosmology later appeared in another trend of Buddhism, 
namely Kegon Buddhism, in their two famous doctrines: riji muge 
(“interpretation of part and whole”) and jiji muge (“interpretation of part and 
part”)164. Moreover, they gave it an axiological dimension by saying that since 
everything relates to everything, there is nothing in this universe that is 
valueless. Odin says, “This view further entails a morality of unconditional 
compassion and loving kindness for all sentient beings in nature”165.  
The term “Buddha-nature” was used by Japanese scholars in various 
senses. For example, Buddha-nature meant sympathy, nonviolence, love, 
wisdom, reality, and compassion. King argues that Buddha-nature is regarded 
as a “social stereological device” for self-transformation in Japanese traditions. 
Buddha-nature motivates human beings to act compassionately to all sentient 
and non-sentient elements. In his words,  
Thinkers and movements as diverse as Rissho Koseikai, 
Soka Gakkai, and Thich Nhat Hanh all assert that it is an 
important part of practice to manifest one’s Buddha-nature 
through bodhi-sattva action in the form of concrete acts of 
compassion and social activism.166 
 
Two important issues in Japanese traditions are “wisdom” and 
“awareness”. Indian traditions, as we have seen, are mainly concerned with 
“liberation” and “ignorance”, while Japanese traditions focus on achieving 
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bodhi or wisdom and awareness. Zuiho writes, “First, the purpose of 
Buddhism is not “liberation” (mukta, vimoksa) but the realization of “wisdom” 
(bodhi) for the practice of “great compassion” (mahakaruna) ”167 . But why 
does one need to realize bodhi? Zuiho adds, “Third, to achieve bodhi-wisdom, 
one must begin by cultivating an awareness of the a priori actuality of the 
phenomenal world that can be expressed in words, and then pass beyond 
words...”168. 
Realization of bodhi would entail awareness of compassion for all life-
forms and myriad things in the Earth. This awareness actually is the 
attainment of the highest identification with the phenomenal world in a unique 
compassionate way. In short, awareness that “causes an emotional and willful 
attachment to the self”169. The Japanese spirit of human-nature relation is 
highlighted in the words of Nakasone, once the Prime Minister of Japan, 
We Japanese are not monotheists. We go through a cycle 
that draws us into the world of polytheism, being born into 
Nature and returning to Nature at death. The mountains, 
rivers, grasses, and trees are our brothers: this is the origin of 
the notion that “mountains, rivers, grasses, and trees all 
attain Buddhahood.”170 
 
In his comments, Nakasone stresses that all natural elements, including human 
beings, share the same Buddhahood, i.e. natural elements are interconnected. 
Some philosophers have perceived it as an “ecocentric turn” in Japanese 
traditions which started in the Japanese Tendai Buddhist doctrine, “...If I 
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realize that Suchness and I are one and the same thing...the myriad 
bodhisattvas are not apart from my very own body”171. 
As pointed out earlier, apart from empathetic perception of nature, a 
good number of Japanese poets and philosophers fused aesthetics and nature. 
Callicott writes, “A long tradition of Japanese poets—including Teika, Saigyo, 
Basho, and Sesshu—captured the delicate Japanese Buddhist religio-aesthetic 
posture toward nature in a medium accessible to a broad audience” 172 . 
Interestingly, Japanese traditions not only maintain this “religio-aesthetic 
posture” theoretically but they have also implemented this view in conserving 
nature. Tucker writes, “It was the Confucian and Neo-Confucian scholars who, 
in addition to admiring natural beauty and revering it spiritually, made the 
natural world...designed to conserve the environment for future 
generations”173. 
 
V. LOCATING SOME ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES IN ASIAN 
TRADITIONS 
 
Asian attitudes toward nature are mainly nonanthropocentric174 . However, 
anthropocentric ingredients are not rare in Asian traditions. So, when we 
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discuss Asian environmental values we should assume diversity and integrity 
in and between these traditions. As we have seen, Asian environmental values 
are articulated with some basic ideas, such as community, identification, 
spirituality, companionship, nonviolence, self-realization, continuity, 
interrelatedness, aesthetic appreciation of nature, devotion, sympathy, and 
empathy. We will discuss some of them which are more vivid and closely 
related to environmental philosophy and ethics.   
The concept of community has appeared in Asian traditions in a very 
broad sense. Community is not limited to human societies, groups, races, and 
religions. Rather, the whole cosmos is seen as a community where human 
beings, animals, gardens, stones, and mountains are all members. One 
community member has no right to dominate others even though these are 
nonliving. Perhaps, the division between living and nonliving is hardly 
regarded as important in all Asian traditions discussed. The value of 
considering all natural elements as a single community is clearly reflected in 
Indian, Chinese and Japanese traditions.  
The Indian perspective of treating nature as body parts of gods and 
goddesses has fostered a change in the traditional view of human-centric 
community. Their value of perceiving different natural powers as the powers 
of gods and goddesses created a strong ethical principle called the Karma 
theory which is mostly based on the idea of one single community. Further, 
the general convention of time by which we denote an event as present, past, 
future was also omitted in the Karma theory since one who pays any 
disrespect toward other beings may come back with the same body and soul of 
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that being. So, time is seen as continuous, and the ethical principle applicable 
to human beings is also applicable to other natural elements, such as animals. 
In the Chinese traditions, community is seen in relation to material 
forces of li and chi or yin and yang. All natural elements, including human 
beings, are composed of li and chi, the primal cosmic energy or matter-energy 
of the universe. The myriad things between Heaven and Earth are community 
members and also maintaining a balance of li and chi which human beings 
should not interfere with. Daoism more radically mentions ten thousands 
myriad things as members of community. A Daoist approaches all of them as 
family members. 
The Japanese Shinto and Buddhist views opposed the significance of 
the living and nonliving distinction. Every natural element holds Buddha 
nature and Buddhahood is the principle of community to be followed. The 
Japanese view of Buddhahood turns to empathy and sympathy for all natural 
elements. The concept of community plays a crucial role in Asian 
environmental philosophy. It may not be wrong to say that environmental 
philosophy is just an expansion of the traditional concept of community. Naess 
wrote his whole book on the interrelation of community, ecology and life 
styles. 
A sense of a wider community represents the value of “totality”. In 
other words, a wider community comprises an idea of totality rather than 
particularity. Totality is a value which might be seen in any aboriginal society 
in the West in a form similar to that in Asian traditions. Many environmental 
ethicists regard totality as one of the basic values in human-nature relation. 
For example, Lovelock observes the Earth as Gaia, or a total, unified organism. 
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Aldo Leopold’s land ethics is another major development of the value of 
totality and community. Leopold writes, “The land ethic simply enlarges the 
boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or 
collectively: the land”175. 
Therefore, Asian environmental values are closely related to the 
concept of “totality”. Put differently, a sense of community based on 
interrelation, interdependent, empathy, and sympathy, has motivated Asian 
people at least theoretically, religiously, and culturally. However, this finding 
is not entirely new since a few comparative environmental philosophers have 
already alluded to some of these values. Callicott, for instance, when 
commenting on Asian environmental values, writes,  
Human beings enjoy an interdependence and mutuality with 
all environing conditions. Perhaps the greatest contribution 
that classical Chinese thought can make to a global deep-
ecological awareness lies in this conception of dynamic, 
mutually constitutive, internal relatedness.176  
 
My findings, however, show that these are only surface level values, 
and for a “global deep-ecological awareness” we would need further analysis. 
The deeper level values which I have indicated in my analysis are 
identification, self-realization, and spirituality. An in-depth comparison in the 
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VI. DO ASIAN WORLDVIEWS HAVE AN ADVANTAGE IN 
ADDRESSING HUMAN-NATURE RELATIONSHIP? 
 
Many Western environmental philosophers have pointed out that Western 
attitudes and values toward nature need to be corrected, and the West should 
adapt a different attitude and some alternative values for harmonious co-
existence in nature. These philosophers have turned their attention to Asian 
worldviews for a potential reformulation. One of the main reasons to consider 
Asian worldviews is that the mind-body dualism found in the Western 
traditions is almost absent in Asian worldviews. Some Asian scholars already 
created the ground by presenting successfully Zen Buddhism, Taoism, and 
Advaita Vedanta philosophy in the West to show how ontological dualism has 
dissolved in their metaphysics. Inspired by them, a few famous environmental 
philosophers related their thoughts to Asian worldviews. Hargrove writes in 
this context, “Deep ecology as a popular movement within environmental 
philosophy did, of course, retain some Eastern elements”177. 
It is well-known that the West considers nature from the materialistic 
point of view. Industrial revolution helped the West to maintain a separation 
between human beings and the rest of nature. Nature was viewed from an 
engineering perspective. Rapidly the mechanistic view of nature was culturally 
absorbed in the West. Callicott and Ames state, “Nature is represented in 
atomism as particulate, reductive, material, inert, quantitative, and mechanical. 
This concept of nature became institutionalized in early modern science and 
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was pragmatically translated into an engineering agenda” 178 . As these 
comments represent, Western traditions gained a mechanistic view of nature 
largely based on science and technology. 
In contrast, Asian traditions attempted to unify humans and nature 
since the ancient times. Unlike the Western traditions which rank nature below 
human beings, the Asian traditions rank nature above human beings. But this 
higher rank of nature did not separate them. Nature was seen as mother, 
natural elements were seen as brothers and sisters, and harming nature was 
regarded as a sin. Nature was respected and understood as a larger family. 
Historian Roderick Nash writes, “Ancient Eastern cultures were the sources of 
respect for and religious veneration of the natural world...As early as the 
eighth century B.C., the Indian philosophy of Jainism proposed that man not 
kill or harm any living creature”179. 
Apart from respecting nature, Asian traditions formulated a rich code 
of conduct to relate with nature. People in this region willingly followed these 
codes, and persons who achieved mastery by performing these codes of 
conduct were generally regarded as wise or enlightened persons. Nash adds,  
...early Buddhists and Hindus professed a feeling of 
compassion and a code of ethical conduct for all that was 
alive. Likewise, China and Tibet produced philosophies 
which honored life other than man’s and promulgated 
elaborate dietary rules in this interest.180    
 
The Asian traditions were devoted to maintaining a compassionate 
relationship with all natural elements. But this companionship was sometimes 
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articulated just as theories. Perhaps, an unconditional sympathetic attitude 
toward animals, trees, plants, and lands is needed in practice. However, 
anthropocentrism was discouraged throughout history. Callicott writes, 
“...human beings and nature leading to sympathy for other creatures, to 
compassion—that is, to ahimsa—is implied...certainly it represents an advance 
beyond egocentrism and anthropocentrism”181. 
Therefore, one of the main advantages of the Asian perception of 
human-nature relation is noted as a “seamless interconnection” or “continuity” 
between the Creator, human beings and natural elements. In the Western 
traditions, there is a hierarchy between the three categories. But this hierarchy 
has been dissolved in Asian worldviews. Two influential Asian scholars, 
Tucker and Grim, comment,  
The East Asian traditions of Confucianism and Taoism 
remain...The seamless interconnection between the divine, 
human, and natural worlds that characterizes these traditions 
has been described as an anthropocosmic worldview. There 
is no emphasis on radical transcendence as there is in the 
Western traditions.182  
 
Selin, commenting broadly on non-Western cultures, says,  
Non-Western cultures, and not just tribal cultures, do not 
necessarily see people and nature as separate entities; they 
know that we are affected by our surroundings and we affect 
them. No great intellectual leap is needed to realize that 
where we are affects who we are.183 
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In his monumental work Needham’s notes, “It is, indeed, as if the Chinese saw 
phenomena in Heaven and Earth running along parallel strands in time, 
perturbing events in one strand giving rise to perturbing effects in the other”184. 
We could find several examples in Asian traditions where not only sage 
masters but also common people realize that their surroundings have 
enormous spiritual, psychological and aesthetic effects on them. So, another 
advantage of Asian worldview is interdependence.  
Nonetheless, these advantages do not guarantee that Asian worldviews 
will solve the present ecological crisis within a very short time. Indeed, despite 
these traditional advantages some Asian countries are evidently under 
environmental threats. China’s current environmental crisis is worth 
mentioning here. Nowadays, many people in China are not able to see the sky 
at daylight due to severe air pollution. Rivers and lakes are occupied with low 
water. Flood, cyclone, draught, and earthquakes are regular events. Mining 
tragedy very often appears at news headlines. Pollution related deaths are 
increasing every year. Militarization with an increasing number of military 
bases has made the environmental issues more complex. 
 For rapid industrial development a huge demand of energy pushes 
China in using all types of natural resources, including coal, gas, oil, hydraulic 
power, nuclear power and fossil fuels. Heavy industrial pollution is often 
dumped into Chinese land, rivers, and seas. Deforestation raises negative 
impact all over the country. One can realize the threats of environmental crisis 
in China by just considering the media reports on the Huai River Watershed 
accident as an example, “In 2004, the media exposed not only this watershed-
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wide water pollution accident, but also a high incidence of cancer believed to 
be caused by this pollution in villages within the watershed”185. Mekong River 
is one the biggest reservoirs of biodiversity, including rare fishes, reptiles, and 
mammals in the Earth. Over-fishing and chemical dumping in the river have 
made some species extinct.  
Environmental degradation is also severe in India. Air, water and noise 
pollutions are the most common problems. India’s main energy resources are 
coal, oil, hydraulic power, and natural gas. However, nuclear power plants 
which use uranium and thorium are rapidly increasing. The bad effects of 
radiation and chemical exploration were reported by the news media. The 
Bhupal disaster in 1984 was one of the worst environmental disasters. The 
chemicals which were released from the exploration were extremely 
dangerous for humans and nonhumans. The Encyclopedia of Environmental 
Ethics and Philosophy notes, “Bhopal is an example of everything that can go 
wrong in an industrial catastrophe”186. 
Japan is one of the top consumers of fossil fuels. Two major 
environmental problems in Japan are industrial pollution and heavy illegal 
dumping. There are several industrial accidents in the history of Japan. They 
include the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the Ashio Cooper Mine accident in 
1880, and the Fukushima Dai Ichi power plant disaster in 2011. Due to these 
environmental disasters a lot of people died of Minamata disease. Some 
suffered for a long time, and land, air, and water pollution were matters of 
serious concern. Even food items, vegetables, and meat were radiation 
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contaminated after the recent Fukushima nuclear accident. The State of the 
Environment in Asia notes, “Recently the most serious problem Japan faces 
with regard to waste management and resource recycling is illegal dumping 
(which includes inappropriate disposal and illegal exports)”187. In addition to 
these, urbanization reduces forest, and hunting whales causes imbalances in 
the environment.  
Now, one can challenge the advantages of Asian traditions by referring 
to the environmental degradation of these countries. Isn’t it a clear 
disconnection with the traditional values just discussed? I agree that certainly 
there is a disconnection between the actual practice and traditional values. 
What is the cause of this disconnection? There are two possible answers. 
Firstly, there is a crisis of policies and perceptions held by the relevant 
countries. Secondly, people have lost their bonding or appreciation of the 
traditional values of nature. Tucker and Grim speak of a “moral and spiritual 
crisis”188. Jiang claims that “China’s environmental crisis is, at its core, a crisis 
of policies and perceptions”189. To me, the environmental crisis is a crisis of 
losing our primitive selves, deeply interrelated with the traditional values and 
our surroundings. 
What can be done to overcome this situation? Major environmental 
problems arise from competition in industrial development. Probably, none of 
the relevant countries would allow a slow economic growth and less 
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technological development. But they can accept the cross-cultural example of 
harmonious living between nature and human beings, the re-establishment of 
their rich social, cultural, and religious heritage. Then they can reconstruct 
their selves and their moral principles in the light of traditional values.  Jiang’s 
suggestion is, “New values of respect for nature have to be (re-) established, 
inspired by both traditional Chinese culture, with its roots in Confucianism, 
Daoism, and Buddhism..., as well as by modern ecological sciences...”190. A 
similar recommendation was made by Tucker and Grim, to “reorient ourselves 
in relation to the earth”191.  
My suggestion is to engage with the common core values extracted 
from the cross-cultural observations and strengthen the bonding with our 
surroundings as ecological neighbors. We need to formulate a comprehensive 
ethical framework. But before that, we should consider whether any 
reformulation of Asian traditions is necessary, as suggested by the Western 
philosophers.   
It should be worth noting that some key environmental thinkers admit 
the relative advantage of Asian worldviews, but they think that without 
significant reformation of Asian “conceptual resources” these worldviews are 
not acceptable. John Passmore, for instance, says, “Mystical contemplation 
will not clean our streams or feed our peoples; no invisible guiding hand, 
whether Providence or History, guarantees our salvation” 192 . Of course, 
Passmore is right in saying that mysticism cannot give us food and eliminate 
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famine, but in the same way sufficient food cannot ensure that we can survive 
environmentally well.  
In sum, I have discussed the concept of nature in Asian perspectives. 
Three major traditions, namely, Chinese, Indian and Japanese, are discussed in 
order to get an overall picture of Asian environmental thoughts. Our analysis 
has shown that Asian worldviews demonstrate an alternative environmental 
philosophy based on some nonanthropocentric values, such as interrelatedness, 
interdependentness, continuity, companionship, devotion to nature, aesthetic 
appreciation of nature, and empathy and sympathy for all living entities. But 
there are also enough ingredients for anthropocentric values, for example, 
Confucian moral self-cultivation. Of course, Asian worldviews have greater 
resources for addressing the human-nature relation because of maintaining a 
respectful, compassionate, and interrelated attitude toward nature. However, 
these advantages may not ensure that Asian worldviews could provide a 
completely correct attitude toward nature because of the dislocation of some 
core values.  
Thus, it seems to me that some of these nonanthropocentric values, 
such as totality, are only the surface level values. The deeper level values are 
identification, self-realization and spirituality, as reflected in our discussion. A 
comparison of Western and Asian traditions will further make it clear how and 
in what sense these values are treated in specific environmental philosophical 
issues. In the next chapter, we will therefore concentrate on a comparison by 











Environmental philosophy in the West and in Asia reflects different attitudes, 
goals, and perspectives which were discussed in the previous two chapters. 
Environmental philosophy focuses on some vital questions, and these 
questions were answered in different traditions in quite different ways. All 
traditions ultimately attempt to articulate a few basic questions when dealing 
with the human-nature relationship: Are human beings unique? How should 
the living and nonliving elements in nature be considered? Is nature sacred? 
So, when we compare Western and Asian views on the environment we must 
address these issues. 
It may not be surprising that Western and Asian traditions sometimes 
reach similar conclusions regarding human uniqueness, the distinction 
between living and nonliving elements, and nature’s sacredness. However, 
there are also differences in perceptions and valuations of the environment. In 
this chapter we will further concentrate on an important question: Why do the 
two traditions differ in valuing the environment? Alternatively, do they have 
the same sense or different senses of some environmental values when 
discussing the issues of uniqueness, living-nonliving distinction, and 
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sacredness? We will begin our discussion by comparing the views on human 
uniqueness.  
I. UNIQUENESS OF HUMAN BEINGS 
 
The uniqueness of human beings is a major issue in Western philosophical 
traditions, as we have noted in Chapter One. Western traditions subscribe to 
two types of theories regarding uniqueness. The first may be called the 
dominion theory and the second is the mechanistic theory. The former is 
derived from Christian theology and holds that human beings are created in 
God’s image and they have inherited power and right from Him to dominate 
over nature and subdue all natural elements.   
Verse I:26 of Genesis states, “Then God said, “Let us make man in our 
image, after our likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, 
and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and 
over every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth” ”193. In verse I: 28 
Genesis also states, “And God blessed them, and God said to them, “Be 
fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it; and have dominion over 
the fish of the sea and over the birds of the air and over every living thing that 
moves upon the earth” ”194.  
This dominion attitude was pervasive in the Greeco-Roman 
philosophical traditions. However, there is no reason to think that all Greek 
philosophers supported this superior position of human beings. A few Greek 
philosophers sought to eliminate the human-nature separation and argued for 
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the unity of nature. Hughes in the Encyclopedia of Environmental Ethics and 
Philosophy comments,  
The oneness of nature can be found in Orphic thought, and 
philosophers such as Pherecydes (c. 544 BCE), Pythagoras 
(fl. 530 BCE), Philolaus (470-390 BCE), and Empedocles 
(492-432 BCE) refined this idea. Orphic cosmology 
envisioned an organic unity of the world and the cyclical 
interplay and balance of elements and creatures within it.195      
 
Apart from Orphic philosophers, Aristotle also showed an internal integrity 
between natural elements. But he also wrote that “Plants exist for the sake of 
animals...all other animals exist for the sake of man”196. 
 Another famous example against the dominion attitude is the Gaia 
hypothesis. Krooth writes, “Free of human interference, Gaia is an unfettered 
living force of wondrous conditions: flowing atmospheric gases that 
interchange with plants and animals; soils, water and sunlight that make plant 
photosynthesis possible, producing food...” 197 . Gaia is an organic whole 
personified in the Greek mythology. Lovelock, who revived the Gaia 
hypothesis in the 20th century, states this organic view more vividly, “As 
understanding of Gaia grew, however, we realized that it was not life or the 
biosphere that did the regulating but the whole system”198. 
 In the Greeco-Roman traditions human beings were primarily regarded 
as dominators, but the organic attitude toward nature was also present and 
continued up to the middle age of the history of philosophy.  
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 Then the mechanistic theory of the environment bloomed. 
Dramatically, since the sixteenth century the organic view of nature was 
completely changed by the influence of Rene Descartes, John Locke, David 
Hume, Karl Marx, John Stuart Mill, Friedrich Nietzsche, Sir Isaac Newton, 
Albert Einstein, and other prominent thinkers. Their mechanistic worldviews 
replaced the organic attitude toward nature. A form of the mechanistic 
worldview was provided in Charles Darwin’s The Origin of Species (1859) 
and The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex (1871).   
 The Darwinian worldview contributed significantly to shaping present 
Western scientific knowledge, attitudes toward the environment, the origin of 
human beings, their relation with other species, and Western traditions 
generally. But Darwin’s works were not much discussed earlier in philosophy 
because they dealt mainly with the classification of species and with 
evolutionary biology. However, a drastic revival of a Darwinian worldview 
can be seen in almost all contemporary Western environmental philosophers 
from Aldo Leopold to J. Baird Callicott. In particular, Alan Holland, Bryan G. 
Norton, Eric Katz, Robin Attfield, and Brian Baxter directly based their views 
on supporting Darwinism. Arguably, Naess’s ecosophy has also incorporated 
some elements from the Darwinian evolutionary biology.  It is therefore 
necessary to discuss briefly the Darwinian worldview and the place of human 
beings in his worldview.   
 Darwin showed that all animal species are the result of the 
evolutionary process through natural selection which is contrary to the 
creation process stated in religions. According to Darwin, human beings are 
simply the complex form of lower members of the same family. The 
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superiority of human beings narrated in the religious scriptures is all about 
language capability and the developed brain functions of human beings. But 
according to Darwin, other lower animals also have the potentiality to develop 
such language and brain functions. A famous defendant of Darwinism, Baxter, 
writes,  
The Darwinian worldview embodies, of course, the two key 
ideas of Darwin’s theory as applied to human beings. Firstly, 
it takes as axiomatic the claim that ‘Homo sapiens is an 
animal species’. Secondly, it accepts the Darwinian claim 
that this species, like all others on the planet, has arisen by a 
process of evolution by natural selection from an ancestor 
common to them all.199  
 
 From this comment, it is clear that the Darwinian worldview is 
completely opposite to the Biblical worldview. According to the Biblical 
worldview, a hierarchical chain must be maintained, which is God, angels, 
human beings, animals, plants, and material objects respectively. In the 
Darwinian worldview, however, there is no hierarchical chain, but rather all 
species develop from their lower descendants and consequently human beings 
are “co-descendants” of an animal family. Darwin writes, “The main 
conclusion...is that man is descended from some less highly organised 
form”200. In a rather clearer way he says, “...all point in the plainest manner to 
the conclusion that man is the co-descendant with other mammals of a 
common progenitor”201.  
 Of course, from the environmental ethical perspective Darwin’s view 
could claim a relative advantage because of eliminating hierarchy. But the 
process by which this hierarchy dissolved is natural selection—a totally 
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mechanistic view. If everything in nature is sustained or lost by the 
evolutionary process, then there is no need for environmental ethics. Humans 
can be frustrated, demoralized and might show less interest in living with co-
operation and natural balance. The behavior of human beings will have little 
or no impact on the Earth. Human beings could do whatever they like for their 
own purposes. The question of “worthwhile life” even becomes blurred in the 
Darwinian worldview. Darwinian humanism thus creates a tension for 
environmental ethics. Krikman notices this tension and writes, “There is, 
however, a serious and plausible objection to Darwinian humanism and its 
consequences for environmental ethics, an objection that merits treatment at 
some length”202.  
 The questions are: What type of humanism Darwin proposes? Are 
Darwinian humans dignified? Is it possible to live a worthwhile life in 
Darwinian humanism?  
 Darwin’s worldview rather sketches a pessimistic position of human 
beings in the animal kingdom for those naturalists who think that human 
beings could certainly claim a superior position for their spiritual and natural 
capabilities. However, Darwin thinks that the difference between humans and 
animals is not in kind, but in degree. Of course, a difference in degree cannot 
justify a higher place for human beings according to Darwin. In a famous 
paragraph he comments, “...that the mental faculties of man and the lower 
animals do not differ in kind, although immensely in degree. A difference in 
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degree, however great, does not justify us in placing man in a distinct 
kingdom”203.               
From this influential passage, we can understand that all animals in the 
Earth, including human beings, belong to one single category because they 
differ mainly in degree, not in kind. A difference in degree is generally less 
important than a difference in kind. Recent “genome mapping” has confirmed 
the Darwinian thesis that there is a very insignificant difference between the 
human genome and the genome of great apes. As Oelschlaeger points out, 
“Following the “genetic revolution”, beginning with Mendel, then Watson and 
Crick...we are confronted with a stark truth: the human genome is virtually 
identical to that of the greater chimpanzee. There is less than one percent 
difference”204. 
 Naturally, like Darwin, many people will ignore this “less than one 
percent difference” as being very insignificant. But ignoring this insignificant, 
less than one percent difference, may be very costly. If there is less than one 
percent change in the Earth’s axis, the whole solar system will break down. If 
there is less than one percent change in the water level, the Earth would have 
either floods or deserts. If there is less than one percent change in the air flow, 
everything either flies or there is fire and death. If there is less than one 
percent change in the Earth’s ecosystem and geological balance, nothing can 
be sustained. So, even if Darwin and the genetic revolution are correct, the less 
than one percent difference is enormously significant and extremely valuable. 
Moreover, Darwin’s worldview does not offer any explanation of inorganic 
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elements of nature, such as land, water, air, sky, and mountains. His view fails 
to realize that there is another world—the inorganic world.  
 By treating the difference of species as merely a matter of degree, 
Darwin undermines some important features of human beings, such as 
incommunicable spiritual and aesthetic experience capacity. Oelschlaeger 
comments,  
The one percent of difference between human and 
chimpkind, as it turns out, makes all the difference. After all, 
chimpanzees are not cratering the planet. In effect, the 
specific difference between the human species and the other 
primates generally, and chimpanzees specifically, plays out 
in those capacities that make us language animals—Homo 
narrans.205   
 
Perhaps, language is the most distinctive characteristic of human beings which 
separates them from other lower animals according to Darwin. He asserts that 
only human beings have a strong power of articulating meaningful diverse 
sounds and ideas. This is possible basically for the high level of mental power 
of human beings. Nonetheless, the high level of mental power, or self-
consciousness, is simply an “incident” in evolution theory in Darwin’s world. 
He says, “...these qualities are merely the incidental results of other highly-
advanced intellectual faculties; and these again [are] mainly the result of the 
continued use of a perfect language”206.  
At least human beings are distinguishable, if not unique, for their 
capability of using complex language. Indeed, some critics (e.g. Daly) have 
argued that Darwin’s theory offers a lower possibility of living a “meaningful 
life”, or a “worthwhile life”, for human beings because, without having a goal 
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or a purpose of life, there is always a threat that human beings will adapt a 
mechanistic life-style where love, emotion, sympathy, and empathy, are totally 
absent. So they claim that as natural selection is the dominating factor in the 
Darwinian worldview, human beings are no more than a “travelers” of the 
evolutionary time machine. However, supporters of Darwinian theory, such as 
Holland, do not think that this criticism is fair to Darwinism. Rather, 
according to him, the Darwinian view can provide a “liberated” life for human 
beings, and produce worthwhile lives.    
Holland’s argument is that if human beings exist in the natural 
kingdom to fulfill any purpose then their lives are not meaningful at all. 
Everything they intend to do must be compatible with that purpose. In other 
words, their desires, emotions and behavior are merely fulfilling that purpose. 
They would just live a life without freedom. In his words, “...individual life 
would have no point if there were already a purpose to human existence, and 
that Darwin’s theory precisely liberates us to lead individually meaningful 
lives”207.  
Perhaps, Holland is just taking here a biased position and his view 
cannot be fully justified. His claim—if there is a purpose for human beings 
then we are not free to lead a meaningful life—seems problematic. There are 
some people in society who believe that the purpose of life is to show strong 
gratitude to the Creator and not to do harm to any human being irrespective of 
his or her religion, race and nationality. Can we say that these people do not 
have liberty? Can we say that their lives are meaningless since their purpose is 
not to harm any human beings? In fact, some great defenders of absolute 
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liberty (such as Mill) suggested that not harming anybody is one of the chief 
ingredients for a worthwhile life, “The liberty of the individual must be thus 
far limited; he must not make himself a nuisance to other people”208.    
Holland concludes that, a call for a realization that worthwhile life 
must be found in this natural world, not elsewhere, is already present in the 
Darwinian worldview. This call has profound impact on environmental ethics. 
A similar argument can be found in Baxter’s interpretation. He argues that the 
Darwinian worldview could offer a robust environmental ethics in the way of 
“moral motivation”. Moral motivation, nonetheless, does not feature vividly in 
Darwin’s own writings. But many scholars, such as Wilson, were inspired to 
show that it is a vital part of the Darwinian worldview. Wilson even developed 
a remarkable hypothesis, known as the “biophilia hypothesis”, to prove that 
the Darwinian worldview clearly demonstrates moral motivation to biophilia. 
Baxter later tried to fit this hypothesis into the environmental ethical context.    
The biophilia hypothesis claims that human beings have an “innate 
tendency” to interact with other life forms beyond their intention to benefit 
from them. Wilson writes, “The object of the reflection can be summarized by 
a single word, biophilia, which I will be so bold as to define as the innate 
tendency to focus on life and lifelike processes” 209 . He believes that the 
biophilia hypothesis is a new way of looking at Darwin’s theory from a 
broader value orientation to nonhuman organisms. By emphasizing the “deep 
and complicated” mental process of human development Wilson maintains,  
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There is more. Modern biology has produced a genuinely 
new way of looking at the world that is incidentally 
congenial to the inner direction of biophilia. In other words, 
instinct is in this rare instance aligned with reason. The 
conclusion I draw is optimistic: to the degree that we come 
to understand other organisms, we will place a greater value 
on them, and on ourselves.210      
      
The biophilia hypothesis claims that human beings reasonably want to value 
other organisms in nature for various purposes which are surely 
noninstrumental. For example, when we use snakes as a symbol for certain 
institutions we want to give a message of mystery, power, and protection. 
Snakes are praised as the protectors of wealth and also for life-saving. This is 
the reason that snakes are used in pharmaceuticals and medical institutions as 
their symbols.  
Similarly, the state symbols of eagle and lion carry the special message 
of keen-eyed, strong power, and danger to the potential enemies. Most nation-
states in the current world use various symbols, designed with animals, plants, 
trees, and flowers, to mark their spirit, customs, philosophy, heritage, and 
traditions. Using symbols has become increasingly important. In fact, we need 
a logo of green tree to appeal for environmental conservation, a symbol of 
panda to represent extinct animals, and a symbol of cheetah tiger to display the 
strength of an engine.   
Ivanhoe states the biophilia hypothesis as a “need” for human beings 
from this point of view and writes, “...it is impossible for us not to have 
developed certain tendencies and learning strategies concerning the world 
around us”211. Moral motivation in the Darwinian worldview can be realized 
in two ways, firstly, human beings could and ought to acquire “a greater 
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degree of concern for their well-being”, and secondly, “...human beings share 
features with other organisms with which they share common descent”212.  
The Darwinian worldview, in my opinion, can result in a minimal 
possibility of worthwhile lives for human beings. Any explanation of the 
Darwinian theory would lead us merely to an anthropocentric lifestyle. 
Moreover, it is frustrating that beyond observing the evolutionary process 
human beings have nothing to do. So, even if they share the deep feeling for 
their descendants that may contribute very little to overcome any global crisis, 
such as an ecological crisis. Indeed, Darwin would not admit it as a global 
crisis. He would rather observe them as an outcome of the evolutionary 
process or a process of development. 
Darwin perceives this Earth as full of living organisms, similar and 
dissimilar. He undervalues or rather ignores the major part of nature—
nonliving elements—which are closely connected to living organisms. To 
Darwin, these nonliving elements are simply material forces, a machine to 
keep the continuation of the natural selection process. But Darwin should be 
credited for recognizing close “affinities” between living organisms and 
presenting an explanation for them by scientific observation. He writes in The 
Origin of Species, “The affinities of all the beings of the same class have 
sometimes been represented by a great tree. I believe this simile largely speaks 
the truth”213. Darwin is right, but this simile could tell the complete truth only 
if his imagination goes far beyond the tree. That is, he should consider the land 
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where the tree stands, the water on which it survives, the air which supplies its 
food, and the light which keeps it alive.      
Relying on Darwinism and a mechanistic worldview, Western 
Enlightenment brings the idea of autonomy, and relates moral responsibility 
with it in a manner that significantly differs from Asian traditions. Ames 
comments, “What is at stake for most of the modern philosophers taken within 
the context of the Enlightenment project is nothing less than the defense of 
individual autonomy and moral responsibility” 214 . In the analysis of 
anthropocentric environmental values in Chapter One, we have seen how 
autonomy, dignity, and moral responsibility portrayed an idea of unique 
human beings in the Western traditions. But these ideas appear in a different 
way in Asian traditions. The distinction is particularly important because the 
main debate in environmental ethics can be articulated as a debate on human 
uniqueness as autonomous persons and their attitude toward nonhuman 
elements.  
The Chinese concept of human beings and personhood was very 
clearly explained by Tu Wei-ming, “Personality, in the Confucian perception, 
is an achieved state of moral excellence rather than a given human 
condition”215. Here we can notice that personality in Chinese traditions is seen 
as a form of “moral excellence”, not as a form of social excellence. Moral 
excellence would take wholeness seriously and aims to maintain the great 
cosmic balance found in the traditional Chinese thoughts. The body in this 
case is metaphysically less important, as is reflected in Tu’s further comment, 
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“The Confucians do not take the body as, by nature, an impediment to full 
self-realization. To them, the body provides the context and the resources for 
ultimate self-transformation”216. 
Yet, the existence of the body is important for proving the context of 
improvement in personality. But what does moral excellence mean to the 
Chinese? Is it gaining a social self? The Chinese traditions answer these 
questions through the heart-mind principle. The heart-mind principle invokes 
the uniqueness of human beings. It is also the hallmark of human dignity. But 
a dignified human being must be a person who feels the sufferings of others. 
Tu notes, “The most prominent feature of the heart-mind is sympathy, the 
ability to share the suffering of others”217. The others are simply everything 
which belongs to sky, Heaven, and the Earth.  
One of the most prominent features of the Chinese concept of 
personhood is that it has to be understood through family. The family is not 
merely a social unit or institution where human beings are born and grow up, 
but it also shapes their personhood. In the Chinese context, the person should 
realize that his or her decision has profound impact on the harmony of the 
family. Empathy, rather than right, is one of the key indicators of the Asian 
view of family life. Family therefore plays a broader role in the Asian context. 
Ontologically, family could comprise the whole Earth and as a result the 
welfare of a person may not be reducible to the welfare of his or her 
immediate family. Family can be seen as a seedbed where virtues are grown 
and cultivated in and between numerous relationships. Lee and Ho point out, 
“When family members cultivate this seed of virtue by acting in accordance 
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with the duties and rituals associated with their roles in the family, the whole 
world is made virtuous”218.   
The fundamental difference from the Western traditions is explained 
by Tu, “Human beings are therefore defined primarily by their sensitivity and 
only secondarily by their rationality, volition, or intelligence”219. Ames drew a 
similar conclusion, but in different terms, “The uniqueness of the person is 
embedded in a ceaseless process of natural, social, and cultural change”220. 
Clearly then, while Western traditions want to gain uniqueness by 
liberty, equality, rights, autonomy and rationality, the Asian traditions want to 
gain it by becoming a human being who is not selfish, but is deeply attached 
not only to family members and fellow humans, but also to nonhumans, and 
perceive nature through a lens of interrelations that provide them with the 
sense of uniqueness, whether in a personal life or in social life. Unlike 
Western traditions, even selflessness is seen as a positive notion in some Asian 
traditions (e.g. Indian traditions). The concept of human being and person thus 
differ fundamentally from the Western traditions. Ames says, “Dualisms such 
as agent and act, self and other, mind and body, are not relevant. Instead, 
persons are seen as integral to a communal field, constituted through the very 
interactions and life forms they seek to define”221. 
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As the earlier comments show, when persons are defined in relation to 
the “communal field” individuals are less likely to see themselves in the light 
of Western Cartesian dualism where human beings are unique in possessing 
minds. In other words, they are less likely to consider themselves as the only 
moral agents because they have minds. Minds are for realizing the communal 
bond and for understanding that humans are part of this greater community. 
Consequently, it leads us to a resolution of Western dualism without 
compromising human’s autonomy and dignity. Perhaps, autonomy in 
Confucian family life is relational rather than individual. Moreover, the 
Confucian concept of human dignity is often metaphorically labeled as a chain 
relation which states that  
...we cannot give a full and satisfactory account of our 
personal identity without taking into the fact that we are also 
part of the whole chain of living things...As such, they are 
objects of our moral concern and necessarily figure in our 
relationally autonomous actions.222       
 
Similarly, Indian traditions also offered an alternative viewpoint of 
relationally dignified, autonomous, and self-conscious personhood. The most 
striking feature of Indian traditions is that the correct perception of Self (or no 
self) would lead a person to a higher stage of human life such as moksa. Moral 
motivation is strongly involved in this transformation. In Indian traditions, two 
ways of thinking appeared. In the first, self is seen in relation to a selfless 
process. In the second, however, the self is seen in accordance with gaining 
self-awareness, or eventually gaining a moral consciousness. Motilal 
comments on the Nyaya concept of self that illustrates the first way, “...the self 
has both a transtemporal and a transmigrational identity, thereby taking care of 
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the moral responsibility implicit in the Karma doctrine”223. For the second way, 
Motilal says, “The ultimate goal is...cessation of samsara through a sort of 
self-realization, the ultimate knowledge of what one’s own self is”224. As 
reflected in Motilal’s comments, both the selfless way or the way of gaining 
self, aim at one ultimate goal, self-realization. Self-realization entails that a 
person, a conscious self, cannot be separated from the Universal Self. 
Indian traditions also embrace relational autonomy rather than personal 
autonomy. Mines has identified the Indian concept of autonomy through the 
ethnosociological approach and the social-psychological approach. The 
enthnosociological approach shows that “Individual happiness and the 
autonomy that produces it are irrelevant; the emphasis is on the collective 
whole, on collective man. Liberty is surrendered to the interests of castes and 
families”225.Similarly, the social-phychological approach states that  
...the ideology and values that accompany India’s 
hierarchical social system rewards compliance and punishes 
autonomy. Adult identity is seen as an identity of adjustment 
rather than as one of self-choice (...), in contrast to the way 
identity formation is perceived as occurring in the West.226          
 
In Japanese traditions, the views of self and person were constructed in 
line with Buddhist views and the indigenous Shinto religion. The Japanese 
concept of human uniqueness can be viewed as a combination of the secular 
and the sacred, secular because of the Western influence, and sacred because 
of the traditional religions. The secular culturally embedded self goes to a 
                                                 
223 Bimal Krishna Matilal, “The Perception of Self in Indian Tradition”, in Self as Person in 
Asian Theory and Practice , ed. Roger T. Ames et al. Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1994.   
224 Ibid., 291. 
225 Mattison Mines, “Conceptualizing the Person: Hierarchical Society and Individual 
Autonomy in India”, in Self as Person in Asian Theory and Practice, ed. Roger T. Ames, 
Wimal Dissanayake and Thomas P. Kasulis (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1994), 319.   
226 Ibid, 320. 
 130
deeper level of self-understanding which is mainly intellectual. The monk 
Kukai develops several philosophical ideas by mixing Confucianism and 
Buddhism. His concept dominated ancient Japan. Kukai’s view of self 
represents a comprehensive and coherent concept of self instead of an 
individualistic self.  
According to Kukai, “The self is inherently empty and achieves its 
meaning (indeed, its being) only as an expression of the cosmic buddha 
[Buddha], Dainichi”227. The self is a special awareness that the Earth is full of 
cosmic Buddhas. When we as human beings participate in this cosmic web as 
an enlightened self we can find a harmony within this universe. However, the 
realization of this cosmic harmony should not be just spiritual, but rather 
intellectual. Lebra called this self the “consciously socialized self” which is 
boundary conscious, empathic, and so stays in between the Western concept of 
personhood.228 
In contrast, the sacred view of Japanese human beings does not 
articulate any element from the Western traditions. This view constructed a 
self of living elements that is sustained in a sacred manner through all entities 
in the universe. Obenchain puts it very interestingly, “It is this conscious 
realization of participating together in something more, in something sacred, 
that is what true self-realization is all about”229.    
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II. DIVIDING LIVING AND NONLIVING ELEMENTS 
 
The division between living and nonliving elements is inevitable in Western 
traditions. Even among the living creatures human beings are given more 
weight for their special qualities. Brennan and Lo note that “...properties such 
as being a subject of a life, being a self-maintaining living organism, or being 
self-choosing and self regulating are the best explanation[s] of the fact that 
human beings are the paradigm case of intrinsically valuable things” 230 .  
Human beings possess some special properties that are the hallmark of 
intrinsic value, distinguishing them from other creatures. Since human beings 
are intrinsically valuable, they have distinctive dignity. 
Human dignity was considered as one of the fundamental principles for 
making laws and policies. For instance, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights—a major development in the history of ideas—recommends that 
human’s dignity and their rights must be respected anywhere and anytime 
irrespective of their race, religion and nationality. This Declaration obviously 
shows that human dignity and their rights can override the rights and status of 
other creatures. 
 Although the recent animal rights movement has challenged this 
fundamental concept, human dignity provides the basis of Western 
worldviews. Immanuel Kant’s contribution to the idea of human dignity was 
extremely influential. His view not merely recognizes human beings as 
dignified, but also regards the preservation of human dignity as a duty for 
mankind. In fact, according to him, morality is grounded in human dignity and 
                                                 
230 Andrew Brennan and Y.S. Lo, Understanding Environmental Philosophy (Durham: 
Acumen Publishing Limited, 2010), 15. 
 132
human dignity is grounded in their autonomy. Kant shows that every being in 
the kingdom of ends has a price or instrumental value. However, only human 
beings have dignity and intrinsic value. Thus, everything else has an 
equivalent alternative except dignity. He writes,  
Now, morality is the condition under which alone a rational 
being can be an end in itself, since only through this is it 
possible to be a lawgiving member in the kingdom of ends. 
Hence morality, and humanity insofar as it is capable of 
morality, is that which alone has dignity.231  
 
Kant concludes, “Autonomy is therefore the ground of the dignity of human 
nature and of every rational nature”232. Beyond respecting other’s dignity, a 
human being should respect his or her own dignity. Human dignity is 
important for human flourishing. A dignified human being cannot perceive 
this Earth as a rabbit perceives it because a human being has the capability to 
revise his or her actions, and Kant called this the “inward view of self-
examination”.  
The idea of human dignity is also valuable for it may lead us to a 
worthwhile life. A worthwhile life respects its own as well as other’s personal 
worldviews. Some of us perceive the Earth as one global village, others as an 
evolving entity, or even as the manifestation of the Ultimate Reality. Apart 
from these views, perceiving the Earth as the sign of the Creator’s superiority 
and His blessings not only for human beings, but also for all creatures is not 
rare. All these views perceive the dignity of human beings in different ways, 
instead of abandoning it. For example, those who think that the Earth is a 
global village maintain human dignity in relation to other creatures.  
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 However, Kant’s notion of dignity creates several problems, not just in 
environmental ethics, but also in the social context. A main problem is that 
Kant clearly ascribed dignity to all human beings without considering their 
rational, physical and social capabilities. Naturally, people’s contributions to 
society may not be the same. People differ in their capacity of reasoning, 
working ability, physical and social power. Thus dignity may often calculate 
on the basis of their contributions to society. We respect a person more who is 
a king, a political leader, a spiritual reformer and a dynamic policy-maker than 
a common individual. Sometimes in order to save an important person we kill 
a lot of individuals, or in order to remove a king, we do not hesitate to kill 
thousands of individuals. The concept of dignity is also governed in terms of 
market mechanism or price. By highlighting present capitalist social systems 
where very often the value of dignity is measured in proportion to the market 
mechanism, Bonefeld and Psychopedis write, “Dignity here appears in the 
perverted form of worth that is conferred on individuals according to their 
effectiveness as market agents, that is, the worth of an individual is governed 
by the ‘price mechanism’ ”233.   
 Yet Kant tried to avoid this problem by claiming that without being a 
person a human being cannot claim his or her dignity. In other words, Kant 
made a distinction between a person and a human being. A human being is a 
sentient rational being. In addition to these capacities, a person, however, has 
the capacity to act autonomously or morally. That is, a person is capable of 
performing an act according to a moral principle. Hruschka comments, 
“Dignity is coupled with a claim to respect. Dignity, or absolute value, 
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however, is not inherent to a human being when seen as a rational natural 
being (animal rationale), but only when seen as a person”234.   
Rationality, consciousness (or sentience), and person are therefore 
typically interconnected. Environmental philosophers face a variety of 
theoretical complexities as they differ in their attitudes toward moral 
consideration and recognition of a person. For instance, sentience nowadays is 
recognized as a basic criterion of personhood. In fact, many scholars in 
environmental ethics maintain that we should at least consider great apes as 
persons. Peter Singer argues for an equal treatment of animals. Contrary to 
Kant, he thinks that intelligence or rationality cannot justify the superior moral 
status of human beings. Since all animals are equal in their capacity for feeling 
pain or suffering, they should be treated equally with human beings. The real 
boundary according to Singer is sentience. In his own words, “If a being is not 
capable of suffering, or of experiencing enjoyment or happiness, there is 
nothing to be taken into account. This is why the limit of sentience (...) is the 
only defensible boundary of concern for the interests of others.235       
Basically, Singer has made two types of claim: factual and moral. The 
factual claim is that “humans are not the only beings capable of feeling pain, 
or of suffering” 236 . The moral claim, according to him, comprises three 
premises. The first one is more significant here, “Pain is bad, and similar 
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amounts of pain are equally bad, no matter whose pain it might be” 237 . 
Singer’s view has significant impact in the development of Applied Ethics.  
One thing is clear, that Singer’s worldview in not anthropocentric or 
human-centred. He advocates utilitarianism, but he never claims that 
economic growth should be justified over preserving wilderness. Nevertheless, 
he also claims that no value is possible beyond sentient beings. What follows 
then is that wilderness has no value in itself, but it has instrumental value in 
relation to the sentient beings.  If so, should we destroy a forest or a natural 
habitat?  An organism (say coral reef) might not be sentient but might be very 
important for the ecosystem. Should we destroy it? Singer would say whatever 
does not have an interest, which can be confirmed by its feeling of pain and 
enjoyment, is permissible to use for any purpose.  
Although Singer is sympathetic to all sentient beings, he has given 
much more weight to the sufferings of great apes.  The great apes are persons 
because they can satisfy the criteria of personhood proposed by Singer. His 
basic features of personhood include, “self-awareness, self-control, a sense of 
the future, a sense of the past, the capacity to relate to others, concern for 
others, communication and curiosity” 238 . So, Singer would allow the 
destruction of an ecosystem if this destruction is the interest of sentient beings, 
but such an interest must be weighted against the benefits to others. Singer 
will consider other non-sentient creatures if their destruction have reverse 
impact on the sentient beings.  
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In this regard, Singer has a fundamental moral disagreement with other 
environmental philosophers, like Naess, Taylor and Rolston. Rolston 
paraphrases Singer’s view in this way,  
But the trees there, and most of the animals, who are 
insentient in Singer’s pain-suffering sense, are “to be taken 
into account only in so far as they adversely affect sentient 
creatures”. That seems rather narrow minded for a 
comprehensive ethic of respect for life.239     
 
Rolston argues that Singer’s view cannot be considered as a 
comprehensive environmental ethic because it only aims to protect a narrow 
percentage (4%) of living things, mostly mammals. Thus, it keeps the whole 
world of plants, trees, and non-sentient organism outside of moral realm. 
Apart from these, uncountable inorganic objects, such as mountains, rivers, 
and seas cannot be protected. 
In brief, two main criticisms that Rolston has developed to show the 
inadequacy of Singer’s view are, firstly, this view does not count the broader 
community of life. Secondly, Singer’s view does not value the integrity of the 
natural environment. For example, plants may lack self-consciousness and 
may lack the capability of future planning. However, they are spontaneous, 
self-maintaining, reproducing organisms which can repair their injuries. 
According to Rolston, these are mere facts for trees, and like a tree, an 
organism has a “good-of-its-kind” which we must count. Rolston notes, 
“Singer will have to say that, even though plants have a good of their own and 
do these interesting things, plants are not able to value because they are not 
able to feel anything...a plant is without minimally sentient awareness”240.  
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Rolston argues that Singer’s distinction between sentient and non-
sentient beings is a good example of subjective bias. The criterion of 
“conscious experience” takes the side of some specific life-forms which are 
minor parts of a bigger picture. This Earth functions as a part of the universe. 
If we ignore this fact, Rolston points out, “We need an account of the 
generation of value and valuers, not just some value that now is located in the 
psychology of the experiencers”241. Each organism and life-form can defend 
its identity by DNA code or what Rolston called a “linguistic molecule”. But 
Singer’s view overlooks these unique biological setting present in every life, 
not just in the life of self-conscious beings.   
In response to Rolston, Singer would insist that he does not deny that 
non-sentient beings are morally considerable. They matter in an instrumental 
way. Rlonston misunderstands him and analyzes his view “out of context”. In 
fact, he clarifies the view by citing his own passage again and notes, “The 
passage asserts that if a being is not sentient, it has no interests that we can 
consider. This is not a claim that Rolston denies. The passage does not say that 
if a being is not sentient, it doesn’t matter at all what we do to it”242. So, we 
should not do whatever we like to the non-sentient beings, we only can destroy 
them if that is necessary for persons. 
Secondly, subjective bias is equally applicable to Rolston’s view. 
Rolston comments “Dirt is instrumentally valuable, but not, Singer will say, 
the sort of thing that has value by itself. Put like that, we agree. An isolated 
clod defends no intrinsic value and it is difficult to say that it has much value 
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in itself”243. So, Rolston agreed with Singer by saying that inanimate objects, 
such as dirt, are instrumentally valuable. But then Singer raises the issue 
whether Rolston himself can avoid the charge of subjective bias. He notes,  
If Rolston thinks that this would be wrong, he should tell us 
why the distinction between human beings and other sentient 
animals is important enough to outweigh concerns about 
species preservation, but the distinction between sentient 
beings and non-sentient beings is not.244    
 
Nonetheless, David Schmidtz also thinks that Singer’s view is “biased” 
in favor of sentient beings. He notes, “Peter Singer and others speak as if 
speciesism [specieicism]—the idea that some species are superior to others—
is necessarily a kind of bias in favor of humans and against nonhuman animals. 
(Singer has no problem with being “biased” against plants.) This is a 
mistake”245.  
Singer’s mistake, according to Schmidtz, is not considering “self-
respect”, which allows us to respect chimpanzees more than mice. Or, 
respecting a human being more, even though he or she is brain-damaged and 
physically unconscious, than a chimpanzee. Human beings as unique creatures 
are “self-aware” and “reflective”. They have the capacity to show respect for 
other creatures, appreciate aesthetic beauty in them, and take care of them. 
Human beings can respect a dolphin without giving equal status to it because 
killing a dolphin for no justifiable reason would mean disrespecting their own 
unique qualities. As dolphins and chimpanzees are closer to human beings in 
their reflective and rational capacities, they belong to a different category than 
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mice or mosquitoes even though they all can feel pain. So, Schmidtz argues, 
“The point is that we can, we do, and we must make policy decisions on the 
basis of our recognition that turnips, mice, chimpanzees, and humans are 
relatively different types”246. 
We can observe, unlike Kant, Singer’s account includes some non-
rational sentient beings as objects of moral consideration. However, Singer’s 
account of equal consideration of the interests of sentient beings should be 
taken in relation to the context of human beings and other sentient beings. 
Instead of taking a broader focus, like the environment, we may place it in the 
debate of moral considerability of rational creatures vs. sentient creatures. 
Then it can claim some crucial benefit, especially saving the great apes from 
maltreatment, torture, and using them in unproductive medical researches. 
However, if the issue is conserving the environment, then his view would 
contribute little to it.  
In my view, Singer’s ethical approach is problematic, at least in two 
ways, when we consider it in the environmental context. Firstly, his approach 
faces the problem of balancing the different interests of living creatures. The 
environment which is painful to a sentient being may not be painful to another. 
Apart from nonliving things, the whole ecosystem consists of living entities 
with diverse interests. Secondly, and more significantly, this view does not 
pay attention to the changing interests of human beings due to the influence of 
science and technology.  
For the first problem, how can we ensure that all sentient creatures 
have the same interest of avoiding certain conditions? For example, a monkey 
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might have the interest to live in the forest, but a human being might not. 
Living in the forest is the best interest for a monkey, but living in the forest 
might be a least interest for a human being. Similarly, a polar bear would 
enjoy the snow environment, while a human being might not. It is just painful 
for a human being to live in an ice-cold environment, while such environment 
is essential for penguins and polar bears.  Even different human beings might 
have different interests. As Talbert argues “Not all beings have the same 
interests”, and he stresses the divergence of interests between both human and 
nonhuman beings 247 . How would Singer balance these different and 
conflicting interests? 
Moreover, like Rolston, Taylor and Naess, environmental philosophers 
who believe that we should have respect for all life-forms, will find Singer’s 
view “narrow”, because Singer wants to show respect only for those life-forms 
who are sentient. Even among living beings Singer paid more value to those 
who are able to feel pain, merely a sect of the whole living creatures.  
For the second problem, Singer’s view will place the protection of the 
environment, or preserving wilderness, in the interest of human or sentient 
beings. In other words, Singer’s view will only protect a wilderness, or the 
environment, for the sake of sentient-beings, not for itself. When human 
beings (or sentient beings) have an interest in the environment they may seek 
to preserve it. However, in this cutting-edge electronic civilization, technology 
plays a vital role to shape our interests. The influence of technology in our 
generations and the generations to come is remarkable. 
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For instance, our parents enjoyed nature by going for a forest walk, 
swimming in the river, catching fish, climbing hills, and a traditional boat ride. 
However, we like to log on the internet, visit a webpage, and prefer watching 
television to engaging in those activities which gave pleasure to our parents. It 
has been highlighted in the following comment of an environmentalist, 
 Our communal contact is dissolving; we lack engagement 
and involvement with others, with activities, and with our 
surroundings. This disengagement is marked by anonymity, 
alienation, and detachment...We know going out for a walk 
is a healthy activity; yet, it seems difficult to pull ourselves 
off the couch.248    
 
The current scenario of the influence of technology among our children 
is even more alarming. We find almost everywhere children and teenagers 
obsessed with new gadgets and iPhones. They like to spend more and more 
time in video chatting on Skype, instant messaging, and extremely popular 
video games on large screen television, iPhone and iPads. A father, when 
reflecting on his own daughter, writes, “...what was even more remarkable was 
that she was able to successfully complete her homework while 
simultaneously listening to Grease on her iPod, instant messaging her friends, 
checking her e-mail, and managing a stable of virtual horses”249. 
Kahn even looks further, and perhaps, expects for a “digital 
experience” of nature than going wilderness for this generation children. He 
writes,  
Entire television networks, such as Discovery Channel and 
Animal Planet, provide us with mediated digital experiences 
of nature: the lion’s hunt, the monarch butterfly’s migration, 
and the adventure of climbing high into the Himalayan peaks. 
Video games like Zoo Tycoon engage children with animal 
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life...Inexpensive robotic pets, such as the i-Cybie, Tekno, 
and Poo-Chi, have been big sellers in Walmart and Target.250   
                                                                                                                                           
We could assume that the generations to come will be more identified with 
electronic devices and multi-task gadgets than with nature. They might have 
very little interest in the wilderness, in identification with and protecting 
nature. As the influence of technology can dramatically reduce the interest of 
human beings in their environment, Singer’s view can contribute little to save 
the environment.      
Should we have an attitude of respect toward all living organism, not 
just sentient beings? A few Western philosophers have argued this point. Paul 
Taylor has developed a comprehensive biocentric theory which denies 
human’s superiority as a species and argues for the moral considerability of all 
living entities. Taylor’s argument is not right-based. Instead of rights, it shows 
that all living organisms have “inherent worth” of their own. Human beings 
have a moral obligation to respect and promote the inherent worth of other 
living entities. Taylor’s biocentric view favors extending our moral concern to 
the biotic communities. In his words, this view derives “...from the science of 
ecology: the interdependence of all living things in an organically unified 
order whose balance and stability are necessarily conditions for the realization 
of the good of its constituent biotic communities”251.         
Taylor would accept that the Earth functions in an interdependent 
manner, not an independent mechanistic manner. In other words, we should 
accept that the Earth can only function when we preserve its balance and 
stability found in the biotic communities. Unlike Singer, sentience is 
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completely irrelevant here for having respect or giving moral considerability 
to plants and animals. Taylor does not think that their “interest” can be 
morally important. What should concern us, according to him, is that they are 
the “possessors of inherent worth”. We should respect all living entities 
because they have inherent worth. Taylor uses an analogy to explain the point. 
We usually respect persons because they are the possessors of inherent worth, 
irrespective of their merits, social status and contributions, race and color. 
Similarly, we can hold an attitude of respect toward all living creatures. He 
notes, “To have the attitude of respect for nature is to regard the wild plants 
and animals of the Earth’s natural ecosystems as possessing inherent worth”252. 
 Taylor’s theory has more merit than Singer’s sentient-centrism. We do 
not need to engage with some complex psycho-physical phenomena, such as 
suffering, or interest, for moral considerability. Animals, plants and other 
organisms are the possessors of some priceless wealth, some of them we know 
but many we do not know yet. We could also avoid the never ending debate of 
intrinsic and instrumental value of nonhumans once we agree that they all are 
inherently valuable. However, it is unclear to me why some nonliving 
elements (e.g. mountains, rivers, seas) which are also contributing in a great 
manner to preserve the ecological balance and harmony lack inherent worth. 
 Taylor’s prior analogy is incomplete and problematic too. It is 
incomplete because he has not provided a clear definition of a person. If 
human beings have inherent worth and rats also have, then should we respect a 
rat like a human being? It is problematic because it will not allow reducing 
some members of a species (e.g. malaria-causing mosquitoes) to save another 
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species (e.g. human beings and other animals). Taylor has to explain how we 
are to resolve conflicts of interests between different beings with inherent 
worth.  
 In Western traditions, consciousness was somehow given priority. 
While personhood often centers on human beings, self and consciousness are 
two complicating factors mostly noticed. We can overcome some of the 
human limitations (e.g. selfishness) by developing or changing ourselves or 
gaining self-awareness. So, one could conceive a social self, a material self, an 
individualistic self, a relational self, or an ecological self. However, all of 
these concepts of self deal with “personality”. By highlighting self and 
personhood, Arne Naess proposes an idea of ecological personhood or mature 
personality. By this he intends to overcome some of the limitations of 
biocentrism just mentioned.    
The ecological personhood, as Naess puts it, is “acting more 
consistently from oneself as a whole”253. Naess and most deep ecologists 
maintain that socially constructed persons “underestimate themselves” since 
they limit their personality by drawing a boundary line between human beings 
and other elements of nature. Thus Naess argues, “Our personality is not as 
narrow as we think” 254 . The lifestyles and perceptions of an ecological 
personhood and a socially constructed personhood therefore differ in many 
ways. The basic difference is the difference in consciousness, or a total change 
in our consciousness. The change in consciousness “...consists of a transition 
to a more egalitarian attitude to life and the unfolding of life on Earth”255. 
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Naess’s biocentric egalitarianism even goes further to protect those who are 
often neglected and vulnerable. Thus, by maintaining the distinction between 
living and nonliving elements at the ontological level one may also extend his 
or her consciousness to preserve natural elements on Earth. How can a moral 
system do this? 
Ten, commenting on moral systems in a comparative perspective, 
writes, “A developed moral system will use these tools...for the protection of 
the weak and the vulnerable who, unloved and uncared for, are in danger of 
being left outside the moral circle”256. This comment rightly indicates that a 
developed moral system should use some normative ideas, such as rights, to 
include weak and vulnerable entities, those who are excluded from the 
traditional moral circle and left uncared. Of course, we could also mention 
other approaches like duty-based approach, virtue-based approach, and care-
based approach in this regard.  
Asian traditions focus on constructing a normative system which is 
mainly virtue-based, but also maintain a different sense of rights in treating 
nonhuman elements. This different sense of rights must be understood 
collectively. In other words, balancing between virtue, rights, respect and duty, 
is a key feature in Asian traditions. Nuyen, pointing to the dark side of 
Western right-based approach, comments,  
More importantly, much is lost when we insist on our rights 
in our dealings with others. To give something to someone 
only because he or she has the right to it is to do so either 
without feelings, or with grudge. To take something from 
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someone solely on the basis of right is to do so without 
gratitude and without appreciation.257   
 
We should notice that in Asian traditions some ideas are morally important, 
such as feelings, gratitude and appreciation, as defended in this comment. 
Taking a balancing attitude, Asian normative systems rarely encourage 
distinguishing between living and nonliving organisms. A combination of 
right-based approach and care-based approach is unique in Asian social 
customs.  
For instance, while many Western nation-states want to achieve social 
harmony through a democratic system which protects the civilian rights, 
Chinese traditions aim to achieve social harmony through ritual practices 
which promote trust among civilians. Sor-hoon Tan nicely writes, “In a 
society where ritual practice reigns, it is easier to trust one’s fellow citizens. If 
one trusts one’s fellow citizens, it is easier to participate in social action. It is 
easier to build a vibrant civil society”258 . A Chinese civil society would 
therefore practice both rights and trust instead of relying entirely on an 
individual’s basic rights to build up a harmonious relation among citizens.  
Similarly, the rights-based approach is also discouraged in the Asian 
family life. Two major Asian scholars, Rosemont and Ames, write, “In the 
Confucian tradition, human morality and the personal realization it inspires is 
grounded in the cultivation of family feeling”259. Previously, we have seen that 
from the cosmological point of view the word “family” could comprise 
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anything in nature and even beyond nature in the Asian context. Now we will 
concentrate on realization to justify the claim that Asian normative systems 
rarely encourage distinguishing between living and nonliving organisms.  
 Realization is the chief moral term which most Asian traditions 
concentrate on. Realization can be seen from two different perspectives in the 
Asian context: separating humans from all other entities and developing a 
sense of humanity, and secondly, thinking about the cosmos first and then 
placing humans in the cosmic unity. In the first case, human beings are 
distinguished by their rationality and humanity by which they are capable of 
constructing a conscious idea of rights and duties toward other human beings, 
or broadly toward other living beings. Human beings must use their rationality 
in order to succeed in their socio-political as well as moral life.  
A successful social human being then should have the ability to make 
rational decisions, to rule the state with appropriate political wisdom and react 
accordingly when the sovereignty of the state is in crisis and the peace, 
stability, and integrity of its citizens are facing challenges. In the Analects 15.9 
Confucius says, “People of knowledge and humanity may accept death in 
order to realize humanity but will not seek life at the price of humanity”260. 
Here we can notice a distinction between human beings and all other beings. 
Like Confucius, many Chinese philosophers (e.g. Mencius) emphasized 
knowledge or education, and human-human relationship was vital for them. 
Huang’s comments might be worth noting here, “Thus, in Mencius’ view, 
while it is important that people are well fed, warmly clothed, and comfortably 
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lodged, sages realize that “without education, they will become almost no 
different from animals” ”261. 
The realization, however, could be reversed when the cosmos is set at 
the centre rather than human beings. That is, when the cosmos is seen as 
interconnected with all living and nonliving elements, and human beings 
occupy the same place as a corn plant, in which case human beings are not 
entitled to perform special duties and obligations toward others. What is 
expected from them is non-intervention in the natural set-up. However, a 
natural question then is: Who will take care of the corn plant? We could 
resolve it by arguing that if there is no interruption for the corn plant, no 
caring is necessary for it. When human beings realize this great cosmic bond 
with all other natural entities their life is called enlightened.  
This enlightenment therefore does not just require morality or 
humanity but rather something more. It is a transformation of the human self 
into the self of natural entities which is necessary for harmonious co-existence. 
Yang remarkably states, “In the realization of value, the combination of the 
transformation from Nature to human and that from human to Nature 
constitutes the essence of the participation of humans in the endless evolving 
process of Heaven and Earth”262. “Value” in this statement must be taken as 
the value of the cosmos, and the transformed human beings are different from 
common human beings.  
In the Indian traditions, realization often relates to this transformed 
idea and is called moksa (liberation). No one can attain moksa without bhakti 
(devotion). Slakter notes, “...it is understood that liberation (moksa) is 
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achieved through individual devotion (bhakti) rather than through the 
fulfillment of one’s ritual obligations and such continued fulfillment by one’s 
descendants”263. Therefore, for Indians bhakti is the way of transformation. 
Both of the cases, i.e. valuing the cosmos and gaining liberation, inspire 
human beings to ignore the division of living and nonliving elements. 
Therefore, we can clearly see that the division of living and nonliving 
elements is perceived from two viewpoints (realizing humanity and realizing 
cosmic integrity). Both of the views are grounded in self-realization. Self-
realization has appeared in a sense of self-examination, self-development, or 
realizing duties and obligations toward fellow human beings as well as 
nonhuman beings. This is the excellence of humanity. By contrast, self-
realization has also appeared in a sense of cosmic integration or realizing the 
wholeness. Human beings themselves feature in both of these views. However, 
the former is anthropocentric, while the latter, in Tu Wei-ming’s word, is 
“anthropocosmic”. The anthropocosmic view is closely related to the 
sacredness of nature.      
III. SACREDNESS OF NATURE 
 
 Rolston remarks, “If anything at all on Earth is sacred, it must be this 
enthralling creativity that characterises our home planet”264. We may notice 
here that Rolston wants to view sacredness in the Earth as an aesthetic 
creativity of God, instead of nature itself being God. Sacredness in nature 
involves spirituality. Often spirituality is used to refer to religious sacredness, 
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but certain views of spirituality have proposed that the idea can be sustained 
without religious sacredness. Take the case of animal ethics. Some animal 
ethicists clearly acknowledge a spiritual kinship relation with animals. 
 There can be two aspects of spirituality in this regard: the first one is that 
human beings may experience a kind of spirituality by maintaining spiritual 
kinship with animals as well as other nonhuman elements in the Earth. They 
may or may not be inspired by a kind of religious sacredness. But soon after, 
as soon as the spiritual kinship with animals and other nonhuman members is 
established by human beings themselves, the uniqueness of human beings 
must be established. The second aspect of spirituality is that human beings are 
separate from all nonhuman members in the Earth. When Darwin mentions 
the “close affinities” of human beings with animals he actually admits the 
second aspect of spirituality. Thus, spirituality in nature may originate from 
religious as well as non-religious roots. The non-religious root is more 
committed with beauty, emotion, inspiration rather than salvation. 
 Darwinian philosopher Michael Ruse, when commenting on Richard 
Dawkin’s view of nature, notes, “But the point, Dawkins stresses, is not that 
nature is intentionally vile. It is just that nature is indifferent. Remember: 
“DNA neither knows nor cares. DNA just is. And we dance to its music” 
(Dawkins 1995, 133)”265. So, for DNA music a religious person would just 
believe sacred things in it given by the Creator, while a scientist would believe 
that there might be several possibilities which are undiscovered at present. But 
a scientist’s uncertainties at present may also offer a kind of scientific-spiritual 
explanation regarding DNA music.   
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 Despite Dawkins, Passmore, following Mill, rejects sacredness in 
nature. His argument is mainly grounded on Christian faith and the 
development of science. He said, “there is one point on which it is absolutely 
clear: nature is not sacred”266. Passmore thinks that sacredness is an obstacle 
to the development of modern science. Since he attempts to solve the 
ecological problems with Western science and new innovation, rather than 
promoting a complete set of new ethical norms and deep consciousness, he 
also admits that sacredness is incompatible with this attitude. Denial of 
sacredness appears an important fact in the Graeco-Christian tradition and was 
revived by Passmore, “Men were free to use nature as they chose—provided 
they did not worship it as sacred” 267 . In short, Passmore believes that 
sacredness is as such anti-scientific and the notion of sacredness creates 
obstruction for environmentalists. For example, while environmentalists may 
want to utilize a forest for tourism and as an eco-park, local people may object 
to this policy immediately as they believe the forest is sacred.   
However, ecologists differ from Passmore. For example, Fikret Berkes 
maintains that ecology is “a worldview different from the mainstream Euro-
Canadian one, a worldview in which nature pulsated with life” 268 . The 
worldview Berkes hinted at is surely different from the Newtonian, Darwinian 
science. This worldview is mainly shared by the world’s indigenous cultures, 
such as the Cree people in Canada, American Indians, Australian aborigines, 
Nepalese Sherpa culture, and other indigenous groups. Their lifestyles, 
identification with nature, belief in sacredness and spirituality do matter 
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because this worldview, as Berkes says, has almost universal characteristics, 
“an ethic of nondominant, respectful human-nature relationship, a sacred 
ecology”269. One example of this worldview could be when the Cree people 
say, “we all knew that the land was sacred and full of spirits”270. 
Nevertheless, sacredness does not appear only in the indigenous 
cultures. Albert Schweitzer, though primarily a physician, dedicated his whole 
life to realize sacredness in life. His theory, “Reverence for life” tries to 
establish one single truth, “life as such is sacred”271.  
Aldo Leopold, the father of land ethics, argues for the realization of 
our “symbiotic relationship” with land. According to him, land ethics enlarges 
the moral community which will include animals, plants, water, in a collective 
sense. But why does he believe that land should be included in our moral 
community? The reason is crucial and becomes clear in his own language, 
“Land, then, is not merely soil; it is a fountain of energy flowing through a 
circuit of soils, plants, and animals”272. In this statement, Leopold seems to 
detect a spiritual energy in land in the sense that it produces plants, trees, crops 
and grow their seeds. 
Thus, it can be argued that beyond the religious meaning of sacredness 
there is another sense of sacredness, and sacredness may not always be a 
barrier to science. Richard Dawkins writes, “And yet there are objects and 
occasions which invoke in me a profound sense of the sacred, and I can cite 
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other humanist scientists of whom this is also true”273. Surely, Dawkins is 
suggesting a sense of sacredness that is not based on religion. In the religious 
sense, God is sacred; nature is the creation and expansion of God, so, nature is 
sacred. Alternatively, everything created by God is sacred. In the words of 
Nigel Warburton, nature is sacred because “it emanates from God”274. Some 
environmentalists use this sense of sacredness to argue that nature should be 
preserved. Richard Norman rejects this argument though he does not deny the 
possibility that nature is sacred.  
Norman accepts Ronald Dworkin’s definition of sacredness. According 
to Dworkin, inviolability is the main criterion of sacredness. That is, if 
something is sacred then it should be “inviolable” and “may not be destroyed 
once it exists”275. So, Norman deduced that sacredness “sets up boundaries or 
barriers which must not be crossed”276. This comment shows that two notions 
of sacredness are possible, sacredness in the instrumental sense and sacredness 
in the deeper sense. Sacredness in the instrumental sense denotes that 
something is sacred because it serves as incremental to find the supreme 
sacred. For example, knowledge is sacred because through knowledge we can 
find the supreme sacred. By contrast, sacredness in the deeper sense means 
that something is sacred because it has been transcendent directly from the 
supreme sacred. For example, human life is sacred. 
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According to the former sense, land, river, trees, and mountains, are 
sacred but not in a sense that life is sacred. According to the latter sense, 
human lives are the most sacred and nothing is comparable to them.  
However, Norman argues that nature cannot be sacred in the 
instrumental sense, nor can it be sacred even in a deeper sense, i.e. in the sense 
that human lives are sacred.  Let’s say nature is sacred in the instrumental 
sense, i.e. we cannot violate the sacredness of land to grow our food. It is 
impractical and a violation of this sense of sacredness is obvious if we want to 
feed our people. If nature is sacred in the deeper sense we have to respect 
everything, species, landscapes, biotic and abiotic communities, not just the 
land. But it is impractical as well because for preserving “harmony and 
balance” we have to reduce at least a portion of them. So, nature cannot be 
sacred in the deeper sense either. The only possibility for sacredness of nature, 
according to Norman, is an account of “aesthetic value” which is non-
instrumental.   
In response to Norman, Alan Holland disagrees with Dworkin’s notion 
of “violation” and argues that “the sacred is precisely that which can be 
violated”277. An example of violation is “original sin”. Holland finds two 
important elements in the concept of sacred: one is whatever is sacred must be 
“exempt from transactions” and the other is “a commitment that is 
unconditional”278. Norman’s aesthetic claim of sacredness does not satisfy any 
of these criteria, moreover, “it lacks the relevant kind of universality”279, he 
claims.  
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Nature should be sacred according to Holland in a comprehensive 
sense, i.e. a sense of deep-rooted “eco-graphy”. Nature is not merely a realm 
of causal laws, but rather it refers to “a unique and historically contingent 
biosphere”280. However, according to Holland, this conception of sacredness 
may not “immediately guarantee respect for nature”. Like Mill, he also 
believes that nature is “amoral” and its sacredness in any context does not 
“foster obedience”281.   
One important candidate for the sacredness of nature seems to be 
overlooked. Nature is the source of knowledge. Nature inspires us, indicates to 
us how we should live. It can help us to live a truly human life. In short, nature 
can be a guide to realize the meaning of life, or in the words of Holland, “for a 
deeper meaning to life”282. Nature is so resourceful that many great ideas of 
living a meaningful life are available here. For instance, we see that everyday 
the Sun rises and sets, day and night appear rotationally. These are very 
important events for calculating days, months, years. We see these things 
happen in a timely manner. So, we can learn punctuality from these events. 
We may not be obedient to nature because modern science does not permit it, 
but we can identify with nature spiritually or non-spiritually. 
 At the same time, it seems necessary to reduce the apparent distance of 
science and religion when both believe that inorganic elements, species and 
biospherical system are uniquely connected. This extremely inspiring 
hypothesis has encouraged theologians and environmentalists for a long time. 
Still, many environmentalists (e.g. Rolston) believe that a new attitude is 
possible once we mingle spirituality and environmentalism. Hay rightly 
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comments, “Certainly, the hostility many environmentalists hold towards 
science and rationality often takes the form of a search for a new 
cosmological/spiritual/religious basis for human life and inter-species 
relationships”283. 
 Hence, we can say that the spiritual basis of the environment is not 
necessarily religious. In fact, Naess’s ecosophy somehow successfully blended 
cosmology, spirituality, and religion. Naess, when commenting on E.F. 
Schumacher’s article about Christian ecosophy, writes, “...he stands in relation 
to the near-common points of the deep ecology movement...a Christian 
‘Ecosophy S’ might be elaborated on the basis of his influential writings”284. 
Clearly then, a deep ecologist could believe that nature is sacred. While the 
sense of spirituality in deep ecology is somewhat predictable, it is not entirely 
clear how spirituality and deep ecology can be infused. George Sessions made 
it clear to us. He writes, “Further inspiration for contemporary ecological 
consciousness and the Deep Ecology movement can be traced to the 
ecocentric religions and ways of life of primal peoples around the world...”285 
From this comment we can understand that both spirituality and deep ecology 
aim to achieve “ecological consciousness”—a consciousness of deep 
ecological interrelatedness.   
 Both the view that nature is sacred and the view that God is sacred may 
share the same degree of ecological consciousness as deep ecology. Gottlieb, 
who mainly explores the spiritual perspective of deep ecology in his many 
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writings, maintains, “Deep ecology is both an orientation within 
environmental ethics and a spiritually based rethinking of human identity”286. 
Interestingly, spirituality in the case of ecological consciousness has received 
great attention in the Asian traditions. Indeed, in the way of religious practice, 
rituals, and cultural heritage, spirituality shapes Asian worldviews and 
peoples’ lifestyles.  
 In general, Indian ethics can be seen from two angles, liberation from 
all personal emotions by practicing selfless actions, and purifying one’s soul 
through the reverence and love for the Ultimate Reality which is extremely 
emotional. The liberation perspective considers Karma theory (the theory of 
action) as its basic moral principle, while the purification perspective 
considers devotion, joy and aesthetic experience as its basic moral principle.  
However, there is an overlapping in all dominating theistic schools in 
Indian traditions. Perhaps, the cultural traditions are more aligned with the 
latter. We can also find enough examples of bhakti ethics in the Gita. The 
basic idea of spiritual teaching in bhakti philosophy is clearly explained in 
Prasad’s comments, “ In bhakti philosophies a devotee’s complete surrender 
of himself to God is very highly rated. Rather, a devotee is advised to do 
that.”287 Bhakti is often equated with the sacred or purified path in Indian 
traditions. Joshi says bhakti is the path of “surrendering everything to God”288.  
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 Bhakti has a close relationship with the Indian word prem (love). Singh 
notes, “In the Eastern traditions, the depiction of the life of higher love has 
been one of the foremost aims of art”289. Art is one of the major ways of 
expressing spirituality which is predominant in Indian cultural traditions. In all 
Indian cultural festivals and literature, art is an essential ingredient. One 
excellent example, which combines love, devotion, art, and spirituality in 
Indian traditions on the one hand, and Westerners’ respond toward it on the 
other hand, is portrayed in Haberman’s words,  
It was close to noon by the time my bicycle rickshaw left me 
off at Mathura’s Holy Gate...the sandy shoreline, couples 
established altar spaces by drawing svasitkas (symbols of 
well-being) with red sindur powder and offered coconuts, 
flowers, rice, milk, money, and incense to Yamuna. Some 
used the services of local priests, others performed the 
worship themselves. The collective mood was joyous; 
delight in Yamuna was palpable...But what about the 
pollution? When I asked one young woman from Gujarat she 
was aware that the river was polluted, she said with a 
beguiling smile, “Yes, the river is polluted. But today our 
hearts are unpolluted, so there is no problem.”290     
                   
 Haberman was illustrating the most famous and sacred Indian festival, 
locally known as Yamuna Jayanti or the celebration of birthday of Holy river 
Yamuna, when billions of Hindus believe that their sins were taken and souls 
were purified by the Holy river Yamuna despite its high pollution level. With 
his Western eyes the author observes the pollution of the river’s water, but 
Hindus with their spiritual eyes see the purity of the same water. Here beyond 
the view of sacredness, they differ with the sense of purity and cleanliness. In 
the West, impure water means presence of harmful micro-organisms (e.g. 
bacteria), while in the Indian tradition if it is the water of Yamuna, though 
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highly impure in one sense, would be regarded as perfectly pure and holy. 
This water, as Indian traditions would explain, could be dirty, but not impure.   
 
IV. WHY DO THE TWO TRADITIONS DIFFER? 
 
Needham comments,  
The Chinese world-view depended on a totally different line 
of thought. The harmonious co-operation of all beings arose 
because they were all parts in a hierarchy that formed a 
cosmic pattern. They obeyed the dictates of their own 
natures, not the orders of some superior authority. Modern 
science and the philosophy of organism have come back to 
this wisdom, fortified by a new understanding of cosmic and 
biological evolution.291 
    
Thus, the Western and Asian worldviews are fundamentally different. They 
differ not only in approaches, valuation of the environment, the uniqueness of 
human beings, the division of living and nonliving elements, spiritual 
experience toward the environment, but also in the senses of identification, 
self-realization, and spirituality. 
 Noticeably, environmental philosophy of the Western traditions 
highlights certain values, such as personal identification. Personal 
identification assumes that the identification process could only be continued 
when it is possible to establish a personal communication. Western traditions 
are more interested in constructing some criteria of personhood for 
determining an entity’s moral considerability. For instance, before Singer’s 
pioneering work on animal ethics, people rarely think about their identification 
or commonality with animals. Indeed, some major thinkers (e.g. Bentham) 
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recognized animal sufferings are unacceptable because, like human beings, 
they are also capable of feeling pain. It does not matter who is suffering, but it 
matters when sufferings are ignored. The important point to note here is that 
the identification with animals creates the possibility of treating animals as 
persons, or taking them into moral consideration.  
 Human beings are considered the only rational creatures and hence the 
moral questions were all about human’s excellence. A lot of medieval and 
modern philosophers (e.g. Descartes) hold that animals are not our moral 
concern, but none of them concluded that human excellence can be gained if 
they torture animals. Most Western environmental views are therefore 
anthropocentric or inclined to personal identification. A human being who can 
identify with other human being’s sorrows, sufferings and pains is generally 
treated as a moral person. Even when animal ethicists argued for broadening 
the moral circle they simply claim a personal identification with animals 
beyond human interests. They show the commonality of capacity for feeling 
pleasure and pain with nonhuman animals.     
 Passmore’s philosophy is also an example of personal identification. His 
thoughts support the Biblical view of human-nature relation. He has given 
priority to personal identification since he thinks that a stewardship relation is 
necessary to overcome the ecological crisis. A steward observes his or her 
commonality with God as well as with God’s creatures. He has a personal 
sense of identification as a caretaker of God’s properties. Utilitarians (e.g. 
Singer) and Kantians both developed a personal sense of identification. Naess, 
however, is an exception in the West. Although it is possible to show 
examples of personal identification in his writings, his main goal was to 
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contemplate an “ecological consciousness” beyond personal experience. His 
theory can be considered as one of cosmological identification.  
  Development of self-knowledge was one of the main elements in 
Western traditions. Plato argues for self-mastery for becoming a philosopher 
king. Aristotle, similarly, develops the concept of a virtuous person who has 
control over her or his emotions, sentiments and pleasure. A virtuous person 
also has the knowledge of the golden mean. Descartes, Hume and Kant 
emphasized self-development—a development in human’s character—to show 
humanity for others. Only an improvement in personhood can make a being 
moral. In the case of mastery over nature, Western philosophers do not suggest 
an irrational behavior toward the nonhuman elements. Rather, they prescribe 
self-realization to behave rationally to nonhumans. However, the example of 
rationality in the instrumental sense is not absent. Treating nonhumans as mere 
means to the pursuit of human ends is immoral because this attitude could 
develop a less creative human society. A creative society may not be a society 
where human beings are emotionless, unkind, without spirituality, and unable 
to feel the aesthetic beauty of nature. In a nutshell, a society where human-like 
robots lives. Self-realization thus can be seen as personal development, 
personal improvement, and re-examination of intra and inter species relation. 
Clearly, a sense of self-realization would imply an improvement in 
personhood. It will demonstrate a concept of ideal human being which is often 
called a virtuous person, an enlightened person, or a person of humanity. 
  Naess also argued for a sense of spirituality. Whether human beings 
submit themselves to nature, or maintain a sense of balance or harmony, or 
even considered themselves as stewards of nature, are all significant for 
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spirituality since these all manifest ecological consciousness. But ecological 
consciousness can also be gained through an indirect (spiritual) 
communication with the larger part of nature, as Naess showed. Surprisingly, 
although appeal is made to different notions of ecological consciousness, the 
achievement of ecological spirituality results in a different kind of human 
being. 
 When human beings manifest non-ecological spirituality, they see 
themselves as unique, not only in reason, but also in using, respecting and 
reorganizing natural elements prudently. There is no need to worship nature. 
Naess, however, may insist on both (i.e. uniqueness of human beings and 
worshipping nature) since by worshipping nature many people show their 
reverence for nature, and practice a deep ecological consciousness in their 
selves. 
 In contrast to the Western personal identification, cosmological 
identification is more vivid in the Asian traditions. Asian people initially start 
with personal identification, but their aim is to gain an identification with the 
cosmos or the Ultimate Reality. In other words, an identification with the 
bigger Self. This cosmological identification has appeared in Chinese, Indian 
and also Japanese traditions. The Chinese anthropocosmic view of nature 
suggests a balance of li and chi with all natural elements. Land, water, Sun, 
trees and all other things are seen in a close integration with human beings. 
They are symbolically like brothers and sisters. Human beings and other 
animals are born helpless, but their parents help them to grow and live. 
Similarly, the Earth and Heaven take care of everything. They are 
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ontologically parents since they nourish and take care of everything. They 
therefore deserve respect and reverence from human beings.  
 However, Chinese worldviews do not discourage the use of nature for 
human needs. Since humans are generally recognized as virtuous persons, they 
are allowed to use nature in a way where li and chi are balanced and 
cosmological harmony is maintained. Indian traditions, nonetheless, tried to 
achieve this balance and harmony in a different way. Their notion of 
cosmological identification should be understood in relation to the Ultimate 
Reality and His manifestation of natural elements. This cosmological 
identification requires devotion and submission rather than balancing any 
material force.  
 In Japanese traditions, cosmological identification appeared in an 
exceptional way. Japanese traditions do not describe nature as the 
manifestation of the Ultimate Reality, but rather everything from the Sun to 
dust is the fountain of Buddhahood. Individuals should communicate and set 
themselves in the Indra’s net (the web of Buddha-nature), where all elements 
in the universe are intimately connected and their relations are mutually tied-
up without harming or destroying other fellow creatures. 
 In cosmological identification, it is not important at all to ascribe 
personhood toward natural elements. The important thing is to gain the 
extremely abstract power of communication with all elements in nature, a 
sense of commonality, so that even a piece of dust can be seen as intrinsically 
valuable (because interconnectedness is the basis of intrinsic value). Put 
differently, in the ontological sense there is no distinction between a human 
being and a grain of sand since they are equally valuable in nature in relation 
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to their status.  For this reason, a sage, a monk, a Brahman may regard killing 
an ant as serious as killing a human being. Since they consider this whole 
Earth and beyond, as one single unit, one single family, all members are 
equally important for them. 
 Similarly, Self-realization could also be a realization of a bigger Self 
whether in the sense of Ultimate Reality, or in the sense of cosmic balance. 
Self-realization should not be merely self-development, self-mastery or self-
knowledge. Perhaps, self-realization is a deep realization of selflessness, an 
abandonment of personal ego. Realization cannot be gained just by feelings, 
but by sympathy, wisdom, reverence, respect and a proper attitude toward all 
creatures. 
 In Indian traditions, self-realization denotes the realization of the bigger 
Self. It is a realization of moksa (liberation) and free from bondage. This is a 
realization that the true Self is manifested in nature so that all natural elements 
are part of the true Self. Nature then becomes a cosmic person to be realized, a 
source of sacredness, deserving human reverence and submission. The 
Chinese and Japanese traditions share self-realization in relation to a cosmic 
family, comprising all natural elements. Humans thus have a duty to act in 
accordance with this sense of self-realization. Self-realization will thus inspire 
them to act in a virtuous way, to act most wisely with spontaneity and 
righteousness. One sense of self-realization is self-examination, while the 
other sense is realizing the oneness-with-nature.   
 The latter sense of self-realization surely commits its supporters to a new 
sense of spirituality. This sense of spirituality need not involve a formal 
spiritual life in accordance with a particular religion. For example, a spiritual 
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life for a Buddhist is to respect natural elements as Buddha. But he or she may 
not be required to submit himself or herself to natural elements. However, for 
a Hindu, it is not enough just to believe in the Ultimate Reality, but he or she 
has to submit himself or herself to nature. Respecting in itself does not require 
submission. One could respect a tree without submitting himself or herself to 
it, for what it involves is the acceptance of the tree’s self-maintenance 
capability, ecological value and beauty. By contrast, submission requires a 
total surrender by realizing that the tree in more than what one sees. The tree, 
being a part of supernatural Being has more power, is capable of changing the 
fate of human beings, is capable of harming or bringing benefit to human 
beings. It is an acceptance that the tree is more important, mighty and 
powerful than a human being. Indian traditions are distinct and unique in this 
sense. The Chinese traditions, however, neither require respect nor submission, 
but require a wisdom of balance and harmony. So, at the end they all invoke 
spirituality, either by submission to nature, or by maintaining balance and 
harmony. This analysis shows that the different senses of identification, self-
realization and spirituality are responsible for different worldviews and 
human-nature relations.   
 To sum up, the basic questions discussed in this chapter revolves round 
the sense, if any, in which human beings are unique? How should the living 
and nonliving elements in nature be treated? Is nature sacred? A comparison 
of Western and Asian traditional views shows that they give different answers. 
When we consider the root cause of the differences, we found that it is a 
matter of taking identification, self-realization and spirituality in different 
senses. This finding implies that these are potential candidates to be 
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considered as core values. In the next chapter, we will examine whether these 































We are living in an Earth where natural catastrophic events are becoming 
more frequent in comparison to previous times. Our cutting-edge scientific-
technological inventions mainly aim at safe and secured human health, enough 
food production, maximum reduction of manual jobs, renewable energy, and 
nanotechnological living appliances for a more comfortable living. In addition 
to this, sophisticated weapons for possible wars, robots and Unmanned Ariel 
Vehicle (UAV), bombs with high radiation capacity, and space ventures are 
also highest priorities. Value matrix therefore rapidly changes since uses of 
technology is a major factor to distinguish between high-tech society and low-
tech society. In general, people in the Western traditions are culturally techno-
lovers, while people in the Eastern traditions are culturally techno-avoiders.  
But some contemporary values, such as globalization, sustainability, 
internet and virtual communication, are commonly appreciated in almost all 
societies. Nowadays, these are no more purely Western concepts because 
almost all societies are habituated with them in their own ways. However, this 
does not prove that all people throughout the globe are happy with the 
contemporary values, such as globalization and sustainability. Nor that their 
impacts in all societies are remarkably positive. Indeed, in some less advanced 
societies the impacts of globalization and sustainability are highly contentious. 
 168
In principle, sustainability requires preserving wilderness areas whereas 
globalization encourages increases in economic production. The developing 
countries are facing difficulties in seeking both. A notable Indian 
environmentalist and participant of Chipko Movement, Vandana Shiva, 
comments, “Sustainability demands that we move out of the economic trap 
that is leaving no space for other species and most humans. Globalization has 
become a war against nature and the poor. We must bring this war to an 
end”292.  
We should therefore answer some basic questions, such as, can we find 
some fundamental values which are common and at the same time be regarded 
as core values in Western and Asian traditions? Are present environmental 
values inspiring enough, or at least convincing? If not, do we need some new 
values? These questions are important, not only for making robust and well-
appreciated environmental policies, but also to conceptualize a sense of 
comprehensive environmental ethics.  
In this chapter, we will identify some common core values and explain 
them. It might not be difficult to find the common values in the light of our 
previous discussions on Western traditions and Asian traditions, but we will 
explain why they should be regarded as core values. We will also discuss the 
relation between common core values and comprehensive environmental 
ethics. Finally, we will concentrate on whether a normative approach or a deep 
ecological approach would be more significant in solving the ecological crisis.   
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I. IDENTIFICATION, SELF-REALIZATION, AND 
SPIRITUALITY AS COMMON CORE VALUES 
 
Three values which are predominant in both Western and Asian 
traditions discussed in the previous chapters are identification, self-realization 
and spirituality. These three values were in Naess’s ecosophy as well as in 
Passmore’s environmental philosophy. We have also noted that they appeared 
in Asian traditions with even more strong examples of living a harmonious life 
through reverence, respect and rituals. Clearly then, these three values are 
common. But their commonality could only partially provide a ground for the 
claim that they are core values. In other words, for a complete recognition as 
core values they must be supported by some robust criteria. We need to 
explain briefly how identification, self-realization and spirituality are common 
values and how they qualify as core values.   
Aldo Leopold, one of the major environmental value thinkers in 
Western traditions, argues for a different valuation of land in 1970s. But his 
land ethics is not merely some suggestions about how we should use land for 
development. Rather, his view is all about a very different concept of 
community, identification, integration, and rare spiritual-aesthetic relation of 
land and human beings. Before Leopold no one thinks that land is alive, land 
is powerful, land is the fountain of beauty, and land exposes a unique sense of 
community. The values he highlighted are identification, self-realization and 
spirituality that conceptualize land in a fundamentally different way.  
In his influential book A Sand County Almanac: And Sketches Here 
and There (1949) Leopold writes, “It is inconceivable to me that an ethical 
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relation to land can exist without love, respect, and admiration for land, and a 
high regard for its value”293. An ordinary person or a conservationist usually 
shows “love, respect and admiration” for land, but an ethical relation deserve 
something more, a valuation which combines identification, self-realization 
and spirituality. Leopold’s remarks clearly signal an adaptation of an 
alternative ethics based on these three values, an ethics which can include 
more than love, respect, admiration, sacredness and aesthetic feeling for land. 
This would result in a different appreciation of land, far beyond its economic 
value.  
This ethics should inspire anyone to treat land not just responsibly, but 
rather with an intimate fellow-feeling. One must realize the vitality, the 
consciousness of land, through his or her spiritual bonding with it. Only then 
would he or she be led to an ethic which Leopold said “...reflects the existence 
of an ecological conscience, and this in turn reflects a conviction of individual 
responsibility for the health of the land”294.    
Paul Shepard’s pursuit of identification, self-realization and spirituality 
appears in his influential book The Subversive Science: Essays Toward an 
Ecology of Man (1969). Like Naess and Leopold, his viewpoint is also 
ecological, but it also reflects the metaphysical complexity of human-nature 
relation. Shepard argues that there are two kinds of selves—one is simple, i.e. 
feeling, thinking, and organizing one’s surroundings through the concept of 
“me”. The other is wider, i.e. a self which is all-inclusive. He writes, “Oak 
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trees, even mountains, have selves or integrities too” 295  . This view is 
developed by Shepard and is completely different from Naess and Leopold, 
because none of them has claimed that nonliving entities could have their own 
selves. 
Shepard’s second view of the self reflects an integrated view where 
human beings can “fit” into the complexity of nature. They may find 
themselves within boundaries, such as society and family, but their vision 
could be across boundaries. This vision is not the ability to see something, but 
seeing something from inside its shell or skin.   
Shepard sees humanity within the complexity of nature. Like nature 
and landscapes, human beings can also create “room” inside their minds where 
plants and animals are not in opposition. He suggests realizing how human 
beings maintained their humanity in ancient times. To these ancient people, 
affirmation of natural entities shaped their worldviews and mentality. Of 
course, they regarded themselves as human beings, but these are the type of 
human beings who are not what Shepard calls “man-fanatic” i.e. species 
fanatic.      
Shepard’s worldview would be comfortable for those who are ready to 
accept an alternative radical view of the self. Such a view does perceive its 
surroundings beyond the traditional boundaries of living and nonliving. 
Shepard himself believes that his view mainly represents those historical 
thoughts which manifest, “...a deep sense of engagement with the landscape, 
with profound connections to surroundings and to natural processes central to 
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all life” 296 . The words “engagement” and “connection” are simply 
equivocation of the value identification. When he says “a deep sense” then he 
really means self-realization since without reviewing one self a deep sense is 
not possible to construct, and the expansion of one’s surroundings is clearly 
some sort of spiritual experience through self-realization.    
Holmes Rolston III, who argues for the intrinsic value of natural 
elements, has valued identification, self-realization and spirituality as 
fundamental. He believes that aesthetic experience of nature is not only 
awesome but also a fountain of joy and delight. Rolston views human beings 
as the ultimate and capable “aestheticians”, having some special qualities, 
such as admiration and sense of good and bad. He writes, “We humans are the 
only aestheticians on the landscape, and if we do not rejoice in this “awe-full” 
beauty, who will? And what a pity if none ever should”297.  
We can find deep identification and a sense of self-realization when 
human beings value nature as full of aesthetic beauty which may also inspire 
them to behave with other natural elements aesthetically and compassionately. 
We have seen that when Asian traditions value the sky, the Moon, mountains, 
gardens, flowers, trees, they very often ascribe spirituality to it. Rolston tries 
to capture this feeling by his aesthetic observation and presents it in a rich 
philosophical language. He comments that a combination of green landscapes, 
blue open space, formation and reformation of clouds must make a strong 
appeal to any human being. They are even more precious than we can think. If 
one is unable to be identified, self-realized and spiritualized with these 
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beauties then one may lose his or her humanness. Rolston notes, “This vast 
nature transcends me and my humanness”298.  
Val Plumwood criticizes Naess’s notion of deep ecology and proposes 
a deconstruction of human-nature relation from an ecofeminist perspective. 
However, she clearly hints that in order to overcome Western rational 
accounts of self, valuing identification, self-realization and spirituality is 
obvious. In the next chapter where Plumwood’s view is explained in detail, we 
will see that she finds the deep ecological self extremely faulty since it does 
not consider the independence of self. The ecological self mainly focuses on 
the interrelatedness or interconnectedness, in spite of independence. But many 
people want to value independence. As Plumwood notes, “...we need to 
recognize not only our human continuity with the natural world but also its 
distinctness and independence from us and the distinctness of the needs of 
things in nature from ours”299. 
Her ecofeminist approach suggests resolving self-nature dichotomy by 
new insights of identification, self-realization and spirituality. According to 
Plumwood’s ecofeminism, the ecological self should be replaced by the 
relational account of self. In contrast to the ecological self, she suggests that 
the relational self would engage, “...through connection to and friendship for 
particular places, forests, animals, to which one is particularly strongly related 
or attached” 300 . The issue here is not just that Plumwood, like Rolston, 
emphasizes place or surroundings, but also that she suggests that identification 
begins with particularity rather than universality. Her view contradicts Naess’s 
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claim that identification corresponds with universality. She also differs from 
Rolston as the aesthetic beauty of nature is not her main concern. Instead, she 
focuses attention on a particular place, forest, or even animals. The aesthetic 
appreciation of place may also increase our consciousness or realization that 
we should care for it.   
Similarly, Asian thinkers provided some mystical accounts of 
identification, self-realization, and spirituality. Their distinguishable thoughts 
reflect how these values could lead to an enlightened or expanded self. 
Nonetheless, this does not mean their notion of expanded self is completely 
metaphysical. Of course, they suggest retaining something which is noble, 
comprehensive, and total in character. But at the same time a practical view 
emerges from their analysis. This practical view urges a “reconnection” with 
the Earth that a techno minded people usually break away from most of the 
times when they relate with nature. David Suzuki et al. note, “We can begin to 
reconnect ourselves to everything on Earth, recreating a complete worldview 
by establishing or rediscovering rituals and ceremonies that celebrate those 
linkages and our communities”301. 
Suzuki’s insightful comments involve a mysterious sense of 
“reconnection”. However, it is not difficult for us to realize that for a complete 
worldview “rituals” and “ceremonies” are important. Asian societies are 
mainly “ritual” and “ceremony” based societies. Asian people like to celebrate 
rituals and ceremonies not just for pleasure, but because of a deep sense of 
identification, self-realization and spirituality. Most of Asian rituals and 
ceremonies are related to spirituality, and offer a different message to the rest 
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of the world. Like other traditions, when people celebrate their rituals and 
ceremonies, Asians integrate once again with their roots. They also perceive 
these rituals and ceremonies as means to a harmonious life, a way to know and 
preserve the ecological balance. As the Western poet John Seed says, “I am 
part of the rain forest protecting myself. I am that part of the rain forest 
recently emerged into thinking”302.  
Here, Seed identified himself with the rain forest and realizes himself 
as “part” of it by his unique spiritual experience. But his process is basically a 
thinking process, instead of Suzuki’s connecting process. Asians do not have 
many rain forests, but they have century-old rituals and ceremonies present in 
almost all of their traditions. Their identification and reconnection with these 
rituals and ceremonies form the same ecological consciousness as John Seed 
felt.  
Like him, Indian composer Rabindranath Tagore says in one of his 
songs, “Is springtime, my friends, a festival only of fresh flowers? Haven’t 
you seen the play of dry leaves and shed petals?...On this spring day, my 
friends, watch the play of shed flowers”303. 
Environmental values are closely linked to religious, cultural, and 
scientific values304. Science and technology in today’s society play a vital role 
in shaping our worldviews. Western traditions admire scientific lifestyles, and 
science divides sharply between living and nonliving elements. This 
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distinction is fundamental to any science, and so living beings are separate 
from nonliving entities. Western ethics, being consistent with this worldview, 
formulated principles which exclude nonhuman elements from moral 
consideration. Indeed, not all living beings are considered as morally valuable. 
Asian ethical systems do not consider the distinction of living and nonliving as 
so important. Rather, most Asian traditions hold that even a stone which is 
nonliving can get our respect and reverence. It is not that the stone is 
economically precious, but rather that it contributes to keeping the harmony 
and balance of our livelihood, and broadly the balance of our Earth. 
But both Western and Asian traditions value mountains, the Moon, the 
Sun, rivers, seas, green landscapes, and water-falls. We human beings all like 
the sea, beaches, wilderness, and deep green landscapes, and that is why 
people usually want to be identified with these whenever they have some time. 
We feel some spiritual experience, even emptiness (in the sense that they are 
aesthetically, physically and ecologically more amazing than we experience) 
once we reach them. Both traditions preserve these natural elements through 
love, reverence, and deep feeling. Some Western thinkers, who believe in Gaia, 
mix-up science and spirituality in preserving them. Their self-realization does 
not separate them, but rather integrates with the scientific attitude.  
So far in the previous three chapters, we have seen that the importance 
of identification, self-realization and spirituality was highlighted in Western 
and Asian traditions. Despite Naess and Passmore, classical Western 
philosophers reinforced these ideas in their own ways. Naess explicitly argues 
for identification with nature. His ecosophy, which is grounded on the ultimate 
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norm “Self-realization”, also conceived the value of self-realization and 
spirituality.  
Passmore holds the view of stewardship with nature. He has suggested 
a new human-nature identification where humans are prudent managers, i.e. 
they are self-realized about their duties and responsibilities for nature. He 
believes that as human beings are creative and innovative creatures, they are 
capable of solving the environmental problems. For example, a rational 
principle can regulate our energy policies, use of natural resources, in a 
harmonious and sustainable way. However, Passmore asserted a spiritual bond 
with nature from the theological perspective. If the Earth is God’s handiwork, 
humans, as His representatives, should respect the Earthly elements and care 
for them. 
Similarly, Asian traditions provide a strong historical persuasion for 
identification, self-realization and spirituality. For the ecological harmony and 
balance Chinese traditions maintain identification with the primal matter-
energies. The success of an individual’s social and political lives is dependent 
on the balanced interaction with Heaven and Earth. Moral self-cultivation 
begins with the spiritual bonding of nature. Daoist philosophers have 
emphasized human’s identification with the Dao and act according to the 
principle of Wu-wei.  
The Indian traditions encouraged a selfless identification with nature. 
Realizing nature as a bigger Self generates deep spiritual relation with the 
natural elements. The Japnaese traditions invoked the Shinto and Buddhist 
spirituality, realizing the “Way of Kami” and “Buddhahood” or “Buddha-
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nature” respectively. Compassionate and sympathetic behavior identification 
with all life-forms and the myriad things is essential. 
When we compare Western and Asian views on the environment the 
importance of identification, self-realization and spirituality was marked again. 
What type of identification can claim human’s uniqueness best? Is the 
distinction between living and nonliving elements so important for a 
compassionate and caring attitude toward nature? Can nature be sacred other 
than in the religious sense? Analysis of these vital questions shows that these 
values are granted with high priority in the human-nature relation and by 
several thinkers of both traditions. It implies that we can consider 
identification, self-realization and spirituality as common values.  The next 
question is: Are these common values core values?   
In order to consider any value as a core value we must have some 
criteria of core values. These core values are universal in character, and are 
used to conceptualize a harmonious and balanced human-nature relationship. 
They are embedded in the majority of people’s lifestyles, thoughts and 
everyday actions. This set of values articulates their empathic behavior and 
inspiration to preserve nature. So, the basis of selecting these values is cultural, 
religious, and philosophical reflections on the human-nature relation revealed 
in the Western and Asian traditions.  
I have set forth the following criteria of core values in the light of my 
previous discussions. Moreover, some of these criteria have been appreciated 
in the religious practices and cultural activities. For example, “fulfillment and 
perfection of life” is emphasized in traditional religions and Western and 
Eastern philosophical ideas. Another criterion, “ecological imagination”, is 
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also vivid in the traditional cultural ceremonies where natural elements are 
seen as persons, gods and goddesses. The Sun, for example, was seen as a god. 
We will see how identification, self-realization, and spirituality can satisfy all 
of these conditions.  
1. Rich way of living and long-term effect on human lives: The richness 
of living is a very important concept we need to consider for environmental 
interaction. People usually do not want to live in a polluted area. Instead of 
risky living, they desire to live in a place which is naturally fresh. They like to 
go outdoor at least once a year with the opportunities of staying beside seas, 
mountains, green forests, natural habitats of animals, birds, fish, and other 
creatures. There is a close connection between living in nature and richness of 
life. It is not surprising that the impressions and experiences people gather 
would have long-term impact on their lives. When values are rightly 
recognized these may even change people’s worldview and their behavior 
toward nature for their whole lives. Any core environmental value should 
contribute to the rich way of living and must have long-term effects. The 
values, identification, self-realization, and spirituality, are those values which 
people want to achieve in their nature-living.  
2. Powerful enough to change people’s attitudes: Environmental 
values could be more important when individuals find that the environment 
inspires them, attracts them. It may not just be enough to use green technology, 
but rather holding a caring attitude toward one’s surroundings is vital. People 
in most cases destroy trees or other natural elements unnecessarily, but they 
could change their attitude when they are deeply identified with these natural 
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objects, take care of them, realize the need for and interest in them and feel 
their spiritual aesthetic beauty.  
3. Joyful and natural: Individuals may find it joyful to hold some 
environmental values not because these are beneficial to some other end, but 
because these are joyful too. When any environmental value inspires, 
preserves diversity, ensures unity and joy, enough people would naturally 
accept it. Identification, self-realization and spirituality are those values which 
people in many traditions find joyful and natural.  
4. Practical rather than theoretical: Environmental values should be 
practical and more pragmatic so that we can practice them not only in the 
environmental context, but also in other perspectives of our lives. For instance, 
if we are identified with the aesthetic beauty of a garden in front of our home, 
we can preserve the aesthetic beauty of our homes by applying the same value. 
Theoretical guidelines, such as various environmental declarations and 
environmental laws, require awareness and a minimum level of knowledge, 
whereas once individuals are identified, self-realized and spiritualized they 
could avoid this theoretical limitation and burden. One possible example is 
indigenous people’s lifestyles. Another example is a nature lover who may be 
unaware or less educated but hold a deep caring attitude to his or her 
immediate environment, such as gardens, valleys, cornfields, mountains, and 
rivers.      
5. Cultivable: Anything that we achieve very quickly may give us less 
pleasure and have short-term effects. But if we cultivate something day after 
day, year after year, then it may give us true pleasure and must have long-term 
effects. For example, most people love gardens, but many of them do not 
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know how to create a garden in their yards. They are even unfamiliar about 
what plants need less water and more sunshine, when fertilizers should be 
applied, how natural pesticides can be used, and how natural symbiosis of the 
garden can be maintained. But once they start to cultivate this knowledge they 
can make beautiful flowers bloom with ecological wisdom that have long-term 
impact. This impact may be used as a seedbed to produce gardens in their own 
heart-minds where flowers like virtues and values would bloom.    
6. Fulfillment and perfection of life: Our lives are valuable but other 
life-forms are also equally valuable intrinsically when mutual co-operation is 
the basis of value. The basic aim is that all human beings want to achieve 
perfection, whether theists or atheists, spiritualists or humanists. The 
perfection of life gives them enormous joy, happiness, satisfaction and a deep 
feeling of meaningfulness. For this reason some people are religious since 
religious values give them perfection. Others are non-religious since religion 
is unable to give them perfection. In the environmental context, identification, 
self-realization and spirituality could ensure the fulfillment and perfection of 
environmental moral life because these values are implicit in any 
environmental theory. However, their senses and resulting ethical principles 
are different. 
7. Motivational force: Motivation is one of the fundamental elements 
for our lives to keep going on. Without enough motivational force people may 
not be inspired to preserve the environment. Some religions suggest that trees 
are sacred. So, the followers of these religions want to save trees even at the 
cost of their lives. Others suggest that trees are created by the Creator and so 
any follower should not destroy them without proper reason. Religious 
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believers wish to follow what they regard as a religious command. But 
environmental values are not like religious commands, and people are not 
bound to follow them. So, why do people still think that these are important 
values? One main reason is that they have enormous motivational force even 
for people who don’t believe the sacredness in nature. Our common values, 
identification, self-realization and spirituality, reflect this degree of 
motivational force irrespective of religion, race, color, and gender.  
8. Against separation:  The main cause of environmental problems, as 
many environmental philosophers agreed (e.g. Naess, Rolston), is human-
nature separation. Human beings who consider their environment completely 
dead matter, and non-responsive, separate themselves from it. Even when they 
regard animals and some environmental elements, as living creatures, they 
think these are lower than human beings in terms of reason, rationality, and 
capability of feeling. So, everything, whether living or nonliving other than 
human beings, belong to one single category, other. This human-other 
relationship is only harmonious when separation is minimized with integration 
and species egoism is reduced. Otherwise this unhealthy separation would 
gradually make human beings greedy, selfish and short-sighted. Therefore, the 
core environmental values must be all-inclusive rather than exclusive. 
Identification, self-realization and spirituality effectively undermine separation 
and aim at integration.   
9. Ecologically imaginative: Imagination is a special power useful to 
any creation. Evidence shows that many great innovations were begun from 
imagination. Even science, which is pragmatic instead of imaginative, values 
this power. Architects randomly fight with their imagination and creation. 
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However, ecological imagination is even more powerful and very effective for 
environmental protection. Recent ecological movies, where animals, trees, 
plants, seas, mountains, and forests, are the main characters, are using this 
power to communicate and make people conscious about their environment. 
Core environmental values should comprise ecological imagination so that 
people can build their own worldviews by nurturing these values. Many 
environmental philosophers have offered an imaginative view of the 
environment. For instance, Passmore imagines this Earth in stewardship, 
Naess and the Gaia hypothesis imagine this Earth conscious and alive as 
human bodies, Freya Mathews imagines the Earth as beehives, the Chinese as 
an intersection of Heaven, Earth and humans, the Indians as Brahman, and the 
Japanese as the web of Buddhahood. But we have seen that all these 
worldviews explore three common fundamental values, identification, self-
realization and spirituality. Therefore, these values are ecologically 
imaginative and surely core values.   
10. Preserve balance and harmony:  Preserving balance and harmony 
is the first priority for environmental protection. Balance and harmony are two 
main ideas which are applicable from human bodies to the Earth’s body. 
Every element in this Earth was received with an appropriate proportion of 
balance and harmony. However, human being’s thrust for knowledge, 
innovation, and domination has made this Earth unbalanced. The unbalanced 
Earth naturally interrupts its internal harmony, and catastrophic events, like 
floods, cyclones, tsunamis, acid rain, and earthquakes, are the ultimate result. 
If we are not caring about the environment, the future might be even more 
dangerous. The simple but rich way of caring about the environment is to 
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recognize some common core values and change our lifestyles in relation to 
these values. 
These criteria are generally commonsensical and may even seem 
subjective. I have indicated that the bases of selecting them are the cultural, 
religious, and philosophical ideas regarding the human-nature relation found 
in the two traditions discussed. These are mainly deep-rooted ideas and beliefs 
which most common people share and praise.  
These criteria are, therefore, important in deciding which 
environmental values we should maintain for a harmonious co-existence. We 
can find so many values in different societies, but we cannot incorporate them 
all in our lifestyles for various reasons. So, some core values that are justified 
by standard criteria can be taken into consideration. Our common core values, 
identification, self-realization and spirituality, satisfy all of these criteria and 
obviously deserve our consideration. But why and how are they particularly 
important in environmental philosophy?      
 
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF COMMON VALUES  
 
    The environmental problems are not limited to local, territorial or 
continental contexts, but rather these are global problems. Like other global 
problems, such as poverty and health problems, this problem is one of the 
major concerns for all nation-states. Many approaches, including technological, 
geographical, economical and sociological, try to meet environmental 
challenges. Philosophers and ethicists have been discussing several options for 
a harmonious co-existence with nature. A global challenge undoubtedly needs 
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a global solution. A solution that is effective, innovative, as well as compatible 
with decades old historical, cultural and philosophical traditions. A peculiar, 
complex, unfamiliar solution surely does not work and may be unnecessary. 
Still, people in some traditions are caring, preserving their environment 
spontaneously, and are considerably aware of it. On the one hand, they are 
maintaining traditional values, on the other hand, they are ready to review 
these values for a better Earth. They do not even hesitate to give up any 
traditional environmental value which opposes environmental preservation. 
Therefore, one of the main tasks for environmental philosophers and 
ethicists is to rethink which values should be protected and which values 
should be rejected, to make people aware of these values, and to inspire them 
to accept some influential environmental values found in different traditions 
for harmonious human-nature relationship. Most importantly, environmental 
philosophers and ethicists would offer theoretical discussions and continue to 
search for some common core values. 
Until now, environmental philosophers and ethicists were able to 
persuade people that most environmental problems are caused by human 
beings in their various relationships with nature. Thus environmental policies 
not only suggest some guidelines on human-nature relations, but also explain 
why people need to follow these guidelines. In that case, a common core value 
approach is the most effective, practical and unified approach. Several 
organizations, like UNESCO, have focused on common core environmental 
values for environmental protection and recommended the adoption of 
“...environmental values shared by those from all communities of the world, 
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allowing for wider global action by all”305. Apart from UNESCO, a major 
environmental Declaration, The Earth Charter (2000), warns us again and 
again, “We urgently need a shared vision of basic values to provide an ethical 
foundation for the emerging world community”306.  
Beside the global scenario, the environment was a great concern for 
every cultural and intellectual tradition in the East and in the West. In recent 
times, many Western presidents are elected from the green parties and they 
have to make significant contributions to their nation’s environmental 
protection policy. Similarly, Asian leaders must assure people that local 
environmental policies could maintain a balance between persevering 
wilderness, sustainability and economic development. Environmental laws 
throughout the globe are becoming more refined and philosophically 
ecocentric, instead of anthropocentric. The values that environmental policy-
makers, both global and local, emphasize are identification, self-realization 
and spirituality.   
The Earth Charter and the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and 
Human Rights (2005) are two notable examples. These Declarations were 
approved by many influential organizations, such as UNESCO and the UN, 
which are committed to promoting common values, rights, and shared interests. 
At the very beginning, the former asserts, “Earth, our home, is alive with a 
unique community of life” 307 . Here, the Earth’s community cannot be 
understood as human community, but rather a community comprising human 
                                                 
305 Universalism and Ethical Values for the Environment, ECCAP Project Working Group 1 
Report, (Bangkok: UNESCO Bangkok 2010), 1.  
306 “The Earth Charter” Earth Charter Commission, 2000, in Encyclopedia of Environmental 
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beings, animals, micro- organisms, both sentient and non-sentient, plants, trees, 
rivers, gardens, mountains, basically everything in this Earth. There are always 
integration and reduction in Earth’s community members and as such the 
Earth is “alive”. This view sharply contrasts with the mechanistic view where 
the Earth is seen as a big machine, dead but evolving since its creation without 
any purpose. Human beings in this mechanistic vision were the centre, 
whereas the Earth in The Earth’s Charter’s vision is the centre. 
In addition to this radical development, The Earth Charter has adopted 
three fundamental common values both explicitly and implicitly. For example, 
it explicitly says, “...we must decide to live with a sense of universal 
responsibility, identifying our selves with the whole Earth community as well 
as our local communities”308. A call for identification is clear but it goes 
further. We must value identification in a way that our aspiration for other 
community members would lead to a sense of universal responsibility for 
harmonious co-existence. Another fundamental common value, “spirituality”, 
is also explicit in principle 8 (b) under the title of “Ecological Integrity” which 
states, “Recognize and preserve the traditional knowledge and spiritual 
wisdom in all cultures that contribute to environmental protection and human 
well-being”309. 
This statement then recognizes the value of spirituality in a way which 
shapes our lifestyles and attitudes toward the environment and can contribute 
significantly to improve our conduct towards it. Indigenous people throughout 
the globe affirm many spiritual elements in nature and maintain a close 
bonding, integrity, and compassionate behavior with nature. Their ecological 
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wisdom is considered as unique and insightful, and inseparable from their 
spiritual living. A true spiritual valuation of nature is important for mankind to 
live a long and healthy life, as well as protect fellow Earth’s community 
members.  
It seems to me that while The Earth Charter explicitly recognizes two 
fundamental common values, identification and spirituality, we can also find 
another common core value, self-realization, in an implicit manner. However, 
this value is surely given high importance to protect the environment. Perhaps, 
one of the basic goals of The Earth Charter could be seen as promoting self-
realization since at the end the Charter states, “Let ours be a time remembered 
for the awakening of a new reverence for life, the firm resolve to achieve 
sustainability, the quickening of the struggle for justice and peace, and the 
joyful celebration of life” 310 . As these words reflect, we certainly need 
“awakening”, i.e. a realization of our responsibility and duty, a realization of 
various impacts of our behaviors, attitudes and activities toward other 
community members, a realization of our uniqueness and interdependence, 
and also a realization of joyful co-existence with firm ecological wisdom.  
Although The Earth Charter is a milestone in environmental policy-
making and for adopting some common core values, it does not spell out any 
particular ethical principle for environmental protection which could clearly 
show us how these values and policies can be implemented within conflicting 
interests and agendas. The Earth Charter recommends avoiding serious 
environmental harm, prevention of environmental pollution, migrating to 
renewable and environmental friendly energies, such as solar and wind 
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energies, from nonrenewable energies, such as coal and gas. But it is silent on 
the moral principle which we should adopt in order to achieve these shared 
goals. Since merely fixing some goals can only bring some satisfaction but no 
solution of the real problem, we should develop appropriate moral principles 
based on these values so that both individuals and policy-makers together can 
build an ecologically harmonious society.  
The next influential Declaration, the Universal Declaration on 
Bioethics and Human Rights, is another major turn toward the ecocentric 
worldview. Nonetheless, this Declaration mainly aspires to biocetrism with an 
emphasis on the species of human beings, “Aware that human beings are an 
integral part of the biosphere, with an important role in protecting one another 
and other forms of life, in particular animals”311. In this statement, human 
beings are not described at the centre of the biosphere, nor are they given 
special priority in relation to other life forms. But it assigns some special 
duties or responsibilities for them to protect the biosphere.  
While human beings are seen as protectors, as an “integral part” of 
nature, the underlying ethical principles to protect nature are not clearly stated. 
Apart from animals, there are many small organisms which play crucial roles 
in the ecosystem, and these are largely ignored. Moreover, members of the 
animal kingdom, those who are necessary for protecting human lives (e.g. for 
medicine) and those who are necessary for protecting the ecosystem but not 
directly useful for human beings, are not distinguished and given equal 
priority. As a result, the role of human beings who are the protectors and also 
consumers appears more complex and puzzling. But there is little or no 
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guideline about how these complexities could be overcome. The boundary line 
of some vital issues, such as basic needs, interests, balance, and harmony in 
environmental protection, needs to be drawn. The necessary principles are also 
unexplained, whether human beings are stewards or merely protectors of their 
own welfare should be addressed.  
Despite these limitations, the Declaration highlighted 
interconnectedness and some important future tasks required for harmonious 
co-existence. For instance, in article 17, the Declaration suggests adapting an 
attitude which is nonanthropocentric and encourages protecting other life 
forms, respect traditional knowledge and wisdom, and supports appropriate 
access and utilization of biotic and genetic resources. 
In its recommendation of biocentrism toward ecocentrism, three 
common core values, identification, self-realization, and spirituality, are 
incorporated with proper emphasis. Interconnectedness appears as a sense of 
self-realization, respecting traditional knowledge and wisdom require 
identification, and spirituality is absorbed into the sense of vitality in lives. 
This advancement of environmental thought was possible because some 
fundamental values were promoted by philosophers, writers, activists in the 
West and also in Asia. Now the questions are: Are these values all 
encompassing? Are they inspiring and significant in comparison to present 
individualistic attitudes toward nature? Both answers are positive and 
highlighted in the future vision of several policy-making organizations. 
TEEB (The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity in National 
and International Policy Making), an influential policy maker’s forum of the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), notes, “We find that at 
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times it suffices just to recognize value—be it intrinsic, spiritual or social—to 
create a policy response favoring conservation or sustainable use (e.g. sacred 
groves; legal Protected Areas or community-based Conservation Areas)”312.         
One of the key messages set forth in the future vision of TEEB is to 
value nature. Although its current policies are human-centric, its future vision 
(2010-2020) adopted a global awareness agenda with highest priority for 
intrinsic valuation of nature through globally agreed values and frameworks. 
The organization has suggested multiple tiered solutions to the ecological 
crisis, instead of present market-based mechanisms and cost-benefit solution. 
It treats the common value of “planetary stewardship” as fundamental. It is 
therefore not surprising that future environmental policies are changing from 
anthropocentrism to nonanthropocentrism, with special focus on some core 
values of ecocentrism. For instance, TEEB’s basic future vision is “working 
with the value of nature” which states, natural biodiversity “needs to be 
preserved for its intrinsic value and the benefits it provides to present and 
future generations...at all geographic levels, from global to local”313. Therefore, 
the common core value approach is and will be a dominating factor in 
environmental policy-making. The common core values discussed here should 
be accepted in global policies.   
At the theoretical level, it is already mentioned that many 
environmental philosophers not only want to develop a plausible theory for 
environmental valuation, but they also argue for a radical change in our 
worldviews and lifestyles. Indeed, not all of them have considered a common 
value approach in solving the ecological crisis. For instance, White and 
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Passmore are against the common environmental value approach and they 
think that a reformation of Western values is sufficient. However, they also 
believe that we need a change in present worldview. Others have diverse 
views on common core values. Norton writes, “What we need, in other words, 
is an approach to environmental values and valuation that fits comfortably into 
the experimentalist framework of an adaptive management process”314. 
Norton’s view clearly does not make any distinction between Western 
and Asian traditions because he believes that the main task of environmental 
valuation is pragmatic and should be suitable for “adaptive management”. In 
fact, he suggests John Dewey’s empirical approach for environmental 
valuation.  Dewey’s social learning might even have wider implications which 
may include some of the Asian values that are also common in Western 
traditions. So, a common core value approach could be a high potential 
candidate for adaptive management as well.  
O’Neill et al. defended a value “pluralistic” approach instead of a value 
monist approach, because our relations with the environment are multi-
dimensional and a single value, like pleasure, happiness or human dignity, is 
not enough to provide a moral guideline in all situations. A “trade-off” among 
different core values is important according to them.  It is interesting that all of 
these philosophers hold that when we lose “so much” in an ultimate value we 
should compensate by gaining “so much” in another ultimate value. So, the 
trade-offs between values basically involves compensating the loss of one 
value with a gain in another. In their words, “There are a variety of ultimate 
values, but we can compare those values and say that a loss in one dimension 
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of value is equal to a gain in another”315. But what might be difficult in this 
trade-off approach is that sometimes it becomes hard to negotiate and set 
trade-offs between different values.    
In order to avoid this difficulty, they introduced a new idea called a 
“common scale”. So, their final suggestion is, “What we need is a universal 
currency for that trade, some measuring rod which we can use to measure the 
different rates at which losses and gains in different dimensions of value 
evidence themselves, and then put them on a common scale”316. According to 
this statement, a common scale actually is a sense of commonality, some 
common core values which explain the value of the environment for any 
human society. These are universal “currencies” that we use. 
Green movements and their supporters in the Western traditions often 
maintain that a radical change in our present value system would mean an 
abandonment of so-called environmental values. For example, using DDT had 
an environmental value in the 20th century because it could protect humans 
and other animals from mosquitoes causing malaria. Many countries in the 
world use DDT as a protection from harmful insects which may cause dreadful 
disease (e.g. malaria, dengue) if uncontrolled. However, this DDT creates 
severe environmental hazards and it has profound harmful impact on other 
species and organisms. Like DDT, so many new chemicals are produced in the 
laboratories. It is claimed that the Enlightenment and the environmental crisis 
are “mutually exclusive”.  Enlightenment supported individualism. We need a 
sustainable environment, but as an enlightenment value it is the individual’s 
decision whether she or he want to recycle his or her own car. It is an 
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individual’s choice whether he or she would continue to use DDT or not. 
Sometimes there is a conflict between an enlightenment value and an 
environmental value. 
But this claim needs a proper justification. Some ecological 
philosophers have shown that the real problem is not fundamental 
enlightenment values, but rather a gap of communication which undermines 
the possibility of finding some common core values. They believe that a 
bridge between the Enlightenment and ecological values is possible to 
establish through accommodating some common core values. One of the 
philosophers who proposes this idea is Hayward, and he comments,  
The implications of ecology, as often elaborated within 
green movements and by their intellectual sympathizers, 
present a challenge to the most fundamental values we have 
inherited from the historical Enlightenment...but that it is a 
mistake to see the values of ecology and enlightenment as 
mutually exclusive...We may then even find there is some 
basis for a synthesis of the values of ecology and 
enlightenment.317              
                         
Apart from the policy and theoretical levels, the common core values 
can play a crucial role in educating our next generation to protect nature. 
Notable philosophers, like Hargrove, point out that “...for the environment to 
be properly protected, value perspectives other than economic value 
perspectives must play a leading role”318. His suggestion is not only that the 
common core value approach could be more important for environmental 
consciousness, but rather it will help to avoid many environmental disputes. In 
that case it must be based on “widely accepted values”, i.e. common core 
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values as well as the traditional ideas and wisdom of a particular country. He 
writes,  
...it is best, I believe, to concentrate not on converting 
current theory in environmental ethics into curricula material 
but rather on general environmental values that are widely 
accepted and consistent with the history of ideas that 
actually formed environmental perceptions in specific 
countries.319     
 
So, the common core value approach is theoretically as well as 
practically significant. Policy-makers and educationists could use the common 
core values to create environmental consciousness both at the local and global 
levels. The common core values should articulate an environmental ethic 
which is comprehensive in nature. Then, the next question would be about the 
relation of common core values and environmental ethics.           
 
III. HOW DO COMMON CORE VALUES AND   
 ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS RELATE? 
 
Environmental ethics is all about environmental values, values we 
should consider in our relation with the environment. These values have 
significant impact on our attitudes and behaviors toward the environment. If 
we value the environment because it is the only means to survive, the only 
resource which supplies us with the basic necessities, such as food, clothes, 
shelter, Oxygen, and pleasure, then the environment is just like a machine. But 
apart from the basic necessities, the environment also inspires us, delights us, 
makes us happy with its aesthetic beauty, help us bloom spiritually, provide a 
sense of vastness and also show up various short-comings of human beings as 
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a species. A perfect sense of community and communal relationship is 
maintained in the idea of the environment.  
We have seen that our common core values are embedded in Western 
and Asian traditions. Although the environmental ethics developed in these 
traditions are somehow different, they all value identification, self-realization 
and spirituality in their worldviews and in human-nature relationship. 
Nonetheless, environmental ethics in a particular tradition might be criticized 
as narrow even if it considers the same environmental values. The reason is 
that there could be some practices in the name of environmental ethics which 
do not actually turn up as environmental protection. For example, killing 
whales is a traditional practice for some fishermen, and that particular tradition 
might justify that activity as a sustainable act because of the presence of a 
huge number of whales. However, that kind of activity may not be sustainable. 
So, none of the traditions could claim its environmental ethics as 
comprehensive.  
Asian traditions are very often criticized for their inability to apply in a 
scientifically advanced society, while Western traditions are evidently 
anthropocentric and often blamed for the ecological crisis. China, Japan and 
India traditionally respect nature, but surprisingly they were unable to protect 
their environment properly and some environmental problems (e.g. 
deforestation, air and water pollution) are severe. Similarly, most rich 
countries in the West use a large number of animals for scientific experiments, 
production of cosmetics, leather and other luxuries goods. Rapid growth of 
their cities, cars, industries, chemical uses, pest control, and weapon 
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production has increased the potential vulnerability of people’s lives. Clearly 
then, a comprehensive environmental ethics is necessary.     
A good number of classical philosophers (e.g. Aristotle, Spinoza, Lao 
Tzu, Samkaracharya, Kukai) have put forwarded a set of values which can be 
used to construct a comprehensive environmental ethics. Contemporary 
philosophers (e.g. Naess, Gandhi, Suzuki, Rolston, Tu Weiming) have 
developed these traditional views and directly or indirectly outlined their own 
sense of a comprehensive environmental ethics. For instance, Confucian 
scholar Tu writes,  
Indeed, it is in the anthropocosmic spirit that we find 
communication between self and community, harmony 
between human species and nature, and mutuality between 
humanity and Heaven. This integrated comprehensive vision 
of learning to be human serves well as a point of departure 
for a new discourse on the global ethic.320     
 
Similarly, Rolston notes, “But the Earth’s atmosphere is as vital as its water or 
dirt. “Earth” is the name of the whole system, the proper name of our planet, 
like Jupiter and Mars. A comprehensive environmental ethics must become an 
Earth ethics”321. 
 However, others think that environmental problems are like other 
social problems and scientific solutions are enough to face them. But human 
beings need to change their attitudes toward the environment for a harmonious 
co-existence and sustainable living. This implies that the values of a 
comprehensive environmental ethics should be some common core values. 
                                                 
320 Tu Weiming, “Beyond the Enlightenment Mentality”, in Confucianism and Ecology: The 
Interrelation of Heaven, Earth, and Humans , ed. Mary Evelyn Tucker and John Berthrong 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1998), 17.  
321 Holmes Rolston, III, Conserving Natural Value (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1994), 205. 
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Now, we need to consider what exactly they mean when famous 
environmental philosophers refer to comprehensive. 
 Unfortunately, like any philosophical idea, comprehensiveness is also 
an idea about which philosophers disagree vastly. The debate on 
comprehensiveness begins in the early 1970s when environmental ethics just 
emerged. After Lynn White, a well-known philosopher, Richard Sylvan, 
boldly argued for a “new” environmental ethics in 1973. Since traditional 
environmental ethics addresses natural elements in an anthropocentric manner, 
Sylvan shows that such an ethics cannot claim its comprehensiveness until the 
intrinsic value of all other elements is recognized. But a good number of 
philosophers, including Passmore, have argued that in order to behave 
ethically toward nature we do not need to ascribe intrinsic value to all of its 
elements. Nor do we have to abandon anthropocentrism. So, an 
anthropocentric environmental ethics can be regarded as comprehensive if it 
treats other elements sustainably.   
 These two views still dominate, and supporters of both views offer new 
arguments to justify their claims. The first view, which I shall call “Ideal 
comprehensive environmental Ethics”, is non-instrumental, radical and all-
encompassing, while the second view, “Adaptable comprehensive 
environmental ethics”, is instrumental, pragmatic and sustainable. The most 
notable philosophers holding the former view are Naess, Sylvan, and some 
Asian philosophers, while the philosophers holding the latter view include 
Passmore, Norton and Holland. Philosophers who seek to reconcile the two 
views of comprehensiveness by a synthesis of science, ecology and ethics are 
Leopold, Callicott and Rolston. We will not repeat here the views of Naess, 
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Passmore and the Asian philosophers. Rather, I will concentrate mainly on the 
views of others.  
Sylvan formulates the issues as follows:  
Whether the blue whale survives should not have to depend 
on what humans know or what they see on television. 
Human interests and preferences are far too parochial to 
provide a satisfactory basis for deciding on what is 
environmentally desirable.322  
 
In this statement, the value of a new comprehensive ethics which Sylvan 
argues for is that the ethical decision regarding the environment should not 
depend on “human interests”, or their “preferences”. Norton, on the other hand, 
refers to a value called “sustainability” or “adaptability” without undermining 
human’s interests and their preferences. He writes,  
...I will propose one approach to a new environmental 
philosophy, a philosophy that is more geared to learning to 
be sustainable than in defining what kind of good nature has. 
This philosophy emphasizes social learning and community 
adaptation, and it derives its method more from the 
epistemology of pragmatism than from theoretical ethics.323 
 
 John O’Neill, with Holland and Light, similarly considered human’s 
interests and suggested that “...a defensible approach to nature has to start 
from a human scale of values and from the rich normative vocabulary that has 
been bequeathed to us through our human engagements with the various 
environments we inhabit”324. The main claim is that values must “start” from 
human beings, but they should not end up or be limited to the human species. 
                                                 
322 Richard Sylvan (Routley), “Is There A Need For A New, An Environmental, Ethic?”, in 
Encyclopedia of Environmental Ethics and Philosophy, vol. 2, ed. J. Baird Callicott and 
Robert Frodeman (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2009), 489.  
323 Bryan G. Norton, “Ethics and Sustainable Development: An Adaptive Approach to 
Environmental Choice”, in Handbook of Sustainable Development, ed. Giles Atkinson et al. 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2007), 29.  
324 John O’ Neill, Alan Holland & Andrew Light, Environmental Values (Oxon: Routledge, 
2008), 113.  
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Indeed, human beings should consider each and every aspect of their relations 
with nonhuman elements.   
 Finally, Callicott thinks that a comprehensive environmental ethics 
should include “spirituality” and contemporary sciences, such as ecology. He 
writes,  
What would a comprehensive Gaian environmental ethic 
look like? It would somehow unite contemporary 
ecofeminist Goddess spirituality with the Gaia hypothesis 
(or model) in contemporary science. So far, though mutually 
acquainted, the two have not been mutually informing.325  
 
Two views of comprehensive environmental ethics are vividly distinguishable 
from these comments. The ideal comprehensive ethics rejects the view that 
human beings are the centre of the universe, or a privileged species, and their 
satisfaction, interest, preference, and well-being should come first. That is, the 
Earth, rather than human beings, is the centre of moral consideration. 
 Earthly elements are intrinsically valuable, apart from human interests. 
The natural system as a whole is also intrinsically valuable. So, all types of 
religious, cultural and philosophical values which represent integrity, respect, 
love, and revere nature, and embody an ideal comprehensive environmental 
ethics. This ethics is necessarily nonanthropocentric. By contrast, the second 
view, the adaptable comprehensive environmental ethics, starts with human 
interests, but human beings cannot be self-centred. A harmonious relation, 
generally referred to as a sustainable relation, is the key value of this ethics. A 
sustainable relation, according to adaptable comprehensive environmental 
ethics, does not mean ascribing intrinsic value to all natural elements, or the 
adoption of nonanthropocentrism. 
                                                 
325 J. Baird Callicott, Earth’s Insights: A Survey of Ecological Ethics from the Mediterranean 
Basin to the Australian Outback (California: University of California Press, 1994), 41-42.  
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 Sustainable living is by human beings, including future generations. If 
burning fossil fuels is harmful for human beings and future generations, then 
there is no reason to burn them, even though burning fossil fuel is cost-
effective. Rather, renewable energy, such as sunlight, which is neither harmful 
for humans nor for other species, should be used. Declaring nature as 
intrinsically valuable makes no sense for philosophers who subscribe to this 
view of adaptable comprehensive environmental ethics. Indeed, this is a 
mistake and would make nature more mysterious according to them. 
 However, a totally new sense of comprehensive environmental ethics 
is noticeable primarily in Holmes Rolston III’s numerous writings. Rolston 
holds that nature is intrinsically valuable but that value originates and 
develops from (rather than by) human beings326. Humans must have duties and 
responsibilities to protect nature without asking the question why. This view is 
neither anthropocentric nor nonanthropocentric, but rather anthropogenic. 
Rolston’s sense of comprehensiveness is grounded on modern science and 
ecology. Science will help human beings to consider nature as intrinsically 
valuable and a joint endeavor of scientists and ethicists would set the 
principles of duties and responsibilities toward nature. Rolston’s idea is 
credited not only for making a bridge between anthropocentrism and 
nonanthropocentrism, but also for its potentiality to apply to modern scientific 
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societies. We should therefore look more closely at the most basic values in 
his comprehensive environmental ethics.   
 In his very first influential paper published in 1975, “Is There an 
Ecological Ethic?”, Rolston denotes comprehensive environmental ethics as 
“Ecological ethics” and says,  
This environmental ethic is subject both to limits and to 
development, and a fair appraisal ought to recognize both. 
As a partial ethical source, it does not displace functioning 
social-personal codes, but brings into the scope of ethical 
transaction a realm once regarded as intrinsically valueless 
and governed largely by expediency.327  
           
Rolston clearly states that a comprehensive environmental ethics would value 
both development and ethics. He thinks that our “social-personal” codes are 
equally valuable when we relate with the environment. But these codes must 
consider natural elements, which were thought valueless for a long time, as 
intrinsically valuable. Rolston’s view is interesting since here some of our 
common core values are directly addressed again and again. For example, he 
writes, “Mountains have both physical and psychic impact. Remove eagles 
from the sky and we will suffer a spiritual loss. For every landscape, there is 
an inscape; mental and environmental horizons reciprocate”328. 
 Note that one of the common core values, spirituality, is vital in 
Rolston’s environmental ethics. In his famous book Conserving Natural Value 
(1994), Rolston gives us a consistent account of a comprehensive 
environmental ethics which he called the “Earth ethics”.  A synthesis of ethics, 
science and development is the basic theme of his Earth ethics. 
                                                 
327 Holmes Rolston, III, “Is There An Ecological Ethic?”, in The Ethics of the Environment , 
ed. Robin Attfield (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2008), 25-26.   
328 Ibid., 25.  
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 Unlike Naess and other deep ecologists, Rolston is committed to 
scientific cultural value and anthropocentric values. Although nature and 
culture sometimes conflict, Rolston notes that natural and cultural values can 
co-exist and even “one value can be subtly transformed into another”329. How 
is this co-existence and transformation possible? His answer is, through 
human beings, “We have a duty to our higher selves to respect nature. We 
have already said that humans who do the right thing in environmental ethics 
can really never lose. They get more Socratic soul”330. We all know that 
Socrates persistently sought “self-knowledge” or self-realization. A Socratic 
soul would represent the value of self-realization in the form of human 
excellence. 
 Of course, there is much more anthropocentric inclination in the 
Socratic human excellence, but Rolston balanced this anthropocentrism by 
defending intrinsic natural value, regardless of the value of ecosystemic 
integrity and the value of unity and diversity of nature. He comments, “We 
cannot have enriched wild nature by clever management, because the 
management ultimately impoverishes rather than enriches...We value nature as 
an end in itself” 331 . If we cultivate ourselves in the light of scientific 
knowledge, spirituality, aesthetics, and love for nature, only then the true 
enrichment can take place. 
 Rolston’s view of comprehensive environmental ethics missed a 
common core value which is identification. Instead of identification, he 
emphasizes appreciation of the aesthetic value of nature. But identification as 
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1994), 33. 
330 Ibid., 163. 
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a value inspires people to protect nature since they find some commonalities 
with the natural elements with which they identified. In contrast, aesthetic 
appreciation of nature is only a fraction of a larger picture of identification. 
Moreover, the sense of “beauty” may vary from person to person and also may 
not inspire equally. What is beautiful in a scientific sense may not be beautiful 
in a common sense. 
 However, Rolston argues that scientific knowledge would inspire 
people to preserve nature. For instance, when one knows that certain types of 
plants have some scientific value, such as medicinal, protect land degradation, 
and help some beautiful insect species to flourish, one would be inspired to 
protect those plants. But it is not possible for all people to access scientific 
knowledge. As a result, protecting nature just based on scientific knowledge is 
difficult. There might be diverse attitudes toward the reliability of scientific 
knowledge in different cultures. One interesting example is animal slaughter. 
The slaughter of cows is banned in some Indian provinces, whereas pigs are 
forbidden in some Arabian countries. But scientifically, there is little or no 
difference between slaughtering a cow or a pig, and between pig’s meat and 
cow’s meat. So, a scientific worldview may not be equally acceptable in all 
cultures and societies. Rolston, therefore, cannot claim comprehensiveness for 
his environmental ethics. The same is true for others who claim 
comprehensiveness. Either they all lack a common core value or are highly 
biased toward modern science.    
 Nonetheless, from the above discussion some basic features of a 
comprehensive environmental ethics can be outlined.  
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 Firstly, a comprehensive environmental ethics attempts to value nature 
beyond its instrumental use. In fact, it holds that natural elements are 
intrinsically valuable or values belong to them independently. In other words, 
the value of nature does not depend on human beings. 
 Secondly, the scope of a comprehensive environmental ethics is so 
wide that the whole cosmos and natural system may be included in the objects 
of moral consideration. 
 Thirdly, the values on which the idea of comprehensive environmental 
ethics is grounded are not the usual values, such as human interests, but rather 
some bigger and noble values, such as interconnectedness, sacredness, beauty 
and sustainability. 
 Fourthly, a comprehensive environmental ethics should be acceptable 
to people in any society and any culture. So, having broad values is not 
enough, it is necessary that these are common core values. In particular, the 
values of identification, self-realization and spirituality. A comprehensive 
environmental ethics which lacks any of these three common core values 
cannot justify its comprehensiveness because these values are fundamental for 
a harmonious co-existence with nature. 
Fifthly, human beings have a vital role to formulate and apply 
comprehensive environmental ethical principles in their dealings with all 
natural elements. But their interests must be modified in accordance with the 
balance and harmony of nature. 
Sixthly, a comprehensive environmental ethics should be able to 
provide pragmatic action-guidingness in any kind of human-nature relation. So, 
it has to include some sciences so that on the one hand people do not 
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undermine themselves (by placing nature above them), while on the other 
hand, they can realize and improve gradually their current lifestyles through 
integration with nature. 
Neither ideal comprehensive environmental ethics nor adaptable 
environmental ethics could justify their comprehensiveness according to these 
criteria. Beyond the intrinsic value of nature, either they ignore one of the 
common core values or they lack action-guidingness. As a result, their 
proposed ethics is inappropriate and unacceptable in a broader context. 
However, even though Arne Naess, John Passmore and Asian thinkers have 
exceptionally considered identification, self-realization and spirituality as 
fundamental values for human- nature relation, their ethical principles are 
insufficient and less action-guiding too.  
 
IV. ENVIRONMNENTAL ETHICS (NORMATIVE) APPROACH 
VERSUS 
ENVIRONMENTAL WISDOM (ECOSOPHICAL) APPROACH 
 
It might be worth noting that the comprehensive environmental ethics cannot 
be just some ethical principles, guidelines, or tools to solve the global 
ecological crisis. Nor can it be a bundle of traditional environmental wisdom 
lacking appropriate, constructive and effective ethical principles. 
Environmental philosophers have been inflexible in applying one or the other 
of these two approaches. Contemporary ecofemist thinker Val Plumwood 
comments on this issue. She says, “...current mainstream brands of 
environmental philosophy, both those based in ethics and those based in deep 
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ecology, suffer...to rely implicitly upon rationalist-inspired accounts of the self 
that have been a large part of the problem”332. So, according to Plumwood 
both ways are problematic since the self-nature relation is constructed 
implicitly on a “rationalistic” account.  
 Plumwood’s comment distinctively shows that there are two main 
approaches in current environmental philosophy: one is based on ethics, and 
let’s call this the environmental ethics approach. Another is deep ecology, and 
let’s call this the environmental wisdom approach. Their debate is fundamental.  
The debate basically is about the value of the environment and the 
protection of this value. If one relies on the ethical approach then his or her 
worldview would be completely different from that of those who rely on the 
wisdom approach. So, it is quite possible that different values and worldviews 
would give rise to different notions of the self. Even the same value, when 
used in different senses and contexts, may produce a completely different kind 
of self, as was noted in Chapter Three. But we have not shown yet how the 
worldviews and the notions of the self influence each other.  
Naess remarkably proposes and develops the idea that the notion of the 
self has crucial impact on environmental relationships. Prior to him, most 
philosophers were engaged in developing a plausible environmental ethics. 
Nevertheless, Naess declares,  
We need environmental ethics, but when people feel that 
they unselfishly give up, or even sacrifice, their self-interests 
to show love for nature, this is probably, in the long run, a 
treacherous basis for conservation. Through identification, 
they may come to see that their own interests are served by 
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Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2008), 193.  
 208
conservation, through genuine self-love, the love of a 
widened and deepened self.333                  
   
Notice that Naess connected some important ideas, such as conservation, self-
interest and a widened and deepened self by one single value “identification”. 
We have already discussed in the Third Chapter Naess’s sense of 
identification as cosmological, while Passmore’s sense of identification is 
personal. Cosmological identification ends up at a unique self which Naess 
called the “ecological self”.  
The ecological self, therefore, is unselfish, non-dominating, non-dual, 
and follows the norms and principles of environmental ethics “naturally” and 
“beautifully” with joy and happiness. No sacrifice is necessary since what is a 
sacrifice to others is a joyful activity to the ecological self. The ecological self 
is an ecologically wise self who has achieved ecological wisdom embedded in 
traditional cultures and values. 
Therefore, it is not surprising, but rather usual that philosophers who 
are arguing for an enlightened self-interest would end up with a self which 
prioritizes human beings. Those who are more rigorous, and find human 
beings as the only rational creatures, and rank their preferences at the top, 
would end up with a dominating self. The dominating self views all types of 
relations as personal in the sense that members of the human species are the 
first priority. Whether it is an enlightened self or an egoistic self, it would first 
consider human beings and their unique ability to solve social, economical and 
ecological problems. Most classical philosophers (e.g. Descartes) in the West 
were arguing for a dominating self. However, a major exception is Passmore 
                                                 
333 Arne Naess, “Self-realization: An Ecological Approach to Being in the World”, in Deep 
Ecology for the Twenty-First Century, ed. George Sessions (Boston: Shambhala Publications, 
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who argues for an enlightened self through stewardship. He writes, “But the 
Western stewardship tradition goes further than that. It demands from man an 
active concern for the earth’s fertility”334.  
Until now no established ethics considers nature intrinsically valuable 
or includes natural elements as moral phenomena, and as such they are all 
somewhat dominating. However, the great advantage of the ethical approach is 
that this is action-guiding and in some cases successful enough to solve 
ecological problems. This approach is also pragmatic and short-term. One 
appropriate example is Passmore’s environmental philosophy which later 
contributed to the development of the notion of sustainability. Without the 
engagement of human beings and their various creative initiatives, sustainable 
development makes no sense. Therefore, personal identification is the basis of 
the ethical approach. Personal identification would lead to a dominating self or 
ecological master.  
The environmental wisdom approach, on the other hand, would 
construct an ecological self or ecological slave. An ecological self is an 
ecological slave because it puts nature first, just as a religious person puts God 
first. In some cases, the ecological self may metaphorically become the slave 
of nature by showing absolute devotion and complete surrender to it. Many 
people worship nature since nature and the Supreme Being became identified. 
They consider themselves as the slave of the Supreme Being, and hence they 
also consider themselves as the slaves of nature. Of course, there are 
exceptions, as we can see in the Chinese traditions.  
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The basic advantage of the wisdom approach is that norms and 
principles are not the driving force for humans. Rather they rely on their 
traditions which support humans and nonhumans. Human beings cannot see 
themselves isolated, distinct, egoistic and absolutely autonomous once 
traditional wisdom disallows these values. Sometimes protecting nature 
through reverence and respect might be internalized in the traditional wisdom.  
So, neither the ethical approach nor the wisdom approach can 
convincingly address the present ecological crisis. They have some advantages 
as well as disadvantages. A rectification for both approaches is necessary. The 
dominating self would downgrade nature, while the ecological self would 
upgrade nature. The former lacks proper wisdom, whereas the latter lacks 
action-guidingness. The ecological self as an idea is a great advantage in our 
environmental thoughts, but theoretically and practically unsound, as will be 
discussed in the next chapter in more detail. A complete philosophical 
reconstruction of both approaches is necessary for a harmonious co-existence 
and appropriate environmental policy. 
In sum, in this chapter, we have deduced three common core values, 
namely, identification, self-realization and spirituality from Western and Asian 
traditions. These values are justified by some standard criteria of core values. 
The three common core values are discussed from practical and theoretical 
perspectives. We have also discussed the relation of common core values and 
comprehensive environmental ethics and noticed that philosophers disagree 
vastly on the notion of “comprehensiveness”. It is argued that the proposals 
for ideal comprehensive environmental ethics and the adaptable 
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comprehensive environmental ethics both are insufficient to address a 
harmonious human-nature relationship.  
A complete theoretical reconstruction is necessary. Is our emotional 
attachment with the environment important at all for a comprehensive 
environmental ethics? What kind of self would suggest our common core 
values? Is it the highly conscious (but impersonal) ecological self or a self that 
considers its emotional bonding with the place? These are the questions we 

























The common core values, identification, self-realization and spirituality, 
embrace an emotional attachment with the surroundings. They developed from 
a place-based responsibility rather than a humanistic responsibility. By a 
humanistic responsibility we mean that human beings can form an ecological 
consciousness through environmental ethical principles. In this case, we do not 
need to maintain an emotional belongingness with the place. In contrast, a 
place-based responsibility develops from our deep belongingness with the 
place. Such responsibility shows that some moral norms spring from our 
relationship with the surroundings. In recent environmental thinking, place-
based responsibility is becoming more prominent since environmental 
philosophers are not only arguing that our developmental policy should be 
sustainable, but they are also arguing for a “sustainable biosphere”, or being 
motivated by “the love of a place or home”. For a solid ecological 
consciousness, these philosophers therefore think that we must value 
ecological relationship, biodiversity preservation, our home, and our locality.  
However, a tension is already there. Is it the biosphere which should be 
sustained, or is it our selves? A sense of a bigger Self, or a “comprehensive 
Self”, which gradually develops from the ecological self is thus created. In this 
chapter therefore our focus will be the complex relationship of the 
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environment, emotion and ecological consciousness. We will argue that 
emotional attachment with our surroundings is important. We need to examine 
which way our common core values can actually move people to conceive the 
environment, i.e. toward a sustainable biosphere or toward a comprehensive 
Self. Let me begin with the idea of a sustainable biosphere.   
  
I. SUSTAINABLE BIOSPHERE 
 
In his latest book, A New Environmental Ethics: The Next Millennium for Life 
on Earth (2012), Holmes Rolston III has outlined a new era for the next 
millennium environmental ethics. Most environmental philosophers in this 
century are engaged with the foundational principles of sustainable 
development. But Rolston warns that sustainable development is not enough 
for the next century. We have to shift to a much bigger idea called 
“sustainable biosphere”. The idea of sustainable biosphere is a fundamental 
paradigm shift in environmental philosophy and ethics. Rolston notes,  
An environmental ethic is not just about wildlands, but about 
humans at home on their landscapes, humans in their culture 
residing also in nature. This will involve resource use, 
sustainable development, managed landscapes, the urban and 
rural environments. Further, environmental ethicists, now 
and in the future, can and ought sometimes wish nature as an 
end in itself, a sustainable biosphere.335 
 
This comment shows that environmental ethics ought to move from 
sustainable landscapes or managing landscapes to the psychological 
attachment of human beings to their place or “home” where they consciously 
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set themselves. A distinction between sustainable development and a 
sustainable biosphere may help to show us how crucial the latter term is.  
 Sustainable development emphasizes “development”, or the 
improvement of the economic condition by using land and other natural 
resources as long as degradation and pollution is tackled, or at least within 
control. Sustainable development seeks maximum production of food and 
agricultural goods at the cost of using chemical fertilizer, pesticides, and other 
means. In short, nature is a “resource” or “capital” for sustainable 
development while keeping pollution and environmental hazards in an 
acceptable or minimum level. For a sustainable biosphere, land should be 
treated as “community” rather than as “commodity”. Economy and 
development must consider nature as a “support system” for humans, animals 
and other biotic communities. According to Rolston, the fundamental principle 
of a sustainable biosphere is that “any production of such goods be 
ecologically sustainable”336. 
 He also calls it the “ultimate survival” philosophy. Earth as our home 
cannot be sustained if our present attitudes toward it continue. A greater 
responsibility will take place when we reconstruct our attitudes for a 
sustainable biosphere, as he metaphorically says, “Earth is not simply the 
stage, but the story”337. In the story, emotions, belongingness, feelings, love, 
and integrity are vital, while in the stage the performance of various characters 
is vital. Human beings can only achieve a sustainable biosphere when they 
recognize this Earth as home instead of a stage, since at home we practice 
sympathy, kindness, love, respect, and care, but on the stage we just perform.     
                                                 
336 Ibid., 219. 
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II. THE LOVE OF HOME-OIKOPHILIA 
 
Human beings have enormous capacity to destroy the environment, but they 
are also capable of restoring or repairing it. For restoration, a motivational 
force is necessary. Roger Scruton in his recent book Green Philosophy: How 
to Think Seriously About the Planet (2012) has introduced an environmental 
philosophy called Oikophilia, or “the love of home”, which is surprisingly in 
line with Rolston’s idea of a sustainable biosphere. Scruton has showed that 
our ecological consciousness can emerge from our local Oikophilia. He claims 
that what could prevent human beings from destroying the environment is love 
of home or belongingness with the place. Love of home supplies the deepest 
motivational force for environmental conservation. He notes,  
...oikophilia, the love of home, a motive that comprehends 
all our deepest attachments, and which spills out in the moral, 
aesthetic and spiritual emotions that transfigure our world, 
creating in the midst of our emergencies a shelter that future 
generations also may enjoy.338 
  
Scruton argues that most national and international environmental 
treaties and governmental initiatives do not work because they lack local 
affections or people’s attachment with their local environment. The centre of 
local environment, as Scruton notices, is home. Home represents a place 
where we feel and show gratitude to our dead forefathers and are also 
concerned about our children and grand-children, i.e. future generations. At 
home, we are most free and most accountable in comparison to our 
interactions with the society, work-place, relatives, friends, and colleagues. 
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This can be said to be a “self-chosen” responsibility, i.e. a responsibility which 
we choose freely, motivated by our deep emotional bonding with home.  
The love of home can reasonably be extended to the planetary level 
according to Scruton. People in Europe, being religiously, culturally and 
legislatively diverse, still share an idea of homeland. Humans are often 
identified by their homeland rather than their religious and linguistic 
background. Home, our living place, therefore generates a loving, caring, and 
responsible attitude toward our surroundings. He observes, “...the love of the 
oikos, which means not only the home but the people contained in it, and the 
surrounding settlements that endow that home with lasting contours and an 
enduring smile. The oikos is the place that is not just mine and yours but 
ours”339. 
To conclude, both Rolston’s and Scruton’s views show that 
belongingness is important for environmental ethics. Perhaps, belongingness 
with place can lead individuals to a responsible attitude and consideration for 
others’ interests in order to achieve harmonious living. How should we then 
define a place?   
III. WHAT IS A PLACE? 
 
Although we use “place” in our usual communication loosely there are a 
number of serious concerns that demand more attention. In order to understand 
place properly, one may think about a space first. A space is empty, a vacuum. 
But a place reflects an interrelation between human beings and other natural 
entities. From the discussion of the previous two sections we may notice two 
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basic features of a place. Firstly, a place represents a community. This 
community is not necessarily comprised of humans alone, but also animals, 
sentient beings, living organisms, plants, trees and other natural entities. 
Secondly, in a place, community members have to sacrifice some of their 
personal interests for the sake of harmonious living. This implies that 
community members living in a place have affections for each other and are 
dedicated to continue their living harmoniously. 
 The first feature provides an account of ecological consciousness. In 
other words, community members value ecological consciousness and engage 
each other over several important issues. Of course, human beings are the 
focus of a community. 
 The second feature provides an answer to the questions why and how 
community members sacrifice their personal interests for others. There are two 
types of explanation in this regard. One way is through the maturity of self or 
intense affection. It is developed by Arne Naess. Another way is through 
devotion rather than affection, an alternative view of Cartesian ethics. I will 
discuss and examine both options, the first at length in sections IV and V, and 
the second more briefly in section VI. 
 
IV. MATURITY OF SELF 
 
The key feature of Naess’s sense of “maturity” is to consider nature as alive. 
This maturity is to identify with nature which is “left out” in the traditional 
 218
sense of self. The mature self would realize “Nature from the very beginning 
of our selves”340. A mature self is an ecological self.  
Naess is the first person in the West to introduce the idea of ecological 
self. In fact, the central theme of his ecophilosophy is the construction of an 
ecological selfhood which feels that nature and self are identified. The 
ecological self will not destroy nature for any reason because that destruction 
is ultimately its destruction. The ecological self is simply the ecologically 
conscious self, a transformative sense of Western selfhood inspired primarily 
from the Indian traditions. Naess provides a clear definition of the ecological 
self in his earlier writings. He says, “I shall offer only one single sentence 
which resembles a definition of the “ecological self”. The ecological self of a 
person is that with which this person identifies”341. 
 As reflected in this comment, a person and his or her ecological self 
are “identified” for Naess. Identification was noted as the opposite to 
alienation or separation. Personhood and the ecological self are inseparable 
once this kind of self is achieved. It is assumed that the ecological self cannot 
develop suddenly. It is a process of development from the individual self to 
the social self, and then from the social self to the metaphysical self. Naess 
points out that “I”, “ego”, and “self” are identified in Western traditions. 
Nature does not play any significant role in this identification. The Western 
form of the maturity of the individual self comprises three stages: “...from ego 
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to social self (comprising the ego), and from social self to a metaphysical self 
(comprising the social self)”342.  
Naess distinguishes between the “social self” and the “metaphysical 
self”. The social self comprises an isolated and egoistic self but maintains a 
social relationship with families and friends in the process of identification. 
On the other hand, the metaphysical self comprises a social self, which is a 
developed form of an isolated or egoistic self, and it considers at least all 
social human beings beyond families and friends for identification.  
Naess’s deep ecological slogan, “life is fundamentally one”, is closely 
related to his notion of maturity of self. A mature self would perceive this 
ecosphere as one single life-form. It attempts to protect this life-form as it 
protects its own self. But then the question is: Why should we consider “life” 
in particular as something to be cared for? Is it because every life is valuable 
and can feel pain or sufferings, and as such nature is also able to suffer? 
However, Naess never explores “sentience” as a hallmark of morality. Rather, 
he is always concerned about the “consciousness” which a human being 
should achieve in order to be aware of other natural elements. Naess’s idea of 
maturity of the self in the end cannot go beyond life-centredness (all life 
should be morally considered).  
Thus, although Naess argues far beyond biocentrism, his notion of 
maturity could result in a mere identification with living elements, and it 
largely ignores the non-sentient elements, such as land, mountains and seas. 
Even if we consider these as life-forms, Naess does not provide any 
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reasonable explanation of what makes them alive. Is there any spirit or vitality 
or other element which make them alive? 
Nevertheless, we have seen that some Asian traditions also hold nature 
as alive, active and dynamic. But their explanations are completely different 
from Naess’s. For example, Indian traditions hold that nature is the 
manifestation of different organs of god and goddesses. Nature itself is the 
Supreme Being and alive. The Chinese maintains that there are material forces 
of li and chi in every element of nature, and the Japanese considered nature as 
Buddhahood or Buddha-nature which is able to feel. Naess’s view is clearly 
then a jump from biocentrism (members of biotic community are morally 
significant) to ecocentrism (members of both biotic and abiotic communities 
are morally significant) without providing sufficient argumentation.                 
Naess’s various examples of the ecological self show that personal 
identity or personhood has a significant role in developing the ecological self. 
One example is that of Norwegian settlers who were transported to another 
place, Naess believes that for them “There is a consequent loss of personal 
identity”343.Similar comments are made about the Eskimos: “We all regret the 
fate of the Eskimos, their difficulty in finding a new identity, a new social self, 
and a new more comprehensive ecological self” 344 . The ecological self 
manifests a certain kind of personality or personhood totally different from 
socially constructed personhood. The ecological self is context-insensitive, 
unemotional as well as rational to the environment. 
In Naess’s view, a person who achieved the ecological self does not 
share contradictory interests with other nonhuman animals or even plants. The 
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interest of any animal or plant is compatible with the interest of that person. 
Only an ecologically enlightened self can realize nonhuman’s interests 
through deep realization of their “inherent potentialities”. Naess notes, 
“...animals and plants have interests in the sense of ways of realizing inherent 
potentialities which we can study only by interacting with them”345. This 
discovery of common interest seems unacceptable because humans and 
nonhumans have different as well as common interests. But Naess only 
highlights the common interests (such as being alive), and provides too little 
attention to the different interests (being moral, maximizing self-interest 
rationally, or sacrifice self-interest rationally for others).  
Naess is partially correct that as much as we “interact” with the 
environment we can realize other fellow creature’s inherent potentialities. We 
need interaction because our study of nature is too insufficient and isolated. 
Scientific study alone cannot give us the real potentialities of nature. Rather, 
an open, spiritual, aesthetic, loving, discovering mindset is necessary. Many 
great scientists spend their whole life in the forest or sea in lieu of their 
laboratories just to study one single aspect of a particular species. Sometimes, 
they do not restrict themselves to purely scientific study, experiment and 
observations. New theories therefore emerged by breaking the old paradigm.  
Naess’s claim about the same kind of interest of human beings and 
other nonhumans is inadequate. At a certain level, for instance, an ant and a 
human being might have similar interests. That is, both want to eat food in 
order to survive, and they also want to save their lives from potential harms.  
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But it is clear that an ant would have an interest for food quite different 
from human beings. Ants would have an interest to walk collectively rather 
than individually. Ants do not need artificial appliances, such as air 
conditioners, refrigerators and cars, for a comfortable and smooth life. Ants 
are not interested at all to know about the outer space, Mars, and the Moon. 
They are not worried about finding water in another planet, or searching 
alternative accommodation there, but human beings are interested in all of 
these. Since their creation ants and other life forms have been maintaining 
unchangeable interests, some of which we too can realize (e.g. community 
bonding). However, the interests of human beings are rapidly changeable and 
largely unpredictable. Something is present in human beings which 
distinguished their interests from the interests of a nonhuman being.  
Which context or place would the ecological self consider, its 
immediate context or the global context? Naess’s examples claim that the 
ecological self is more inclined towards its immediate environment. Perhaps, 
the ecological self is inseparable from its immediate surroundings. But there 
are times when Naess stresses the idea of global consciousness, such as when 
he writes: “From the identification process stems unity, and since the unity is 
of a gestalt character, the wholeness is attained. Very abstract and vague! But 
it offers a framework for a total view...”346.  
Certainly, Naess’s main goal is to present a “total view” of what he 
called “total field-image” throughout his ecosophy. But his arguments are 
vague as he himself acknowledges in the previous statement. Naess tries to 
avoid an abstract ecological imagination as much as possible, as his standard 
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example of identification and the example of Norwegian settlers show. Naess 
also regards a balance between “emotion” and “reason” as vital for his 
ecosophy. But he is inconsistent in his formulation of the ecological self. 
Naess uses context and emotion in his interconnected thesis. However, he is 
mistaken in focusing merely on ecological consciousness. Recognition and 
valuation of emotional attachment with our immediate surroundings is much 
more important for ecological consciousness. Naess initially admits this, but 
finally overlooks it.    
More clearly, in the example of Norwegian settlers, Naess has initially 
admitted that fishermen living in the Arctic coast maintain an emotional 
closeness with their surroundings (e.g. they enjoy wilderness and living with 
the sea creatures). Their resettlement in the new place was described as a 
transportation of their bodies, not their minds and emotions, as these remained 
in the previous place. However, Naess then moves further in a broader scale of 
the same feeling for Eskimos and penguins which is transpersonal rather than 
personal. While he notes “...their home-place was a part of themselves and that 
they identified with features of that place”347, he mistakenly holds that all of 
these emotions can be articulated in a single term “ecological consciousness”. 
Similar emotional approaches can be found in other key examples. 
However, the idea of the ecological self has received significant 
attention in contemporary environmental philosophy. There are some other 
influential deep ecologists (e.g. Freya Mathews and Warwick Fox) who 
exclusively formulated different models of the ecological self.  
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Mathews built up her model of the ecological self on the basis of a 
theory of quantum physics, generally known as the “theory of 
geometrodynamics”. In her book The Ecological Self (1991), she argues that 
the principle of geometrodynamics provides enough support for Naess’s 
interconnectedness thesis. Once we appropriately follow this principle, we 
would end up with a “New Physics” and a new selfhood. This new selfhood is 
the ecological self.  
The interconnected thesis is explained by Mathews in two basic terms: 
unity and discreteness. Natural substances, such as stones, plants, sands, and 
rocks, do not have discrete identity, rather, their identity must be retained with 
cosmic unity. By a combination of Einsteinian physics and Spinoza’s 
cosmology Mathews presents an argument that “substance is a fluid 
continuum which cannot be carved up into separate chunks”348. Substances are 
fluid continuum. That is, they are not separate, distinct and independent. 
Newtonian physics holds atoms static and passive, while Einsteinian physics 
describes them as a dynamic field where electron, proton and neutron are 
bonded together. Mathews claims that we have to analyze substances in a 
“space-time manifold” in accordance with this interrelation.  
 Ontologically, Mathews’s view then would define natural elements 
from two perspectives, geometrical structure and functional form. A rock has 
identity and stability in relation to its geometrical structure, but its 
functionality is as the same as an organism. Whatever dynamism and unity can 
be found in organic elements can also be found in it. From the functional point 
of view a rock is also a self-maintenance machine as an organism is. All 
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elements in this Earth then function under one single systematic principle, 
“self-maintenance”.   
To say that both living and nonliving elements function under the 
“self-maintenance” system implies that the Earth itself cannot be left out. The 
Earth has to follow its own self-maintaining functionality. According to 
Mathews, this self-maintenance should be called “Self-realization” because it 
is “goal-directed”. Since the goal directedness is intrinsically valuable, Self-
realization is also intrinsically valuable for her. Only self has objective identity 
in Mathews’s Self-realizing system where there are uncountable small selves 
and one bigger Self, the cosmos. The important point in her claim is that 
selfhood cannot be limited to human beings alone, but everything from rock to 
cosmos could have a selfhood. So, her main claim can be summarized in a few 
words, “...that the cosmos as a whole possesses the power of self-realization, 
and hence qualifies for selfhood”349.  
This view is not fully compatible with Naess’s view. Naess did 
conclude that there is a wide sense of self, but that has to be extended from the 
narrower self. Mathews finds that the cosmos “as a whole” is the bigger Self 
and claims its selfhood. But in order to claim selfhood, showing structural 
similarities may not be enough. Mathews further has to show that the cosmic 
Self has the same feeling capability, emotional response, and most importantly, 
autonomy which an individual self might have. Her geodynamic principle 
provides an argument for self-maintenance present in all organisms, trees and 
plants. However, along with self-maintenance, we need to know whether the 
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cosmos can do it consciously. Or, does it just run according to a mechanistic 
model through interrelatedness and interdependence?  
Naess, on the other hand, begins with ecology not physics. His basic 
principle is the ecological relationship found in natural elements. We all ought 
to value and maintain this relationship. He finds that all organisms and natural 
elements are inherently connected and are contributing to the functioning of 
the biosphere. He is less interested in whether the biospheric aliveness could 
claim a kind of selfhood. Of course, he would not reject Mathews’s view as 
deeply ecological.     
One of the main goals of Naess’s ecosophy was to remove spirituality 
or religious phobia from nature, and provide an ecological explanation which 
can match well with Western views. However, Mathews goes far beyond 
Naess’s view when she claims that the cosmos as an organism could qualify 
for selfhood. Moreover, her view would not be very different from those in the 
Indian traditions. Mathews, therefore, could be regarded as a Neo-panpsychist, 
while Naess is not a panpsychist.  
Another version of the ecological self was developed by the 
contemporary deep ecological thinker Warwick Fox, which he called “the 
transpersonal self”. While his approach is also based on Naess’s 
interconnected thesis, it is “more ecocentric” and “cosmological”. He uses 
psychology rather than theoretical physics. Fox’s transpersonal self is mainly 
endowed with the deep ecological notion of Self-realization. He argues that 
deep ecology should be articulated in three different senses, formal, 
philosophical and popular.  
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The formal sense is “asking deeper questions” related to our ecological 
relationships. Any kind of religious or philosophical pantheism, which also 
asks such deep questions and provides answers, will be included in this sense. 
The philosophical sense refers to the derivation of Naess’s own ecosophy, 
ecosophy T. Finally, the popular sense adopts all kinds of radical ecocentrism 
that supports Naess’s ecosophy, such as when one says, “Let the mountain 
Himalaya live!” 
Given these three distinctive senses of deep ecology, the fundamental 
problem Fox finds with Naess’s notion of deep ecology is, in his words,  
...insofar as we hold deep ecology to be concerned with an 
ecocentric approach to ecology/living-in-the-world, Naess’s 
formal, asking - deeper - questions / derivation - from -
fundamentals sense of deep ecology is not a tenable sense of 
deep ecology. It fails to distinguish ecocentric views (or 
those who hold these views) from anthropocentric views (or 
those who hold these views).350       
 
Fox’s challenge is twofold, first, only asking deeper questions is not deep 
ecology. We need to change our behavior immediately and that requires Self-
realization. Secondly, Naess’s sense of deep ecology may lead us to an 
anthropocentric conclusion. In the end, deep ecology is an attempt to construct 
the anthropocentric ethics under the name of ecocentric ethics. These attacks 
are not fully justified in my view.  
 Asking deeper questions is painted as an indication of deep ecology. 
Many environmental problems caused by human beings can be solved if we 
ask deeper questions. Do we need to use a plastic bag? Most people do not 
think about this, but a deep ecologist raises the issue, and refines at least his or 
her own activity. This change in his or her behavior does not arise from “Self-
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realization” with the plastic bag. Instead, it just comes from deep thinking and 
feeling. Since a deep ecologist does it habitually, thinking about duties or 
calculating utility may not be necessary for him or her. An appreciation of 
deep questions, deep realization of the impact of his or her activity is enough. 
Deep ecology is a prominent approach in this regard. It is important to note 
that Naess stresses “Self-realization”, but he also paid enough attention to 
identification and spirituality. Thus, isolating Self-realization from the rest of 
his views would be misleading. We should consider the whole of his deep 
ecology. 
 I agree with Fox that there are several anthropocentric elements (e.g. 
joy, happiness) in Naess’s ecocentrism. This is probably because human 
beings possess some special qualities (e.g. they are capable of taking care of 
other creatures from a sense of duty or utility). For Naess, human beings are 
unique in realizing “interconnectedness” or realizing that they are inherently 
connected with other community members. This realization warns them 
against greed, egoistic and isolated behavior. Their awareness is at the core of 
an appropriate attitude toward nature. 
 Nevertheless, we have little basis for claiming that Naess is 
anthropocentric because he never thought human beings are superior. Nor did 
he think that all values should be derived from human beings, from their 
preferences and choices. His view is just an ecocentric view as he proceeds 
from biosphere to human beings, not from human beings to biosphere. But it is 
evident that he is more concerned about “life”, than with nonliving elements. 
He might hold a biocentric view, but by believing “all life-forms are one” he 
dissociates himself from anthropocentrism.  
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Fox tried to show that a true ecocentric view has to be “impartial” to 
all elements, living and nonliving. In other words, he believes that an 
ecocentric view must overlook all special qualities of human beings and 
realize that all elements are equal. In this type of ecocentrism, a farmer’s 
identification with his or her own cattle and his or her identification with all 
other cattle in the Earth intensively and qualitatively is the same. What Fox 
suggests is that Naess’s notion of Self-realization generates a transpersonal 
self, not an ecological self. 
Fox’s transpersonal self is not distinct only from the ecological self, 
but it is also distinct from all kinds of selves so far proposed. As he claims,   
This is because, whatever their qualitative differences, the 
desiring-impulsive self, the rationalizing-deciding self, and 
the normative-judgmental self all refer to a narrow, atomistic, 
or particle-like conception of self whereas the transpersonal 
self refers to a wide, expansive, or field-like conception of 
self.351     
            
At this stage it is necessary to review whether we need to distinguish 
between Naess’s three senses of deep ecology. We need to ask, does Fox’s 
view correctly address Naess’s deep ecological approach? On the one hand, 
Fox has tried to provide a philosophical framework for deep ecology, Naess’s 
ecosophy and ecocentrism in a broad sense. On the other hand, he has 
misguided other deep ecologists to perceive Naess’s ecosophy only from a 
cosmological perspective, instead of a combination of personal and 
cosmological perspectives. Naess’s main concern was to define some values, 
such as identification, self-realization, and spirituality, and to use them to 
build a comprehensive environmental philosophy.   
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Most scholars (e.g. Bill Devall, George Sessions, David Rothenburg) 
think that the term which represents Naess’s Gestalt thinking is “Self-
realization”. Some of them, such as Mathews and Fox, interpreted this term in 
an excessively psychological and cosmological manner. Others prioritize his 
Gestalt move or “shift” from the narrow self to a comprehensive Self. This 
Gestalt shift significantly contributes to change our attitude and behavior 
toward the environment. Christian Diehm, one such deep ecologist, concludes, 
“Starting with the gestalt ontological considerations...we have found that 
emphasis ought not to lie primarily on expanding the self but on expanding the 
possibilities for new forms of encounter with nature and for a deeper 
understanding of the values it holds”352. 
Diehm’s point is that we should consider different types of “encounter” 
with nature, instead of just focusing on a single norm, “Self-realization”, when 
explaining Naess’s ecosophy. However, from my point of view, throwing 
other possibilities away, Mathews and Fox just focused on Self-realization, 
and that is a clear deviation from Naess’s basic ideas.        
 
V. MAIN OBJECTIONS TO THE ECOLOGICAL SELF 
 
Naess and other deep ecologists claimed that the only viable way to solve the 
ecological crisis is to reduce our alienation from nature to a maximal degree. 
In order to do so, they have suggested viewing nature as part of us. 
Alternatively, we and nature are not distinct and separate. So, nature cannot be 
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independent from us but rather, nature is a unified cosmic whole with human 
beings as a part of it.     
The ecological self, referred to as the “expanded self”, is a widened 
and deepened self that is capable of feeling others’ destruction as its own 
destruction. This kind of self includes others’ interest in its own, and 
ultimately treats nature as an expanded notion of “self-interest”. How can it 
avoid egoism? The problem of the expanded self is not merely carrying 
egoistic elements, but it also rationalizes them as far as possible. As a result, 
the distinctiveness of others is denied.  
Another problem is that although Naess says empathy should not be 
the main issue for the expanded self, his illustration clearly shows that such a 
self must “empathize” with nature. However, all deep ecologists strategically 
avoided the role of empathy. In the end, the expanded self shares both egoism 
and “sacrificed” self-interest. Plumwood comments that the expanded self is 
“...just another pretentious and obscure way of saying that humans [can] 
empathize with nature”353. She agreed with fellow ecofeminist philosopher 
Warren that in this account of self “Others are recognized morally only to the 
extent that they are incorporated into the self, and their difference denied”354.  
 Plumwood’s view is that the ecological self should necessarily be a 
caring self, full of emotion, and valuing personal relationships, rather than an 
“abstraction” and “detachment” from places. Her conception of self is entirely 
feminine, and she calls it a “relational account of self”. Her relational self 
would maintain two basic characteristics, “...the distinctness of nature but also 
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our relationship and continuity with it”355. There is no merger of egoistic self 
and bigger Self, nor any diminishing of ego, nor even highly abstract 
cosmological identification. The relational self thus sees the “...self as 
embedded in a network of essential relationships with distinct others”356. 
Fox’s transpersonal self is also detached from particularity and aims at 
“impartial identification” with the cosmos. That is, as he claims, it discards 
“particular concerns, personal emotions, and attachments” while maintaining 
impartial identification. The advocates of the transpersonal self intend to 
provide a universal framework of deep ecological philosophy. However, many 
scholars find this universalization a great deviation from Naess’s basic thesis. 
As Plumwood notes,   
...it cannot allow for the deep and highly particularistic 
attachment to place that has motivated both the passion of 
many modern conservationists and the love of many 
indigenous peoples for their land (which deep ecology 
inconsistently tries to treat as a model).357    
 
 We have noticed that the attachment to place appears as a major 
concern for Naess in his many examples, including Norwegian settlers and 
Arctic penguins. Plumwood’s concern therefore must be taken seriously as she 
notes that a lot of conservationists get their motivation and passion from their 
identification with a particular place. A place can never be just a place if one 
identifies with it. It can always be defined with motivation, inspiration, 
passion and intimacy. Otherwise, it seems very hard to explain why sometimes 
people stay in a place with their families for the whole life. We love our old 
home even though we leave it, our old schools, our old villages, and old 
playground. There is possibly no way to undermine these personal attachments. 
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Thus Plumwood says, “In inferiorizing such particular, emotional, and 
kinship-based attachments, deep ecology gives us another variant on the 
superiority of reason...”358.   
 One of the major issues in environmental philosophy is to define the 
position of human beings and the position of other natural elements in relation 
to them. The deep ecological self requires that we should live in a way that is 
“self-in-Self”. In other words, except for fulfilling fundamental needs we 
cannot destroy nature. The comprehensive Self is much bigger and more 
valuable than human beings. The deep ecological self cannot allow building a 
dam even though without it many people will die each year because of flood. 
The comprehensive Self (or nature) dictates to individuals what they should do. 
Their personal interests will be fulfilled by nature just as a religious person’s 
interests are fulfilled by his or her Creator. So, human beings’ freedom, 
dignity, autonomy are definable only in relation to the supremacy of nature. It 
seems that they are living with nature as slaves live in order to support the 
interests of their master.    
 That should not be the right position for the human species, the only 
capable species on Earth to take care of other creatures, to realize their deep 
connection with other natural elements, to identify very intimately with their 
surroundings, and most importantly, to protect nature through their attitudes, 
behavior, reason, and activities. Other natural elements could be their 
inspiration, motivation, fulfillment of deep aesthetic-spiritual understanding, 
but not their masters. So, in the idea of the ecological self both the positions of 
human beings and other elements of nature are misplaced. Human beings are 
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neither masters nor slaves of nature and vice-versa. A partnership relation is 
much more appropriate.   
 The idea of the ecological self is a seriously mistaken synthesis of 
Western science and Eastern mysticism which neither fit well in the Western 
context nor can it fit in the Eastern context. Arne Naess acknowledges that he 
was greatly inspired by Gandhi’s thought, specifically, his notion of Self-
realization. Gandhi’s concept of Self-realization was not a new thing, it was 
directly borrowed from Hindu religious scriptures. In particular, Samkara’s 
Advaita Vedanta was its origin, as we have discussed in the Second Chapter. 
So, the idea of Self-realization obviously has a religio-cultural context. In the 
Hindu cultural context, Self represents the Ultimate Reality or Supreme Being. 
One important thing to note here is that in Hindu metaphysics “ignorance” and 
“knowledge” play a vital role. The way of being self-conscious and of 
realizing the Ultimate Reality required knowledge. Individuals can obtain this 
knowledge through devotion, their complete surrender to nature through 
performing several religious rituals.  
 Once they realize that this world and the Self are identified, nature is 
an expression of the Ultimate Reality, they achieved liberation (moksa) from 
all kinds of ignorance (bondage). Self-realzation therefore has a very strong 
religio-cultural background in the Asian context. However, Naess borrowed 
this influential term and discards its religio-cultural roots when he replaced it 
in the Western context.  
Western cultures attempt to justify human-nature relation on the basis 
of science. Naess as a Westerner imports his notion of interconnectedness 
from ecological science, but imposes the Eastern metaphysics of Self-
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realization. Therefore, clearly there is a religio-cultural gap or missing link in 
Naess’s synthesis of ecology and cosmology. For this reason, Naess 
sometimes provides vague, obscure, overlapping meanings of identification, 
self-realization and spirituality. Moreover, Brennan and Lo have emphasized 
the inadequacy of the ecological self and Naess’s deep ecological platform, 
“There is no need to hold a relational conception of the self, or to share his 
views on identification and extended self-concern in order to sign up for the 
platform”359.       
 A related problem is that the idea of the ecological self can hardly 
motivate people who do not support the deep ecological platform. Thus, lack 
of motivation could be seen as a major problem in the idea of the deep 
ecological self. One might argue that “interrelatedness” should play the key 
role to motivate people, whether they believe in the deep ecological platform 
or not. But this kind of argument is acceptable at the surface level, not at the 
deeper level. Many governments, despite being aware of their 
interconnectedness with the local environment, are engaged with 
environmental hazards. Sometimes their activities are so irresponsible that the 
whole nation has to pay for it.  
For instance, Ludescher recently calls for global environmental 
activism to save the Amazon rain forest. She writes, “The destruction of the 
Amazon rain forest via deforestation, mining, and oil drilling presents a grave 
environmental crisis demanding immediate action”360. The author notes that 
the “aggressive resource extraction” is operated by global oil companies with 
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a partnership of Peru and the Ecuadorian governments. Now, we could easily 
imagine the scenario of other developing countries where law and order are 
mostly ineffective or simply absent. Although a few powerful people, who are 
benefiting from such activities, know that “everything is interrelated”, they are 
not motivated enough to protect the Amazon. However, the indigenous people 
around the Amazon and all over the Earth are always motivated enough and 
displayed their concern for the environment through repeated movements. 
Why? 
 The ecological self provides us little or no action-guidingness in 
making practical decisions. Environmental decision-making is becoming more 
and more complex in the contemporary world. We are now living in a time 
when people are relatively conscious about their environment. But 
simultaneously, they also want to live a much more comfortable life. They 
want all equipments to be automatic and remote-controlled, so they can enjoy 
their lives without disruption or physical labor, and feel much more secure and 
environmentally clean.  
 However, a well-known problem is that we have to choose to either 
preserve the environment and live less luxuriously, or enjoy huge economic 
and scientific development with less environmental preservation. The 
developed world has implemented “sustainable development” so that they can 
maintain both rich life styles and preserve wilderness. But environmental 
decisions are not so simple for them too.  
Let’s take one familiar problem in one of the most developed countries 
in the world, the United Sates of America. In the western United States an 
endangered fish species is humpback chub (Gila cypha) which has no 
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instrumental value, no aesthetic value, no ecosystemic value and also no 
transformative value. As Smith describes the problem, “Since either the 
humpback chub has no clear instrumental goods, or what few instrumental 
goods it does have are likely outweighed by the costs of trying to save it, 
instrumental goods cannot reasonably be used in a defense of its 
preservation”361. Should the U.S. preserve humpback chubs at the cost of 
millions of dollars and considerable sacrifice? How does Naess’s ecological 
self guide us? 
Naess would say that an ecological self perceives all life-forms as 
intrinsically valuable. Since all life-forms are fundamentally the same in 
quality and they are parts of a big comprehensive Self, it is not important 
whether chubs are useful or have economic value. The question which is 
important to Naess is, are they members of the ecosphere? An ecological self 
would feel the sufferings of chubs due to the loss of their habitats. Then, the 
ultimate guideline is that Americans should preserve humpback chubs even at 
the cost of downgrading their lifestyles to generate funds. This guideline is 
somehow acceptable, though some people may find it irrational.  
However, Americans cannot leave the Colorado River useless just for 
the habitat of an endangered species which has no or ignorable instrumental 
value. Long before Smith’s paper, pioneer environmental philosopher Holmes 
Rolston III mentions that Coloradans need a dam for available water supply to 
the inhabitants and also for economic development,  
Coloradans need to decide whether to trade water 
development on the Colorado River, providing growth and 
convenience for the Front Range cities, against the 
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extinction of the humpback chub...The chub cannot live in 
the lakes behind the dams that humans desire.362                    
         
The issue is now complex. Should Coloradans have the dam at the cost of the 
extinction of a unique creature? The supporters of the ecological self could 
reply that human beings are not the species which should come first. In 
making this decision why should we give priority to the human community? 
Coloradans must accept a shortage of water supply and less consumption of 
water if they are ecologically conscious. Surely, this would be an impractical 
guideline for the Coloradans and annoying for the U.S. government. 
 Now, let us turn the issue in an opposite direction. Consider 
Bangladesh, one of the least developed countries in the Earth with a huge 
population and currently facing extreme environmental threats from Climate 
Change. In fact, scientists forecast that parts of the country may “disappear 
before too long”363. Bangladesh, with her neighbor India, owns the largest 
mangrove forest in the Earth, “Sundarbans”. 
Sundarbans is a habitat of hundreds of species of fish, crabs, snails, 
mollusks and shrimps (prawns) with birds, reptiles, animals, insects, and 
uncountable micro-organisms. A large number of species of flora, locally 
known as “Sundari” (Heritiera tomes), are distributed throughout the forest 
land. Should Bangladesh preserve the Sundarbans or continue to collect 50% 
of the total forest related revenue at the cost of rapid reduction of flora and 
funnel species? Can the ecological self motivate the Bangladeshis to preserve 
Sundarbans at the cost of not feeding themselves and their families?  
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Recently, in a study on Sundarbans it is found that “The significant and 
recent causes of Sundarbans mangrove loss in the past decade have 
included...the destructive production methods of export-oriented industrial 
shrimp farms and factories”364. Note that this study has mentioned one of the 
major causes of wilderness destruction in Sundarbans, “destructive production 
methods”. Of course, human beings are directly or indirectly responsible for 
every cause related to wilderness destruction and biodiversity extinction in the 
forest. But if we want to know the root causes we must know who these 
human beings are. An in-depth historical and cultural study has showed that 
Sunderbans is now occupied with migrant settlers who are basically workers 
for various trade industries. 
Interestingly, the study noted that at earlier times there were only 
temporary settlers. Later, a few permanent settlers maintain their livelihood by 
collecting honey and producing salt from saline water. Gradually, “The jungle 
receded to the background and the original settlers were exploited”365. 
Definitely there is a difference between the identification of “original 
settlers” and “migrated settlers” with Sunderbans. The difference lies in the 
knowledge of relationships to their surroundings. Knowledge that the migrant 
settlers lack but the original settlers practice is simple, “They know that in 
time the jungle will reclaim its territory, the tiger and the snake will become 
their neighbours and then it will be time once again to search for new 
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homes”366. They have the knowledge of neighborhood, a responsible mentality 
found in the neighboring self.    
Indeed, the solution that Smith has provided to preserve humpback 
chubs is to develop a virtuous self. This virtuous self will show “humility” to 
other creatures. If one can recognize what is important in the other species, 
having a virtuous self he or she should be motivated to do that for them. In this 
way, Coloradans can save the lives of chubs, even though chubs are not 
intrinsically valuable. So, the core idea “...is being motivated to promote the 
importance of other things outside oneself and one’s associates”367.   
Smith’s solution is sensible, that if someone is motivated enough to 
promote other’s important interests then the question of intrinsic or extrinsic 
valuation becomes irrelevant. Indeed, Smith argues that all biological species 
possess intrinsic goods. But should we also preserve mountains? Is there any 
value in nonliving elements? Or are they just valueless? Why should humility 
be practiced “outside oneself and one’s associates”? 
In my view, a better solution could be a fundamental change in 
Coloradans’ perceptions of neighbor, and an increase in their level of 
awareness toward harmonious living. We assume that many Coloradans 
naturally share Western anthropocentric environmental values, but at the same 
time they are also (more) informed about the environmental crisis. Dealing 
with this local as well as global crisis we need personal and collective 
initiatives. For a better living Earth Coloradans may begin from their own 
State, like the Sierra Club people started from Hetch Hetchy Valley, California. 
They need to come out from their high rise buildings and visit the Colorado 
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River, enjoy its beauty and also see the beauty of humpback chub, their happy 
movements in their own habitats. It will increase Coloradans’ existing level of 
identification. After going back home they will realize that they need water 
and uninterrupted energy supply, but the fish also need the river just for 
survival. This realization would be totally different. They will feel that 
humpback chubs are their neighbors, living in the same territory. A spiritual 
consciousness may develop on the basis of this neighboring relationship that 
would guide their decision-making.  
I think that when Coloradans shift their understanding and relation 
with a river and a fish species through identification, self-realization and 
spirituality they would conceive a different kind of self, namely, the 
neighboring self (I explain this notion of self in detail in the final chapter). It 
will change their mindset, awareness level, and perceptions of their 
neighborhood. In due course, they themselves will decide how much sacrifice 
they can make for their fellow neighborhood species. Like the Sierra Club 
people, there are many examples throughout the globe where native 
inhabitants join their hands together to save a species, a river, a forest, or a 
mountain. Why not Coloradans?   
 
VI. LOVE AND DEVOTION 
 
Despite Descartes’s well established anthropocentric view of nature, an 
alternative view of his philosophy has been proposed by Cecilia Wee. Wee 
shows us how an individual can sacrifice his or her interests for other 
community members by maintaining a Cartesian ethical principle. Generally, a 
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Cartesian agent is self-centred. But the agent can overcome this self-
centredness through the virtue of love and devotion. Descartes believes that 
this universe was created by God. One who loves God must have love for all 
of His creations, including the Earth. In this way, the Earth as a whole 
becomes his or her object of reverence, love and respect.  
The point to consider here is that Descartes’ view does not support an 
extension of love on a one-one basis, i.e. human beings’ love for their animals 
or any other particular species. Instead of it, love should be extended to the 
universe as a whole. Wee notes, “...Descartes believes that the universe as 
whole has its own value above the value of its component parts. Moreover, as 
this value far outweighs our own as individuals, we should place its interests 
above our own”368.  
Now, a Cartesian response to the question why agents should abandon 
their own interests to preserve nature becomes clearer. We may also assume 
the motivational force that drives them to do so. Descartes made a distinction 
between “affection” and “devotion” to discuss this point more precisely. If one 
loves an object he or she should have devotion for it, not just affection. He 
says, “when we have less esteem for it than ourselves, we have only a simple 
affection for it...and when we have more esteem for it, our passion may be 
called “devotion” ”369 . Thus, a Cartesian agent may have affection for a 
natural entity but that has to be transformed into devotion for the preservation 
of nature since “In the case of devotion, the agent feels greater esteem for the 
loved object than for herself, and so the loved object is considered the greater 
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part of the whole. The agent would then abandon her interests for the 
preservation of the loved object”370.  
Wee’s argument appropriately shows that community members may 
abandon their personal interests for the good of community. But one important 
issue could be that when an agent does not believe in God, or nature is not His 
creation, he or she may not share similar esteem of love or devotion for natural 
entities. One option to resolve this tension is viewing nature as mother.  
 
VII. NATURE AS MOTHER   
 
There are some Asian traditions which invoke a feminist relation with nature. 
For instance, Indian traditions view nature as a mother and very often called 
“Mother Nature”. In Western traditions, Gaia was also a name of a mother 
goddess who is identical with Earth. So, the “Mother Earth” slogan is not 
unfamiliar to the West. But is there any advantage if human beings perceive 
this Earth as “Mother Nature” or “Mother Earth”?  
From my point of view, the feminist concept of “Motherizing” nature 
might have very little significance to protect the environment. The relation 
between mother and child is very special, psychologically begins even long 
before the child comes into this Earth. In other words, the mother and child 
relationship develops as soon as fertilization happens. Although the zygote 
does not have human-like structure and consciousness, the mother’s emotional 
attachment with it cannot be overlooked. A mother begins her imagination 
truly as a mother, thinking that her baby is growing. A mother’s imagination 
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even goes further once she starts to feel the existence of the baby in her womb 
through its physical movement.   
Apart from deep emotional attachment, the mother-child relation is a 
highly caring relationship. Once the child was unable to do anything, but 
mother did everything for him or her. Later the mother becomes unable to do 
many things by herself, and the child does those for her. So, a kind of 
unconditional intimate support and co-operation from both sides can be 
observed. However, the traditional “Mother-Nature” relation is one-sided. 
Human beings as children are seen only as a receiver of food, shelter, air, 
water from the Mother. But human beings do not receive these unconditionally. 
Sometimes they have to pay physical or intellectual labor, money, and other 
kinds of return. So, unless there is a religious inspiration it is hard to view 
nature as a mother. 
However, there is another metaphorical way of viewing nature as a 
mother. A mother carries the future generations. So, the next generation and 
the mother’s womb are identified, inseparable. This Earth is like the mother’s 
womb. If we want to preserve our own next generation, generations of other 
species, from extinction, we should be caring for and protecting the Earth 
which produces food for all kinds of living creatures. If the mother’s womb 
becomes toxic no child can be sustained. Numerous recent researches have 
found that food materials are becoming toxic day by day because of the use of 
complex chemicals and as a result of pollution. Mothers, both in the animal 
kingdom and in the human species, are consuming these toxic foods. As a 
result, not only a particular mother’s body, but also the next generations and 
even the whole Earth is under threat.  
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We should be caring about mother. As Simms observes, “When we 
alter nature through the introduction of artificial compounds, we also alter the 
female body and the bodies of generations to come” 371 . This kind of 
ecofeminist philosophy provides us with enough insights to go beyond the 
individual mother and think about the ecological responsibility that we have 
towards the Earth. Before doing any alternation, or producing chemical 
compounds in nature, we must keep in mind that “...the extinction of our 
species is happening in our bodies”372. Surely, a child can sacrifice some 
personal interests for nature if he or she views it as Mother.  
I will end this discussion with Rolston’s comment on ecological 
wisdom. His following comment summarizes the basic limitations of the mere 
ecological consciousness and also shows the significant reason to abandon it. 
Rolston writes, “What is required is not just prudence, but principled 
responsibility to the biospheric Earth”373. Rolston is correct in saying that the 
ecologically conscious self that could only provide us with “prudence” is not 
enough. We also need a “principled responsibility”. Of course, Rolston has 
outlined his own principles of responsibility, but purely on the basis of physics, 
Darwinism and psychology. So, he does not need to develop a concept of self. 
However, in my view, the concept of self is crucial for human-nature 
relationship if we really want a viable solution to global ecological crisis since 
only a responsible self can change the current attitudes and lifestyles. Is it 
possible to construct a self which is based on ecological prudence and a 
principled responsibility? The answer is given in the final chapter.   
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In this chapter, after discussing the complex issues of emotion, 
ecological consciousness and the environment, we considered that an 
emotional attachment with our surroundings is not just present but is required 
for a sustainable biosphere. If we love our home, value it for emotional 
attachment, that should motivate us to preserve other natural entities closely 
associated with it. While we appreciate that an ecological consciousness can 
direct ourselves toward an impersonal communication with nature, it will not 
provide an action-guiding moral principle. On this ground, we have discussed 
some significant reasons for abandoning the idea of the ecological self or 
maturity of self. Regardless of holding an idea of maturity of self, one may 
view all entities in nature as God’s creations and love for Him enables us to 
sacrifice some personal interests. Alternatively, Earth as Mother seems 
plausible for the caring of future generations. All these discussions signify that 
a place and our emotional attachment to it should be taken more seriously.  In 
the last chapter, I therefore intend to develop a new version of human-nature 
relation based on our three core values and one primitive ethical principle 

















A neighbor-centric sense of three common core values, identification, self-
realization and spirituality, was distinguished in our previous discussion. This 
new sense creates the possibility of constructing a version of the “neighboring 
self” and a guiding principle for the protection of nature. In other words, the 
concept of neighboring self is a product of comparative analysis of Western 
and Asian environmental views. My intention is to present a full version of a 
neighbor-centric approach that synthesizes elements from other approaches in 
environmental philosophy. In addition, I will outline a protection principle to 
promote my neighbor-centric approach. I will then argue that a comprehensive 
environmental ethics would maintain this principle. Some potential criticisms 
of the neighbor-centric view will also be addressed accordingly.     
“Neighbor” as a term is vividly present in our social, political, 
religious, anthropological, scientific, philosophical and even legal discussions. 
It has appeared in many perspectives. Yet, most environmental philosophers 
have overlooked the idea till now, and current environmental policies do not 
address the issue as a potential solution to the global environmental crisis. The 
idea apparently receives less attention in the environmental context. One of the 
main reasons for this is its local orientation. Put differently, “neighbor” refers 
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to a relationship focused on the local surroundings. However, there is no 
reason to think that this idea is less significant in the environmental context 
just because environmental problems are global in character, whereas neighbor 
is a local concept.  
Human beings as responsible agents can have harmonious co-existence 
with their fellow nonhuman neighbors. Indeed, there is evidence that when 
this Earth was environmentally sound, human beings maintained a harmonious 
relationship with their nonhuman neighbors. Currently, the indigenous people, 
who rarely lead a techno-centric civilized life, somehow bear the sentiment. 
Their lifestyles are environmentally very rich, but generally simple. What then 
is a neighboring self?  Is there any deep-rooted ethical principle that is 
embedded in this notion?  
 
I. A CONCEPT OF ‘NEIGHBORING SELF’ 
 
A neighboring self is a neighborhood conscious self, rather than the 
ecologically conscious self. I am using the word “neighbor” in the ecological 
sense where communities are defined as “natural communities”, instead of 
“social communities”. Generally, neighbors are people or a group of people 
who live in the same area. Sometimes, neighbors denote those people living in 
two different countries in the same geographical region. Neighbors   may also 
refer to a group of people who have a common race, language, culture, 
religion or ideology. Neighbors usually maintain a co-operational and 
harmonious relation for mutual benefit. The term represents an intimate, 
emotional, and caring relation. However, it is not obvious that all neighbors 
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have responsible relations. People of two neighboring islands can fight for 
decades without any neighboring relation. Indeed, history shows that if 
neighbors have a harmonious neighboring relation they can live better.  
 We are habituated with human neighbors. But I am highlighting here 
that the habit of excluding other community members, such as, trees, rivers, 
plants, mountains, and numerous flora and fauna, may make our lives 
challenging. Is it really correct that only humans can be our neighbors? What 
does a maple tree beside my residence lack that excludes it from being 
regarded as neighbor contrasted with a handicapped human being?  
We human beings are not isolated from natural elements. Sometimes 
natural elements can represent a country. For example, Niagara Falls in 
Canada, the Great Barrier Reef in Australia, Sahara Desert in Africa, Mount 
Everest in Nepal, the Nile River in Egypt, Mount Fuji in Japan, Huang He 
River in China, and many more. We feel proud of them. These natural 
elements inspire us in various ways. So, we should also look at our 
surroundings, where many natural elements are living with us for a long or 
short while, but may totally be unknown to us. This separation arises for a 
very narrow meaning of the term “neighbor”. 
 I believe that neighbor should be understood in a spatial sense. Natural 
elements are ecological neighbors to us. We live in the same surroundings. We 
have an emotional attachment to them which other elements elsewhere lack. 
We cannot survive in their absence. They also need care from us. The main 
advantage of considering them as neighbors is motivation. Our ecological 
neighbors motivate us to flourish as a caring human beings, responsible 
persons, and conscious citizens. 
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 Generally, neighbors involve a place and community. A place is not 
just a combination of some biotic and abiotic elements. A place has a system, 
other life-forms and natural elements are fabricated within it. A community is 
a mutual attachment, sharing and sacrificing some personal interests between 
all members. Local affections can reduce many environmental problems we 
are facing today, such as losing forest, land degradation, river pollution, and 
biodiversity extinction.  
Since human beings are regarded as social and political animals, 
previously the term “neighbor” was confined to social human beings. Its 
original connotation was even more limited to a “member of Israel”374. That is, 
the word “neighbor” literally refers to a particular nation. However, such a 
definition given to this word was simply “nation-based” and was not well 
accepted.  
The term was later adopted in the social sciences with a wider 
“society-based” engagement. But in the development of animal science, it 
becomes clear that some animals (e.g. the great apes) are social animals as 
well. So, the “society-based” definition of neighbor was also modified since it 
did not include other social animals, confining itself to human beings. Clearly 
then, the term warrants a very significant and wide meaning. I believe that this 
meaning is ecological. Modern science partly accommodates the ecological 
sense by using words like “virtually neighborhood community”, “shared 
neighborhood model”, “neighborhood consequences”, and “neighborliness 
relation”.  
                                                 
374 Daniel Patte, ed., The Cambridge Dictionary of Christianity (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 859. 
 251
But the revival of the term is incomplete because the term is detached 
from the “place-based” emotional attachment and applied to the impersonal 
social ties of online arrangements. So, a new sense of “neighbor”, namely, 
“virtual neighbors”, where members need not live in the same place, same city, 
or even in the same country, has been established. But an intense connection 
and emotional relation found in the place-based neighborly relation is absent 
there, what Yi-Fu calls topophilia, “Topophilia is the affective bond between 
people and place or setting. Diffuse as concept, vivid and concrete as personal 
experience...”375. 
The basic idea of the term is ecological, and we should consider it in 
relation to identification with the surroundings. Until we consider nonhuman 
members, such as animals, plants, rivers, mountains, as our neighbors, and we 
value our intense identification and interaction with them in our daily lives, we 
have not fully embraced the values of neighborhood. Our community must be 
considered a natural community, rather than a social community, where 
humans and nonhumans are neighbors. The basis of a natural community has 
long been a mutual relation in a shared location.  
An ideal relation between neighbors is emphatic, compassionate, 
joyous, dutiful, independent as well as interdependent and co-operative. 
Neighbors are defined basically in relation to place and distance. People living 
within the same area are neighbors. Their relation is neither official nor so 
informal as that between family members. However, they can even become 
more intimate because of place and their immediate bonding with the place. 
So, the value here must be identification, perhaps the identification-as-
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neighborhood. The identification-as-neighborhood surely does not refer to the 
personal identification or cosmological identification.  
 Identification-as-neighborhood fundamentally differs from the 
traditional thinking. Unlike the traditional view where neighbors are persons, 
identification-as-neighborhood is not restricted to persons. The whole idea is 
that humans could consider their surrounding non-human members as 
neighbors. Some animals have mysterious similarities with humans, others 
share similar self-maintaining activities with them. For example, tigers and 
lions hunt by a combination of their intelligence, pace and timing; migratory 
birds fly from one country to another, or even from one continent to another 
continent by maintaining wind directions, navigation, and intelligence. Plants, 
mountains, rivers, and seas become closer to them, if they realize the intrinsic 
value of these elements and their interconnectedness. Sometimes they can be 
destructive to us. But our human neighbors can equally be violent. Natural 
disasters actually destroy our neighborliness. 
When there is a natural disaster we lose one set of neighbor who is 
then replaced by a new set. In this way, people adapt and gain strength to 
sustain themselves. The Norwegian settlers, for example, find their new 
neighbors when they have shifted from the old one. However, there was a 
significant emotional loss of the original place. Naess rightly noticed that 
“their home-place was a part of themselves and that they identified with 
features of that place”376. Now, “the features” of their old place was nothing 
but a harmonious co-existence of human beings, rivers, landscapes, trees, 
plants, mountains in a tiny locality where the difference between human and 
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nonhuman beings was not important. But this kind of mentality and 
personhood was possible because of uninterrupted relation, strong 
belongingness and emotional attachment within a community where all 
members consider themselves as equally valuable. Naess thus said, “the tiny 
locality...has formed their personhood”377. 
 Identification-as-neighborhood can construct a personhood based on 
the idea that there exist no hierarchical relations. Humans and nonhumans 
belong to the same community where the hierarchical division is simply left 
out. Two lessons are important here, first, this is an acceptance by the local 
people that humans and nature are equally important to each other and belong 
to the same community. Second, there is a suggestion to view Earth as 
neighborly ordering, instead of the hierarchical ordering. 
 In the neighborly ordering, the message is that Earth is organized and 
functions as a “neighboring plate”. There are enough examples in every 
natural process and event which can mark the Earth as interlinked. Only a 
neighborhood conscious self could understand the lessons behind them (e.g. 
the capacities and uniqueness of each creature are quite different, the physical 
systems of each organism are different, and it is possible that their perceptions, 
reactions and expressions are different, in some cases superior to some human 
beings). If we look carefully around our Earth there are diversities. Some 
regions are deserts, some are covered by ice, some are simply floating on the 
water, and some are landlocked. The size, shape, culture, belief system in each 
region is different from others. The minerals which are extracted from 
different regions are different in their color, quality and quantity.  
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There are millions of uncountable creatures in the Earth. Only a few of 
them are known to us. They differ in their own ways and have different tasks. 
The diversities we perceive are countless. However, a great unity among these 
diversities is clearly recognizable. The same trees produce the same kind of 
fruits and vegetables all over the Earth. The same water is given to them. They 
grow on the same quality of land and weather conditions. 
Although all human beings are rational they themselves differ in colors, 
sizes, preferences, attitudes, beliefs, intellects and characteristics. Nonetheless, 
these differences are not rare in nature. The fruits and vegetables in one region 
are excellent to eat, while those in other areas are not. Even fruits from the 
same tree may have different tastes, color and size. The same soil grows 
different trees, some are short, some are very tall, some have green leaves, 
some are multiple colors, and some are even leafless. Some trees need desert 
to grow, while some need an undersea environment. We can see in the same 
forest some trees are reaching maturity, others decaying. New young trees are 
filling up this gap. But these diversities are well-balanced and well-structured.  
Suppose we think about a forest community. The surface of the forest 
once was rocky. Some tiny rock particles formed a layer in the course of time. 
The formation process continues through some complex chemical reactions by 
rain water, sunlight, dusts and sands. Fungi, followed by grasses and herbs, are 
grown. One day wind brings some seeds to grow and numerous young trees 
are grown. Successively, birds, reptiles, several viruses, bacteria, uncountable 
insects and millions of organisms set themselves as a forest community378. 
They all belong to the same forest as united community members with great 
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empathy and mutual interdependence. They have different functions. For 
instance, earthworm prepares the soil, butterfly and beetles contribute to grow 
flowers and then fruits. When the parent trees became old, fungi play their 
roles to decay and viruses and bacteria do their parts to mix them into the soil 
again. 
Since every forest has its own rhythm, balance and community, all 
community members are integrated in a neighborly ordering. That is, all of 
them display and maintain a neighboring relationship, they are potentially 
aware about their own good as well as the good of neighbors. They belong 
with true compassion but also with competition. They never upset the 
equilibrium of forest by selfish greed, power and dominance. They all follow 
one simple principle of protection.  
Now, let us think of the Earth as a big forest where humankind is one 
of the species. Humans sharing a neighboring self observe this Earth as a 
unified whole rather than a fragment. For most deep ecologists the protection 
of nature is seen as a by-product of the expanded self. In other words, the aim 
of cosmological identification is to expand one’s narrow self, not to protect the 
individuals themselves. Through protecting the bigger Self all natural elements 
will be protected. So, the process involves self-defense rather than self-
sacrifice. However, those who are arguing for self-sacrifice ideally suggest 
complete sacrifice. As a result, enjoying human life sometimes conflict with 
enjoying nature. 
The neighboring self is the medium between them. Through 
identifying-as-neighborhood, this kind of self could realize the wisdom found 
in nature. Natural objects, such as water, are not regarded as merely useful to 
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human beings in a limited manner. Water, which is a must for the survival of 
living creatures, can be liquid, ice, or cloud. A small piece of steel cannot float 
on it. But water can transport millions of tons of steel, iron, copper, silver and 
other necessary elements, including crops, foods, and medicines, from one part 
of the Earth to another part. No maritime activity is possible without water. 
Winds help ships and other vehicles to reach their destinations. 
The ecological self, as Naess suggested, would recognize the diversity 
and unity of Earth’s ecosystem. But it would not recognize the diversity of 
interests and needs of different community members. In contrast to the 
ecological self, the neighboring self could avoid this problem because it 
acknowledges the variation of interests and different needs of entities in nature. 
Expanding awareness, empathy, compassion to other neighborhood entities is 
primary for the neighboring self, rather than expanding its consciousness to a 
maximum level and then becoming selfless. Self belongs to the neighboring 
self in a manner. As renowned Japanese scholar Keiji Nishitani says, “the self 
truly knows itself, and that this self-knowledge is at the same time 
accompanied by some sort of activity”379. 
The distinguishing feature of identification-as-neighborhood is the 
awareness of Earth’s neighborly ordering. Unlike the ecological self, the 
neighboring self perceives the ecological ordering more closely and intimately. 
In so doing, the neighboring self is not just aware of the unity and diversity, 
but it is also aware that this ordering is neighbor-centric. Earth’s oceans, seas, 
rivers, ponds, and canals are therefore not just ecologically connected, but 
these are the containers which hold and preserve different kinds of water for 
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different neighbors according to their interests and needs. It was impossible 
for human beings or any living beings to preserve water themselves even for a 
week if the Earth was unable to do that for them. Moreover, if someone could 
manage it anyway just for himself or herself, it would be very hard to keep this 
water pure and usable. But the Earth holds water in various ways, such as 
liquid, ice and clouds. The Earth purifies and makes water usable for all living 
creatures in a very sophisticated way.  
The Earth’s surface also works as a great reservoir. If all these 
reservoirs were able to reserve water in only one form, say liquid, we have to 
float on water with all kinds of poisonous garbage, if they were in ice form we 
have to live in extremely cold environment, if it were in cloud form we have to 
fight with heavy rain falls and devastating floods. All of our neighbors are 
serving mysteriously and tirelessly to keep each other alive and functional. 
This is not just human beings who are aware and can realize Earth’s 
neighborly ordering. Each and every element in nature is vital for its neighbors, 
just as a forest community members are vital for their neighborhood and co-
existence. A tree is serving Oxygen and taking Carbon dioxide, a river is 
taking dirty water and supplying clean water, a mountain preserving 
geological and ecological balance, different organisms and plants are 
supplying precious life-supporting elements for humans, animals and other 
organisms.  
Although all entities, including human beings, are integrated parts of 
the Earth’s neighborly ordering, only human beings have the capacity to 
realize their duties toward all other neighbors. Self-realization for human 
beings is simply the realization of duty or responsibility toward their fellow 
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neighbors, humans as well as nonhumans. Though all traditions and religions 
subscribe to a loving attitude toward human neighbors, nonhuman neighbors 
are largely ignored. Most prominent philosophers have also addressed loving 
human neighbors as a universal moral norm.  
In his essay Utilitarianism, Mill writes, “...love your neighbour as 
yourself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality”380. The reason 
he sates, 
As the means of making the nearest approach to this ideal, 
utility would enjoin, first, that laws and social arrangements 
should place the happiness, or (as speaking particularly it 
may be called) the interest, of every individual, as nearly as 
possible in harmony with the interest of the whole...381. 
 
Mill shows that utility and happiness depend on the collective harmony of 
neighbor’s interests. Our laws and social policies therefore should be 
compatible with the collective interest, not the individual interest.   
Joseph Butler writes, “The competition and rivalship is between self-
love and the love of our neighbour: that affection which leads us out of 
ourselves, makes us regardless of our own interest, and substitute that of 
another in its stead.”382 
Christoph Horn writes,  
The biblical commandment “love your neighbor as yourself” 
does not imply that love is the appropriate starting-point of 
moral action. It does not even imply that love is an adequate 
motive at all. It rather describes and demands a process of 
habituation: If I practice beneficence, I will obtain, as a 
result, love as a feature of my character.383 
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Passmore advocates conventional morality, based on a famous moral 
principle, human beings “ought not so to act as to injure their neighbours”384. 
Of course, Passmore’s neighbors do not include merely the present generation 
of human beings, but also future generations.   
Naess too admits this golden norm of conventional morality with due 
emphasis and declares it as one of the top norms of morality, “The top norms 
may concern liberty, equality and fraternity, love for one’s neighbour, or the 
search for truth”385.  
We have noticed that Naess has argued for a cosmological viewpoint. 
However, he also writes, “In practice, we have for instance greater obligation 
to that which is nearer to us”386. By the word “nearer” he means species 
closeness or human-human and human-animal relationships. So, his view 
contradicts with his own ecosophy.     
This analysis shows that neighbor not only relates to empathy, love and 
sympathy, but also some other moral virtues are embedded in this relation. 
The virtue that my neighbor-centric view mainly underpins is duty. When this 
view is endorsed in the non-Western traditions it also exhibits a concern for 
duty. Human beings should not limit their obligations to their fellow human 
beings, animals and other sentient beings. They should also show concern and 
dutiful empathy to plants, mountains, rivers and other natural elements in their 
surroundings. This sense of duty would contribute to a virtue to act with 
appropriate neighborliness, and the harmony of nature is ultimately preserved.  
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Kant considered loving one’s neighbors in accordance with the ethical 
law of perfection and the duty of sympathy. His maxim is the maxim of 
benevolence which says that even if one does not have respect, or does not 
find loving his or her neighbors “worthy”, he or she cannot avoid the duty of 
sympathy to neighbors. Kant declares, “In accordance with the ethical law of 
perfection “love your neighbor as yourself”, the maxim of benevolence 
(practical love of human beings) is a duty of all human beings toward one 
another, whether or not one finds them worthy of love”387. 
Note that without performing their empathic duties toward neighbors 
one cannot be a perfect human being according to Kant. Moreover, when Kant 
said “Sympathetic Feeling Is Generally a Duty” he mentions two basic 
features of humanity, first, their capacity of feeling joy and sadness, and 
second, their capacity of feeling others’ joy and sadness which promotes 
aesthetic experience in themselves. Kant says, “Now, humanity can be located 
either in the capacity and the will to share in others’ feelings (humanitas 
practica) or merely in the receptivity, given by nature itself, to the feeling of 
joy and sadness in common with others (humanitas aesthetica)”388.  
In this context, instead of taking humanity with great emphasis we 
should take note of Kant’s point of receptivity. Kant clearly says that 
receptivity spreads “naturally among human beings living near one another”389. 
Kant’s endorsement of “living near” in this statement is a precondition to 
perform one’s duty with sympathy. My basic concern is not only for human 
beings but also for those nonhuman elements which belong to our close 
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surroundings. I feel that we should show deep empathic attitude through our 
love, duty and kindness to let them survive in their own ways. Whether we 
take care of them or not, one thing is clear, we should not wipe out their 
existence for ever. As an individual, living in Asia, I may not be able to take 
care of the animals, plants and trees in the Amazon, but I could certainly take 
care of my neighborhood mountains, rivers, trees, plants, birds, insects and 
micro-organisms. This is not because these are useful for me but because we 
are living in the same surroundings. These elements have neighborhood value 
to me that the elements in the Amazon forests lack. But in a greater sense, the 
Amazon forest might have some neighborhood value.  
I believe that Kant’s view may include nonhumans as neighbors. Kant 
firmly says, “Love for the creature is always good, in so far as it is considered 
to be a creature”390 . There is no sacrifice or loss if we consider natural 
elements as our neighbors. Rather, as Kant says, feeling neighborliness to 
others, regarding them as creatures just like us would be “good” for us as well 
as for them. Indeed, one might be misguided about Kant’s notion of capacity 
when taking it merely as a rational capacity. Actually, Kant’s emphasis here is 
the capacity of realization of others’ good and pursuing this good successfully 
through our special qualities like emotion, joy and aesthetic appreciation. 
Kant’s focus may become clearer in Paul Guyer’s comments, “it is actually the 
ability to set our own ends and the capacity to realize or successfully pursue 
them”391. If we practice love for neighborliness among ourselves and inspire 
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others to do so, we all can extend our moral circle with less effort in a virtuous 
manner.  
Therefore, duty is the appropriate outcome of neighborhood self-
realization. Yet, it is not just confined to duty alone. For any tradition, 
neighborhood also invokes unity, harmony, responsibility, and aesthetic 
tribute. An enriched human neighbor would value his or her ecological 
neighbors for various intrinsic goods they conserved. In fact, we may not be 
able to form a complete sense of some basic ideas if the word “neighbor” is 
restricted to the human species.  
For example, consider a family where each member enjoys liberty to 
express his or her opinion. They can choose to stay alone when they want. 
They can enjoy themselves according to their own preferred ways. But for 
collective issues, such as switching off the television after 11 p.m., they all 
rely on the father’s decision. We can find some sort of unity in this family 
tradition. However, if they share their neighbor’s concern and realize the 
disturbance they have caused, and maintain a lower level of noise, we may 
find a better concept of unity. Similarly, if the family members decide that 
they could reduce the time of using air conditioners, or switch it off by 
realizing the harm caused by CFC to various entities living in the same 
surroundings, then we can say there is even a bigger sense of unity in this 
family. Finally, if all the family members, before engaging in any activity; 
think of the harm it may cause to things in their surroundings, and act in the 
same responsible way, then they show even greater unity. This unity is called 
neighborhood unity.  
 263
This example illustrates the importance of taking “neighbor” in a much 
broader sense. It raises the point that neighbor in the case of solely human-
human relation is less significant. Imagine an Earth where only human beings 
exist and they all maintain a neighboring relation. There are no birds, no trees, 
no gardens, no flowers, no rivers, no seas, no green fields, no mountains, and 
no water falls in their surroundings. Can the idea of unity be complete? Is 
living worthy at all in such a scenario, even though human beings continue to 
maintain a neighboring relation among themselves? Surely, none of us want to 
live in such an Earth.  
But one important question remains unsolved: Isn’t diversity and 
neighborhood conflicting? In other words, how can we maintain diversity and 
neighborhood simultaneously? We will come back to the issue soon.  
For the moment, the true unity is one where human beings and nature 
are united, the smallest species united with the biggest species, the largest 
creatures united with the smallest creatures, the most intellectual creatures 
united with the most stupid creatures, the most sentient creatures united with 
the most insentient creatures, the most powerful neighbor united with the most 
powerless neighbor in a surrounding. Almost all creatures follow this moral 
convention (unity and co-existence through neighborhood feelings) except 
human beings. It’s a moral convention because in any human society and 
nonhuman community a neighborhood bond is respected.  
We see in our neighborhood that butterflies, dragonflies, honey bees 
and beetles can stay together, and never try to dominate each other. They sit 
on the same flowers but never quarrel. Some of them collect honey from 
flowers without doing any harm to the flower plants. Flower seeds also cannot 
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spread without them. An excellent, rich and vibrant garden requires these 
neighbors. However, insects are also responsible for destroying a garden. But 
that will take a long time and in due course a new ecosystem can take place. 
One is not justified in killing all of these insects to satisfy one’s own plan of a 
garden. But most human beings will prioritize their plans rather than these 
insects. Their so-called highly complex brain very often makes them egoistic, 
isolated and detached. 
 But they should keep in mind that everything in this Earth is 
mysterious, unique, amazing and have their own abilities to play their parts in 
different ways. Currently, we know very little about their ability and activities. 
If we exclude other natural elements as our neighbor because they are not 
sentient, or brute, or machine-like, then there is a strong chance that we will 
lose in the end, instead of gain. We may lose humanity, we may lose sympathy 
and empathy, we may lose good health, we may lose enjoying long life, and 
we may even lose our future generations. 
We should be responsible toward our ecological neighbors. But how 
much responsibility do we need to show them? The answer itself is hidden in 
the powerful single word “neighbor”. We may practice responsibility by 
maintaining a single moral principle developed hereafter.   
Responsibility to our natural neighbors may ensure safety feeling for 
human beings. Those human beings who respect and protect their natural 
neighbors can enjoy worthy lifestyles. Many environmental scholars have 
pointed out that a “partnership” relation with the environment must be 
established for a safe and harmonious living. For instance, Mirjam de Groot et. 
al. have conducted an empirical study on recent Western societies and have 
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noticed that “Virtually all respondents believe that humans are morally 
responsible for nature and recognize the intrinsic value of nature”392.  
The reason for this sense of responsibility is that we all are facing 
serious natural calamities, such as extreme low temperature, heavy snowfalls, 
deadly floods, high magnitude earthquakes, and ferocious volcanic eruptions 
globally. One of the new responses to such natural disasters, as de Groot 
suggested, is to articulate a “partnership” and a vision that synthesizes 
stewardship and oneness-with-nature ethics. This vision is called 
hermeneutical environmental ethics, “Hermeneutical environmental ethics 
could even help to articulate and cultivate an environmental virtue ethics”393.  
Unity and responsibility are environmental virtues which would not 
forbid human beings from using their natural neighbors. Further, they may be 
good for strengthening human-human relationship. Responsibility involves an 
informed awareness regarding our duties toward the environmental neighbor. 
In general, most human beings are more or less caring for their surroundings, 
whether for themselves or for the good of natural entities. But their effort may 
not be enough. Since the industrial revolution, the competition in achieving 
remarkable advancement in science and technology through dominating nature 
has already unbalanced the harmony of Earth. We must show empathetic, 
caring, responsible, and dutiful attitude toward the environment if a new 
balance or harmony is to be established. 
A few years ago, a notable radical ecologist, Carolyn Merchant, has 
also proposed a partnership ethics. Although de Groot did not fully develop 
the basic feature of partnership ethics, Merchant defines and develops this new 
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ethics in a simple and straight-forward way. She states, “It is an ethic based on 
the idea that people are helpers, partners, and colleagues and that people and 
nature are equally important to each other”394. The definition she has given for 
a partnership ethics is inspiring, “A partnership ethic holds that the greatest 
good for the human and nonhuman communities is in their mutual living 
interdependence” 395 . The key concept a partnership ethic endorses for a 
harmonious human-nature relation is “mutual living”. In this mutual living, the 
partnership ethics holds that natural elements are human being’s partner.  
They are not passive partners, but rather partners who could act and 
react similarly as human beings. They are like individuals who belong to the 
same community and share the same events in everyday living. In our general 
vocabulary, a partner is a male or female human being who maintains some 
sort of commitments such as, equal respect, trust, and sharing the feelings of 
joy and suffering. But Merchant argues for an innovative view where a 
comprehensive idea of partnership could easily accommodate a tree, a salmon 
fish, and even a butterfly. This is comprehensive because her partnership 
ethics has five basic foundations outlined in her other book: both humans and 
nonhumans are morally considerable, their communities are equally valuable, 
biodiversity and cultural diversity should be respected, minorities, women and 
nonhumans must be protected by an ethical code of conduct, and finally, the 
health of human and nonhuman communities ought to be preserved and any 
ecological management must be consistent with their preservation.396  
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Interestingly, Merchant’s view synthesizes most of the conflicting 
views in environmental philosophy from anthropocentrism to ecocentrism. 
Indeed, she does not ascribe intrinsic value to human beings, nonhuman 
beings, or the cosmos as a whole. Alternatively, she finds the idea of 
“relation” is intrinsically valuable. So, there is no difficulty for Merchant in 
appreciating a bear as a partner. She writes, “But the term partner can also be 
used to represent gnatcatchers, coho salmon, grizzly bears, and checkerspot 
butterflies. Indeed, nonhuman nature itself can be our partner”397.  
We have noticed in the discussion of previous chapters that many 
famous environmental thinkers pave the way for redefining or widening some 
basic terms which could make a significant impact in our attitude toward the 
environment. For instance, we have seen that Gaia involves a new perspective 
on the organic system of Earth, Willson’s biophilia hypothesis has suggested a 
new way of looking at our common descent, and Naess proposed a new 
concept of a mixed community.  
Environmental philosophers therefore wanted to establish an adequate 
communication with their nonhuman members in diverse ways. The outcome 
is that we have achieved a new mentality or at least psychological set-up to see 
nature with different eyes. Merchant’s view is an important addition to this 
move.  However, viewing nature as our partner might have less support from 
the evolutionary history available. 
Historically, the most appropriate term for “mutual living”, as de Groot 
and Merchant are suggesting for harmonious co-existence, should be 
“neighbor” rather than partner. When two people say they have a partnership 
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relation then they could either mean a physical or a business relation between 
them. For a physical relation, sexual happiness and satisfaction play a major 
role in their mutual living. For a business relation, on the other hand, equal 
and just distribution of burdens and benefits play the vital role in their mutual 
living. In human-nature partnership relation, both types of attitude could be 
problematic. Although there are some examples where some traditions 
practice a physical relation with natural elements, such as marrying a tree or a 
dog, these are merely symbolic. Nonetheless, they send a message that nature 
is not that much separate as science suggests (separating living elements as 
opposed to nonliving, dividing the Earthly elements into two groups, i.e. 
physical and biological, and stating that human beings are superior to any 
other creatures). It also explores an alternative view to perceive nature beyond 
the economical perspective.  
The business attitude toward nature has been practiced for a long time, 
but this relation was merely a monopoly for human beings (most actions were 
taken in favor of human beings or for human’s benefit). In this case, nature 
was seen just as a passive partner, unable to receive the burdens and benefits. 
So, we cannot see nature as partner. But we can see nature as a neighbor 
because neighbors do not require a physical relation, or a business relation. It 
simply requires the existence of two or more entities in a common surrounding. 
Moreover, all the environmental values (e.g. equal respect) found in the 
partnership relation can also be found in the neighbor-centric relation.                           
A good person may not be a person who is caring, kind and responsible 
to his or her family and friends alone. A bad neighbor could be one of the 
most unexpected events in our lives. Similarly, a good person must be a good 
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neighbor. There is no need for him or her to dominate nature, to ignore nature, 
or to protect nature at the cost of destroying himself or herself. In any society, 
good treatment of neighbors is appreciated and reflects a high scale of 
relationship. The value neighborhood self-realization suggests is that of loving 
one’s neighbors, neighbors who are humans as well as neighbors who are 
ecological, through dutiful empathy.  
A sense of spirituality could help to view nature as our ecological 
neighbor. We are rational, but at the same time intuitive, imaginative. We 
could even understand an abstract concept through our intuition and 
imagination. For this reason, intuition and unity have emerged as two major 
ideas in contemporary environmental philosophy. No one can answer the 
question what nature is, until he or she recalls his or her sense perception of 
the immediate surroundings. This is because we all have grown up in a 
neighborhood with which we are united. Philosophers’ views of the 
environment are very often based on their intuition and also how they have 
perceived the remarkable unity in nature. The environment is basically the 
representation of human being’s imagination and understanding. These two 
are the unique capacities of human beings, as Kant notices, “...imagination for 
bringing together the manifold of intuition, and understanding for the unity of 
the concept uniting the representations”398.  
Through the power of imagination and understanding human beings 
can observe nature as aesthetically rich. In fact, our aesthetic appreciation of 
nature is mostly dependent on these capacities. For some of us, when birds 
make sounds, we can realize it as they are singing. We can hear these songs 
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with great interest. But for others these are merely meaningless noises. Some 
even could consider these as their voice and an expression of meaningful 
communication. So, poets and philosophers would see them as a community 
like human beings, and some of them may appreciate their songs better than 
those of other human beings in some respect. Can we ignore the bounty of 
natural beauty at all? Kant remarkably appreciates natural beauty,  
Even a bird’s song, which we can reduce to no musical rule, 
seems to have more freedom in it, and thus to be richer for 
taste, than the human voice singing in accordance with all 
the rules that the art of music prescribes; for we grow tired 
much sooner of frequent and lengthy repetitions of the 
latter.399       
 
But natural beauty is not just for pleasure, we have a duty to preserve 
and protect it. Kant’s aesthetic argument for natural appreciation grounds a 
pure notion of duty. He shows that our immediate, rather than the 
cosmological, relation to the environment is the source of distinctive pleasure 
and delight. He defines beauty as “morally good” and argues that we have a 
duty to protect our neighborhood environmental beauty. He states, “Now, I say, 
the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good, and only in this light (a point 
of view natural to every one, and one which every one exacts from others as a 
duty) does it give us pleasure...” 400 . Kant makes it clear to us that our 
sensations of neighborhood beauty would create a kind of moral consciousness 
which leads to the duty of protection.  
The powers of nature invoke spirituality. We feel nature sometimes 
ferocious, mysterious, mighty and destructive. But we also see people around 
us love nature, enjoy it and care for it. On the one hand, people fear nature. 
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Very often they are harmed by natural disasters, and regard them as some of 
their biggest enemies. On the other hand, they are surprised to see natural 
beauty, to enjoy the intimacy with nature. They find that worshipping natural 
entities cannot stop natural disasters. But there are many other ways to respect 
nature for their own blessings. Some cultures therefore offer singing, dancing, 
even food in their festivals. Others think that managing nature through 
spiritual communication is more important than just surrendering to its mighty 
powers. This consciousness may be impossible to define. We could simply 
call it “spiritual consciousness”. 
Through spiritual consciousness, a sense of responsibility and 
reverence for nature can arise. Neighborhood spirituality is a kind of spiritual 
consciousness when people spiritually accept natural entities as neighbors and 
become conscious about their duties and responsibilities toward them. 
However, neighborhood spirituality is not an outcome of some kind of 
religious experience or baseless intuition. People’s participation and 
transformation of their consciousness reinforce the idea of neighborhood 
spirituality.  
Neighborhood spirituality maintains three common core values in a 
practical manner, and invites human beings to an ethics of caring through 
emotional attachment. It is hard to find a culture where natural fertility has not 
been recognized with spirituality. Natural fertility is a sense which suggests 
that nature has a great potentiality to grow corns, fruits, vegetables and other 
kinds of food necessary for human survival. But this is merely a potentiality, 
and human beings can contribute to make it actual by connecting with nature 
spiritually. That is, by making nature pleased to produce these resources for 
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them. During a certain period in every year some kind of rituals are performed 
to reconnect with nature. However, most of these rituals highlight ecological 
meditation, healing and worshipping natural deities. Neighborhood spirituality 
opens up a desirable alternative for all people, believer and non-believer. It is 
just an appreciation of natural entities as neighbors through imagination and 
understanding.  
Becoming selfless appears as an inconceivable view for many 
environmental thinkers. The idea of selflessness can be found in traditional 
nature spirituality and deep ecology as a means to show respect and reverence 
for nature. Neighborhood spirituality does not require becoming selfless. The 
neighboring self could correct the limitations of “selflessness” just by 
understanding natural spirituality in a different direction. Through 
identification as neighbors, the neighboring self does not become selfless. In 
other words, the self does not disappear. In spite of the widening self, the 
neighboring self deepens and expands its awareness through empathy, 
compassion, and sympathy for other entities. Since deep intimacy plays the 
main role in neighborhood spirituality, the neighboring self would ensure the 
least alienation. The neighboring self affirms three common core values in a 
different direction: identification-as-neighborhood, neighborhood self-
realization and neighborhood spirituality.   
The neighboring self recognizes that “everything is interrelated” and 
everything has their own value beyond human being’s use. It acknowledges 
that all entities have intrinsic value because everything is contributing in its 
own way, visibly or invisibly. This is a sense that Holmes Rolston III attempts 
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to capture, “No one is free-living in these woods; the root fungi...the pine-
drops rising from the roots... Bios is intrinsically symbiosis.”401 
In contrast to the ecological self, the neighboring self would take into 
consideration the diversity and differences among natural entities and also 
their various needs. Human beings and other entities can preserve their 
autonomy in the sense that two neighbors preserve their autonomies. They are 
separate, but at the same time united. Like me and my garden can stay together 
in a residential area.  
The notion of neighboring self would maintain an emotional but 
responsible attitude toward nature. It is neither an ecologically dominating self 
nor an abstract ecological self. The neighboring self thus does not subscribe to 
an ecological master, or an ecological slave mentality. It admits that human 
beings are unique creatures on Earth in the sense that they are the only beings 
who acknowledge an empathic duty to their fellow creatures. They have the 
power of imagination and understanding to view their surroundings as 
neighbors. They admit their ecological neighbors as intrinsically valuable 
since some basic relationships are incomplete without considering them as 
neighbors.  
We should distinguish further the neighboring self from the relational 
self and ecological self to understand it more clearly. Neighboring self is 
primarily concerned with the surroundings than the forests, lands, rivers, 
mountains, and other natural elements far away. For example, if a bird species 
lives in one’s surroundings, its extinction is more painful than the extinction of 
a bird species in the Amazon. In the same way, the extinction of the Amazon’s 
                                                 




bird species will be more painful to the Amazonians than to others living 
elsewhere. This is because they are more identified with the bird species than 
any one else. Clearly then, natural elements and human beings are distinct, but 
maintain an ecological neighboring relation. To a relational self, nature is also 
distinct from the self. A relational self recognizes both continuity and 
difference. In contrast, to an ecological self, nature is merely a bigger Self. It 
acknowledges continuity but rejects the difference. 
 The neighboring self protects the environment by a guiding moral 
principle, that is, the Protection Principle. Although the relational self does not 
prescribe any specific principle for the protection of nature, ‘respecting’ nature 
might serve as a basic principle to it. Thus, individuals might be uncertain 
about how much respect natural elements can deserve from them. Is it equal to 
other human beings or less? Will animals get equal respect as stones? For an 
ecological self, the same is true. There is no action-guiding moral principle 
outlined so far. However, one could assume that the principle is ‘equality’, 
that is, an equal treatment of nature and human beings. We have already 
discussed the problems which can arise when nature and human beings are 
seen as equal to an ecological self. 
 Human beings cannot ignore their surroundings. A neighboring self 
maintains that human beings are neighborhood conscious individuals. To a 
relational self, human beings are socially conscious individuals. As a social 
being an individual must show love, empathy, sympathy, care and respect to 
others. He or she is also entitled to show respect to the other natural life-forms. 
But to an ecological self, human beings are ecologically bounded creatures. 
Social human beings are egoistic because current society respects human 
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beings more than any other animals or natural entities. Social beings are 
isolated from the bigger community. 
To a neighboring self, the Earth is a neighboring track. The bonding 
between human and other natural elements is neighborliness. The relational 
self views this Earth through the lens of various relations. Viewing everything 
from the “relational” point of view seems problematic and complex. Perhaps, 
a scale of weighing various relations is necessary. The ecological self views 
this Earth from a total viewpoint. Everything that belongs to the biosphere is 
interrelated, whether we value them or not. Any destruction of a particular 
life-form will be treated negatively.  
A relational self respects natural elements because it is an expression 
of a social human being. However, the expression varies in relation to persons, 
their wisdom, feelings and emotions. To an ecological self, feelings for natural 
elements increase in proportion to the maximization of diversity. When an 
individual becomes selfless through identification with nature, responsible 
behavior develops in him or her. Perhaps, everyone might not be inspired by 
such intense identification. In contrast to them, the neighboring self exhibits 
awareness toward its neighborhood entities and shows dutiful empathy for the 
protection of nature.  
Identification with a particular place is very important for both the 
neighboring self and the relational self. They both value emotional bonding 
with the particular place for a respectful and caring attitude regarding nature. 
By contrast, the ecological self does not require any emotional attachment 
with a particular place. The whole biosphere is identified with the self. 
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However, then it is hard to realize how an individual can develop an intimate 
community bonding.  
The goal of the neighboring self is not only to show awareness of 
ecological neighbors, but rather also to perform duties to them without 
discrimination at a certain level. Realizing ecological neighborhood is an 
advantage for human beings over destroying them. The neighboring self limits 
human imagination within locality, but conceive the potentiality of extending 
further. The neighboring self considers environmental protection not as an 
additional duty, but rather as a habitual commitment to a noble neighborhood 
relation.   
Is the neighboring relation necessarily a relation of co-operation and 
harmony? There are bad neighbors who actually want to do harm to others. I 
agree with these factual claims. However, it is hard to find any relation 
universally peaceful and co-operative. Friends, brothers, sisters, relatives, and 
parents — all these kinds of relation are based on some noble values such as, 
love, intimacy, co-operation, sympathy, empathy, care and admiration. 
However, they all can go wrong. We have an image of good friends as well as 
experience of bad friends. But we do not blame the friendship as a whole. We 
do not also give up friendship. We hope that our neighbors will be good, co-
operative, sympathetic, loving and intimate.  
Natural hazards can be seen as actions from a bad neighbor. We may 
not eliminate such actions. But we could reduce them by improving our 
ecological bond with nature. One real life example might be useful here. 
Currently, the relation of two neighboring Koreas is hopeless. A similar 
situation existed between West Germany and East Germany. But the two 
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Gemanys came together, inspiring co-operation and harmony. We may not 
reach the ideal always. However, we should have an ideal to guide our 
decisions and policies. People may hate their human neighbors for reasonable 
cause, but they will not hate the neighborliness of the seas, mountains, flower 
gardens, and waterfalls.  
Nevertheless, there might be a situation in which we have no option 
but to destroy the neighbors. For example, suppose that we need some wood 
for building a house where we, our pets and other domestic animals may live. 
Birds, other mammals and organisms have their own living place. But the 
living place for humans and some other animals are quite different from them. 
A house with minimum facility (e.g. water supply) is necessary for human 
beings and some other domestic animals. In that case we have to cut some 
trees since we don’t have any option. Similarly, if there is plague we have to 
kill some rats. If we were affected by dreadful virus and bacteria we have to 
kill them.   
A comprehensive environmental ethics, contrary to what deep 
ecologists are suggesting, should acknowledge that we have to preserve all 
organisms and natural entities until the lives of human beings are at threat. 
This is not because human lives are more valuable than others, but because 
only human beings can perform an empathetic duty toward their ecological 
neighbors.  Shouldn’t we allow some trees to be destroyed for the comfort of 
human beings? The case is emotional from the neighborhood perspective and 
depends on several conditions (such as our basic needs, significant interests, 
and ecological benefits). Of course, if there are available trees of the same 
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species, or a tree is going to die, or it is already dead naturally, I will use it for 
better living.   
However, we cannot let those rats live which are causing death to 
humans and nonhumans just because their lives are also intrinsically valuable 
as those of human beings. The same should be applicable to human beings. If 
they are evidently a threat to other human beings, animals and nature as a 
whole, they should be either controlled, or even destroyed if there is no other 
alternative.  
A neighboring self, therefore, would follow a basic moral principle. It 
is the moral principle which is fundamental for any reasonable version of 
comprehensive environmental ethics. I will call my moral principle “The 
Protection Principle”. I believe that community members who share the same 
goal (harmonious co-existence through interdependence), actually share the 
values of identification, self-realization, and spirituality, which ultimately 
manifest the value of protection, i.e. “protect” each other from destruction. For 
example, we protect trees by producing carbon dioxide, and trees protect us by 
producing oxygen. The Protection Principle has roots in the Asian as well as 
Western traditions, and also in indigenous people’s kinship lifestyles. The 
simple version of my principle is stated as follows. 
 
II. THE ‘PROTECTION PRINCIPLE’ 
 
The Protection Principle: Neighbors have an obligation to protect their 
neighborhood until destruction is the only option to fulfill their basic needs, 
significant interests, and ecological benefits. 
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Here, basic needs refer to those needs without which existence is 
impossible. But for human beings mere existence is not sufficient. They also 
need to respond to various problems (e.g. common and rare health diseases for 
humans, animals, trees and plants, damage of an ecological health, natural 
biodiversity loss, and extreme weather) and some of the significant interests to 
be fulfilled. Ecological benefits include those benefits which are to be 
considered for saving and caring of other creatures.  
Nature itself is interwoven by several sophisticated systems and these 
systems work in a perfect way. Destruction and creation as a system suggests 
that human beings could make use of some elements of what they get in nature. 
All species survive and benefit in a natural manner. However, human beings 
cannot survive in the same way. If we do not use the objects that are produced 
in nature, they may sometimes become harmful to the ecosystem. Human 
beings therefore have to use these to consume, preserve, and maintain the 
balance of the ecosystem.  
Interestingly, the Protection Principle is followed in the whole animal 
and living kingdoms consciously or unconsciously. A lion will not attack any 
other animal in a forest until he is hungry enough. A tiger will not attack a 
deer when he is full. A snake will not bite humans until she is hurt by them. 
An eagle will not catch fish until it is required for its own survival. Plants 
cannot consume excess water. They do not take Nitrogen from soil and 
Carbon dioxide from air beyond their needs and necessities. However, only 
human beings do not follow this universal principle consistently. But we could 
change our viewpoints and feelings to our ecological neighbors and can apply 
this principle for a better Earth.    
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One example will clarify my point. Suppose that there are many ducks 
of the same species in our neighborhood. Each duck is contributing to the 
ecosystem for preserving neighborhood balance. But we could use some of 
them for food and medical research to fulfill our basic needs. However, we 
may not finish all of them and make the species extinct even in a case when 
that is required for our survival and satisfaction of taste. In that case, we 
should consider another means to survive. We must sacrifice some personal 
interests for ecological benefit. The issue is not a particular duck versus a 
particular human being, or a duck species versus human species. But rather, 
sacrifice of some personal interests for the good (or interest) of the greater 
neighborhood community.    
Nevertheless, we have heart-mind, and thus, we love, create, enjoy, 
and sacrifice. So, we also need mental satisfaction. Arts and culture are two 
main ways to share our emotions, happiness, joys, sorrows, and creativity. 
Arts make a bridge between our emotions and experience of life. Natural 
objects generate our emotions and play a key role in our feelings. We should 
promote them in a persuasive way. Therefore, scientific experiments, 
innovation, and enjoyment, which are consistent with ecological benefits and 
harmonious living, might be justified.  
For example, if one of our neighbors is an architect and wants to build 
a wooden museum with amazing architectural design we should allow him or 
her to do so provided that it will satisfy two conditions, first, there are enough 
trees of the same species available, and second, the museum does not create 
ecological burdens for other neighbors, both human and nonhumans. We 
should permit museum building for two reasons. The first is that it will satisfy 
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the creative interest of human beings, others may inspire and learn from it. 
The second is that the museum may showcase and preserve other creative 
works, such as paintings, arts and crafts, and theater. It will also serve as a 
meeting place of community members to enjoy themselves and the aesthetic 
beauty of nature.  
 How does the Protection Principle relate with mainstream 
environmental approaches? Can it be found in any current environmental 
approach? Can the neighbor-centric approach be regarded as a synthesis of 
mainstream environmental thoughts? Should we be “wilderness purists” or 
wise “nature managers”?   
 Let us start with the two opposing approaches for the protection of 
nature, conservation and preservation. Gifford Pinchot, a leading forester and 
founder of modern forest conservation, proposes the former, while the latter 
was proposed by John Muir, founder of “Sierra Club” and preservation 
movement worldwide. The conservation approach advocates the “wise use” of 
nature. The basis of this approach is ecology, biology, geology and soil 
science. It suggests considering restoring or recreating ecological habitats, if 
necessary. The ecological health of a habitat is more important than its 
aesthetic beauty or spiritual value according to the conservationists. So, this 
approach would allow any kind of human “intervention” or “interference” as 
long as it is consistent with scientific theories (i.e. botanical and zoological 
theories). Three main principles of the conservation approach are: 
development, prevention of waste, and human’s benefit. In Pinchot’s words, 
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“Conservation means the greatest good to the greatest number for the longest 
time”402. 
 By contrast, the preservation approach suggests leaving nature as we 
got it because we have already made substantive development and only a few 
wildernesses have been kept in the Earth. We should leave them alone for 
priceless joy, beauty and sources of spirituality. Even though in the natural 
process some species may get extinct, in all circumstances nature should be 
preserved. The damage naturally caused will be less than that caused by 
human intervention. So, the preservation approach will not allow any human 
intervention or interference. Muir notes, “Landscape gardens, places of 
recreation and worship, are never made beautiful by destroying and burying 
them”403.  
 Apart from aesthetic beauty and spiritual importance, preservationists 
think that keeping wilderness uninterrupted is respecting its dignity. Recent 
environmental scholars label the conservationist approach as “nature 
managers”, and the preservationist approach as “wilderness purists”404. The 
debate between nature managers and wilderness purists is still on-going. In our 
context, Passmore belongs to the former group, whereas Naess belongs to the 
latter. 
 It might be good to recall that Passmore interprets Conservationists as 
farm-managers who are “co-operating with nature in an attempt to perfect 
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it”405. Naess, on the other hand, wants to preserve wilderness for richness and 
diversity. Valuing wilderness is for him the key to achieve ecological 
consciousness. Asian traditions are likely to adapt the preservationist approach. 
However, neither the conservationist nor preservationist worldview could 
claim comprehensiveness.  
 The proposed neighbor-centric worldview is a third approach to 
environmental philosophy. Nature management should not mean perfecting 
nature by enormous alternation, or redesigning the wilderness for the 
satisfaction of human beings. The interests of human beings are diverse and 
unlimited and as such mere reorganization cannot ensure that all the needs and 
purposes of human beings will be fulfilled by a single alternation. Alternation 
as a tool of management is not viable. Indeed, the traditional concept of 
management is gradually changing and the consideration for other species has 
slowly been acknowledged. But nature management is still extremely 
dependent on scientific invention. Chemical fertilizer, DDT, for example, 
previously was seen as good for land based on scientific research, but we have 
already noticed their adverse impact on the environment.  
 Conservationists, therefore, need to look at more than scientific 
investigation and invention. They need to be more cautious than before 
because recent chemical inventions are even more powerful and toxic. So, 
generally their adverse impacts might be long and serious. The 
conservationists need to gain and nurture a self inside their heart-mind. The 
self should not only be caring, but it should also be sympathetic, emphatic, and 
more importantly, dutiful to other natural elements. The self should consider 
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its local surroundings thorough the values of identification, self-realization, 
and spirituality, and also should be able to balance between duty and 
interconnectedness. The self should give priority to the protection of its 
ecological neighbors.  In short, conservationists need to achieve a neighboring 
self by observing the above mentioned values.  
 Similarly, preservation should not just mean “non-interference”. 
Leaving the environment without enjoying its enormous wealth for health, 
mind, arts, and beauty would be unjustified. If we leave our neighboring yard 
as it is, then in due course virus and bacteria could form. The yard then 
becomes a problem for other members living in the same surroundings. We 
should plant some nice flowers or vegetables where some other insects and 
organism could have their habitats. But in the case of a large area like the 
Amazon rain forest, there might not be a simple solution. The management 
procedure then is necessarily complex.  
However, the philosophy behind me and my yard, managers and the 
Amazon rain forest, should be the same. Like any other forests, the Amazon 
rain forest is one of the great creations on Earth, a source of our ecological and 
botanical knowledge, aesthetic beauty, spirituality and excellence of art. There 
are uncountable herbs, plants, animals, birds and organisms in the Amazon 
which are precious sources of medicine, food and learning. There is no point 
in ignoring this benefit in the name of preservation. In fact, whether we enjoy 
these benefits or not, the Amazon rain forest will continue to produce them. 
These will also be destroyed in their own ways. So, some kind of management 
is a must for any forest, including the Amazon.   
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 However, the degree of management depends on our attitudes, 
morality and intimate sense of belongingness. I have proposed the decision 
and management policy in a simple manner, “protect your neighbors”. What is 
valued here is the intrinsic value of the forest through intimate belongingness. 
A preservationist could be a prudent manager too.  
 One might argue that we cannot manage and preserve the Amazon rain 
forest in this way because the demand for its valuable resources (e.g. 
medicinal herbs, rare animals, birds and woods) is extremely high. The 
population of the Earth is ever growing and there is only one Amazon for them. 
So, we have to collect as much as we can get from it. Of course, destroying the 
Amazon is not the solution to meet the unlimited demands of the world’s 
population. What we need is a practice of prudent lifestyle. A lifestyle that is 
simple but rich for us as well as our ecological neighbors.  
 We should attempt to search for these kinds of lifestyles throughout the 
globe. We should find how people in some cultures and place enable them to 
build the bridge between “purists” and “managers”. Examples are rare but not 
absent. Let us consider the example of an indigenous Amazonian society.  
There is a herbal treatment procedure in the Amazon rain forest called 
vegetalismo in the Shamanic society, where the physical and mental is hardly 
distinguished. The treatment procedure is simply a re-interaction between 
human beings and the forest. Shamanic treatment must be given in a forest 
environment by two practitioners, one who knows and brings the specific 
plants for the treatment, and the other performs several activities in visions or 
dreams. Each time different kinds of plants should be used for complete cure.  
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The treatment is rather interesting because it is mainly the dissolution 
of human-human relational boundary and a replacement of the forest-human 
relation. Barbira-Freedman notes,  
Psychoactive plants dissolve boundaries between self and 
outside world in the shaman’s ecstasy. They enable the 
constant redefinition of cosmic landscapes in which social 
relations with kin and neighbours are re-negotiated on 
patients’ behalf in terms of relations between humans and 
the forest.406     
                                    
In this example, it is clearly shown that one tribe preserves the medicinal 
plants and the other knows how to use them in human-forest healing procedure. 
The message is not only interdependence of the forest and human beings, but 
rather, the interaction of purists and managers for effective outcome. With 
their collective effort nature can be preserved and enjoyed.  
Similar kinds of practice can be found in Asian indigenous societies. 
One common example from the Himalayan farmers involves the practice of 
multiple farming, crop rotation and intra-species cultivation. It is noticed in 
the following comments,  
The barahnaja, an inter-cropping pattern practiced by 
farmers of the Tehri Garhwal region of the Uttar Pradesh 
Himalayan foothills, involves the use of about 12 types of 
crops grown in a single field, each with a different growing 
cycle and nutrient requirement, and all combining into a 
highly productive, sustainable system.407 
         
In this way, the indigenous people throughout the Earth fulfill all their 
needs, such as for food, treatment, agriculture, recreation by local attachment, 
                                                 
406 Francoise Barbira-Freedman, “ ‘Vegetalismo’ and the Perception of Biodiversity: 
Shamanic Values in the Peruvian Upper Amazon”, in Cultural and Spiritual Values of 
Biodiversity, com. and ed. Darrell Addison Posey and Oxford Centre for the Environment, 
Ethics and Society, UK (Nairobi: United Nations Environment Programme, 1999), 277.   
407 Ashish Kothari and Priya Das, “Local Community Knowledge and Practices in India”, in 
Cultural and Spiritual Values of Biodiversity, com. and ed. Darrell Addison Posey and Oxford 
Centre for the Environment, Ethics and Society, UK (Nairobi: United Nations Environment 
Programme, 1999), 190.  
 287
wise management and nature protection. The Australian aboriginal people, 
New Zealnd’s Maori people, Canadian Cree people, Native American-Indians, 
numerous Indian tribes, Nepalese Sherpa people are some of these people. All 
of these indigenous people do not maintain a mere ecological self, or just a 
sense of interconnectedness with nature. But rather, they hold a neighboring 
self which enable them to know well their land, weather, local plants, 
mountains, animals, birds, insects, organisms and the whole ecosystem of their 
surroundings. They know very well the aesthetic and spiritual value of their 
neighborhood. So, I strongly differ from Naess and other deep ecologists who 
claimed that indigenous people’s lifestyles reflect an ecological self.  
 In my view, Naess’s main concern of cosmological identification is 
rare in the indigenous people’s worldview. They are evidently more inclined 
to their own territory, their own land, their specific relations with some of the 
plants, trees, animals and mountains in their neighborhood. Posey makes the 
same observational notes in the rich and voluminous collections of UNEP 
(United Nations Environment Progamme) where almost all indigenous 
cultures and their ecophilosophies have been compiled,  
Local knowledge embraces information about location, 
movements and other factors explaining spatial patterns and 
timing in the ecosystem, including sequences of events, 
cycles and trends. Direct links with the land are fundamental, 
and obligations to maintain those connections form the core 
of individual and group identity.408      
          
 Therefore, the sense of interconnectedness cannot supply the 
appropriate ethical principle for protection of nature. In addition to it, a sense 
of inner connectedness which is absolutely local has always been part of the 
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protection principle of indigenous people. Perhaps, the local people never 
protect their neighborhood as a part of preserving “wilderness”. They even do 
not have a sense of wilderness. They maintain a very different ethics to view 
and protect their surroundings as reflected here,  
...there is usually no concept of ‘wilderness’. The only 
exception would be sacred landscapes/habitats/species which 
are off limits for use. In all other cases, including 
agricultural fields, forests, wetlands and pastures, both 
conservation and usage are integrated.409                 
 
Indigenous people’s lifestyles and practices set an example for us. 
Their view of surroundingness is neighbor-centric rather than ecocentric. 
However,   viewing natural elements as neighbors is not potentially beyond 
criticism. Perhaps, it qualifies to gain critical attention as a viable option to a 
few major environmental philosophers. But these environmental philosophers 
did not provide new arguments, they just loosely commented on it. For 
example, Rolston dismisses the neighbor-centric view for two old reasons,  
Earth, too, is a big rockpile, only one that happens to support 
life. It is no doubt precious as a means of life support, but it 
is not precious in itself. To add a new imperative, loving 
Earth, to the classical one of loving neighbor (and God), is to 
make a category mistake. Neighbors (and God) are persons, 
ends in themselves, who respond to love. But Earth is just 
earth, dirt. Earth is not some proper-named person who can 
respond.410     
 
These two reasons according to Rolston’s statement are, first, 
considering natural elements as neighbors is a category mistake, Earth, like a 
rockpile, is non-sentient, nonliving and so it cannot belong to the higher 
category of persons who are rational, sentient and living beings. Second, we 
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should not love Earthly elements as neighbors because they are not able to 
respond with our love. One can only love persons, such as human neighbors 
and God, who are qualified enough for love as being a proper-named person. 
However, loving Earthly elements as life support means is morally sensible in 
Rolston’s view.  
The first argument is purely Kantian which we have already discussed. 
We have claimed that Kantian ethics has several elements (e.g. aesthetic) to 
consider nature beyond his categorical distinction. Moreover, the argument 
itself is extremely anthropocentric.  
The second argument has little or no support from historical 
perspectives. Loving someone or something does not require personhood. 
Love cannot be based on the hope of return, or receiving a response. Perhaps, 
the reverse has taken place in the heart of great saints, philosophers, 
philanthropists, social workers, and humanitarians. If there is anything unique 
in human beings, it is their imagination, understanding and most importantly, 
the boundless capability of feelings of love for everything. Viewing natural 
elements as neighbors and loving them is just a part of our unique capability of 
intimate feeling. Very often we have this intimate feeling  for neighborhood 
trees, rivers, mountains, gardens, green fields, forests, roads, bus stops, and 
buildings. Our unique capability of having such feelings therefore does not 
require natural elements to have their individual names. Environmental 
philosopher E. Foss, who regards human beings as the “nervous system” of 
planet Earth, notes, “We need to be the eyes and ears and brain of the planet. 
We need to develop our power to act on behalf of us all...We need to focus our 
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competitive feelings on the largest and most worthy adversary we have ever 
faced: the uncaring physical universe”.411    
Nonetheless, the neighbor-centric approach has a few drawbacks. The 
important drawbacks of neighborhood environmental philosophy must be 
addressed. Firstly, we cannot expect nature to reciprocate. Secondly, in 
principle, diversity and neighborhood are conflicting, i.e. neighbors are fixed 
but diversity is an unlimited flow of elements. One might be stuck with his or 
her unattractive natural neighbors. He or she then can be frustrated in caring 
for them. Thirdly, the main worries of global environmental problems (such as 
climate change) may not be solved by a neighbor-centric approach. Finally, 
the emerging idea of NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) and people’s mobility 
for globalization are clearly conflicting with the neighbor-centric view.   
In response to these drawbacks, I believe that there are some 
opportunities that enable us to find a possible solution. Let me review the idea 
of reciprocity first, and then consider its application in the environmental 
context. The ethics of reciprocity was developed in the writings of Greek 
philosophers as a “mutual covenant” or “contract”. In order to avoid injustice 
in the earlier societies people agreed that they will not torture or punish each 
other. Since all want to avoid sufferings or punishment the contract was 
maintained. The idea was that both the stronger and the weaker were treated 
equally or were able to give equally. The stronger realizes that showing force 
is bad, while the weaker has the capacity of disliking or avoiding oppression. 
Based on this reciprocal ethics, Nel Noddings, a founder of feminist care 
ethics, suggested that to receive caring “reciprocity” is a must. In other words, 
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those who are consciously capable of appreciating our caring are qualified to 
receive it. According to her, “...there is no true ethical relation between 
humans and plants because the relation is logically one-sided”.412 
However, not all philosophers think that reciprocity is a good ethical 
norm at all. Perhaps, they think that we do not need to take reciprocity as a 
norm for moral considerability of animals, plants, and other nonhumans, or for 
taking care of them. For instance, Peter Singer argues that we should not base 
our morality on reciprocity. Singer comments, “Because no account of the 
origin of morality compels us to base our morality on reciprocity, and no other 
arguments in favour of this conclusion have been offered, we should reject this 
view of ethics”413.  
In environmental consideration, reciprocity is not an effective idea 
because human beings have to think far from reciprocity for harmonious living. 
If our ethics is based on reciprocal behavior then the emerging effort to 
include other parts of nature in a moral circle will be at risk. Environmental 
ethics suggests some guidelines of behavior beyond a concern for the human 
species, including a concern for animals, biotic and abiotic entities, and others 
who cannot reciprocate.  
Reciprocity might be appropriate for some human relationships. For 
example, taking care of neighbors, visiting friends especially in their 
ceremonies and illness, helping relatives when they are in need, and extending 
charity to children and the aged. In this context, the value of reciprocity can be 
seen as a universal consideration for greater bonding and sharing.  
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But reciprocity can also be negatively interpreted. If a person helps his 
friend by lending a mobile phone or a computer, in return when the friend 
does the same thing, they are maintaining a trading relationship, instead of 
sharing relationship (or friendship). Eventually, their friendship will 
discontinue. Friendship would require not engaging persistently in the 
expectation of a formal return. Instead of that, a friend would act with 
kindness, sympathy, compassion, generosity, and love.  
Reciprocity promotes a few obligations. However, in order to be 
treated morally, something need not be reciprocal. Most environmental 
philosophers and applied ethicists, such as John Passmore, Arne Naess, 
Holmes Rolston III, and Peter Singer, think that we have obligations toward 
our future generations even though they are not reciprocal. We should take 
sustainable initiative so that our children and their generations can live in a 
pollution free, clean, and fresh environment. They may not exist now. But our 
focus toward our environment should be kindness, empathy, sympathy, 
compassion, and love, not reciprocity. This is because we are able to extend all 
of these dispositions and good deeds irrespective of considering paybacks. 
That is why we take care of disabled infants or palliative patients without any 
return. Their smiles encourage us, their words, even eye contacts, give us 
motivation, peace and happiness.  
Likewise, we care for the river flowing near our village, old home, 
birth place, wilderness, mountains, trees, and green lands. When we are so 
exhausted with so many complexities in life, bored with most human relations, 
we may go there and sit for few moments. We rediscover ourselves at the bank 
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of the river. Nature does not react to our violence, in the way that some 
humans would.       
Secondly, the conflict between diversity and neighbor-centric 
philosophy is also possible to resolve. One of our concerns with the 
neighborcentric philosophy is emphasizing locality and avoiding abstractness. 
Neighborcentrism does not close the option of new adaptation, new 
association, and new communities. In fact, preserving old livelihood as well as 
facilitating new initiatives is an important feature of neighborcentrism. We 
should allow as much diversities and associations with our natural 
communities that we could afford. Surely, we will preserve a mango tree in 
our back yard. At the same time, we can plant a guava tree, an orange tree, a 
jackfruit tree, and an apple tree. We should not stick only with our mango tree.  
We could have just an orchid garden in our neighborhood, but we 
could also have a garden with lilies, roses, tulips, jasmines, and camellias in 
the same piece of land. So, if we are bored with orchids we should simply take 
the initiatives for an increase of other varieties of flower. Once we have 
multiple varieties of flower, we could expect various insects to come and stay 
with them. Beautiful butterflies will obviously come. Despite them, some of 
the other insects could be more enjoyable, nice and colorful for us. Gradually, 
when the number of insects increase, the number of some animals will also be 
increased. Thus, if we were bored with squirrels in our old set-up, in the new 
set-up we could expect some amazing birds, ducks, monkeys, and even some 
snakes (most snakes are not poisonous). So, the neighbor-centric view is open 
to initiatives for increasing diversity. We just need to think how we can 
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accommodate or adapt diversities without destroying the present natural 
neighborhood.  
Viewing natural elements as neighbors and loving them is an ability, 
not a necessity in order to become a human being. As Foss puts it in his 
philosophy of integrated nature, “This is an ability of Homo sapiens. It is by 
no means a necessity, but it can be done”414. Yes, it can be done for a better 
Earth. An Earth, where human beings are caring for their natural neighbors, 
just as they are caring for human neighbors.    
Thirdly, how could a neighbor-centric view respond to climate change? 
Climate change has threatened all lives seriously, including the people who are 
living now and future generations to come. This is a large scale problem. 
Sufferings as a result of climate change have already taken place in the Artic 
zone, lowland states, island states and even the developed world. The solution 
to climate change is much more ethical and political rather than scientific. 
How can a large scale problem, such as climate change, be solved by taking 
local initiative, such as protecting one’s neighborhood?415 How can it help if 
an individual cares for his or her neighborhood? It might appear that a 
neighboring self would have negligible or insignificant effects. But in fact this 
is not the case.   
 While the United Nations is taking global initiatives, a collective effort 
from local people and local governments is also required for environmental 
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problems. Each and every individual has a moral responsibility. As Garvey 
notes,  
However, you are lumped with the problem of climate 
change. It’s a moral problem for you, right now. You have 
some decisions to make about how to live, some choices 
which concern your everyday life. There is some moral 
pressure on everyone of us to come to some conclusions.416  
 
Responsible individuals can push the government to make responsible 
decisions and participate in the international treaties and policies to protect the 
environment. Governments might not always give priority to the environment, 
focusing too much on the greater economic benefit and technological 
development of the nation.   
A combination of private morality and public morality is important 
here. When individuals are conscious and responsible, governments cannot be 
irresponsible. Recently, John Broome, in his book Climate Matters, concludes 
that “Climate change makes moral demands on our behavior as individuals in 
our private lives, and it also makes moral demands on governments” 417 . 
Scruton argues that environmental policies should focus on “local affections”. 
As he notes in this statement, “In my view this is the most poisonous aspect of 
the campaign to put global warming at the top of the environmental agenda. 
For it removes attention from the fact that good stewardship begins at home, 
and can never be guaranteed by treaty”418.  
Whether an individual’s decision to use fossil fuel to generate 
electricity would have ignorable or massive impact on climate change or 
                                                 
416 James Garvey, The Ethics of Climate Change: Right and Wrong in a Warming World 
(London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2008), 4. 
417 John Broome, Climate Matters: Ethics in a Warming World (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 2012), 187. 
418 Roger Scruton, Green Philosophy: How to Think Seriously About the Planet (London: 
Atlantic Books, 2012), 374. 
 296
global warming is not the issue. The real issue is that the more we identified 
with our neighborhood, the more responsible we will be to our environment. 
The motivation to protect the neighborhood could deter the government from 
making environmentally harmful policies. It gradually may also be extended 
to the global level.  
Finally, the idea of NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) throws another 
challenge to the neighboring attitude toward nature. There are very few people 
who really care beyond their immediate environment, or own home. Moreover, 
people are too mobile in this globalized world. Only very few mobile people 
can have neighboring bonding with the place. Most of them are unconcerned 
about environmental issues or intimate relation with their neighborhood.  
Nimbys are concerned about their locality. Local affection and their 
love for neighborhood inspire them to resist a harmful establishment in their 
place. Most environmental problems arise from our lack of concern. We 
usually never think beyond our home or yard. However, the situation has now 
been changed. Climate change and global warming can threaten us and our 
future generations too. So, we cannot ignore environmental issues any more. 
We need to adapt a different attitude. We should look beyond our home, our 
yard, our neighborhood, and even our country. Consider, for example, the 
current haze problem in Southeast Asia. The origin of haze is in Indonesia, but 
it affects Singapore, Brunei, Malaysia and Thailand. As a good neighbor, 
Singapore extends her hand to solve this problem by offering advanced 
scientific and technical support to Indonesia. This is not just because 
Singaporeans are affected, but also because it ensures a sustainable and clean 
environment for the whole region.  
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Mobility is not an entirely new phenomenon. Perhaps, people are more 
mobile than before. As people are mobile, they have greater opportunities of 
facing environmental challenges, such as harsh weather, drought, floods, 
cyclones, and earthquakes. Mobile people have more options to share the 
environmental information, and modify their behavior. They need to think and 
start acting toward their present neighborhood wherever they live. 
Undoubtedly, we produce CFCs at home, in our regions, and in our 
countries which cause global problems. So, if we really want to solve these 
problems we must switch off our refrigerators, our electric lights, our air 
conditioning systems when we do not need to use them. Or we can do it for a 
whole day in a week at our local community. Thus, one of the influential 
slogans to solve the ecological crisis is “Think globally, act locally”. If we are 
able to achieve the neighboring self we could think of any place as a 
neighborhood (let’s assume we are wayfarers). But one must start with his or 
her own neighborhoods. If all of us are able to protect our neighborhoods the 
whole Earth will be protected from CFCs. 
  Home should be our key motivational force, the Oikophilia, in 
Scruton’s term, for environmental protection. He impressively reminds us, 
“Home is not just any place. It is the place that contains the ones you love and 
need; it is the place that you share, the place that you defend, the place for 
which you might still be commanded to fight and die”419. Granting Scruton’s 
suggestion, why not think about our own neighborhood first to keep it 
environmentally clean and fresh, start doing our part with little sacrifice and 
minimum effort.     
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 The suggestion of globalization or global responsibility has already 
faced severe challenges throughout the globe. One of the reasons for this 
challenge is the huge difference between the contribution to Carbon emission 
and imposing equal responsibility for all. The contribution to the Earth’s 
pollution, and responsibility of taking care of the Earth (or paying 
compensation) should be proportionally distributed. Moreover, globalization 
has many side-effects on the developing and poor people, and notable 
environmentalists throughout the globe have raised their voices against it.  
 To sum up, I have proposed a version of the neighboring self as a 
viable solution to the ecological crisis. This neighboring self admits that there 
are diversities as well as unities in the neighborly ordering of our Earth. There 
is no restriction to enjoying natural resources as long as it is done in line with 
neighborhood principles. Neighbors are not God or goddesses. They are 
neither slaves of human beings nor their partners in a true sense. Neighbors are 
locally bounded and might be considered as ecological. Perhaps, neighbor 
from an ecological point of view is more meaningful than any other 
interpretations. For example, a social interpretation of neighbor does not go far 
because it may only consider social human beings living in the same 
compound.   
 The neighboring self neither subscribes to a dominating worldview nor 
a cosmological worldview. Instead of these, the neighboring self holds 
identification-as-neighborhood, neighborhood self-realization and 
neighborhood spirituality as the most appropriate dimensions of common core 
values. In other words, the neighboring sense of three common core values 
would constitute a totally new version of self, namely, the neighboring self. In 
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lieu of protecting the whole biosphere, the neighboring self protects its 
neighborhood by a guiding moral principle, the Protection Principle. The 
neighbor-centric worldview does not foster abstractness in human-nature 
relationship. Rather, it is a transformed view of the indigenous people’s 
lifestyles and their neighborliness ecophilosophy. The neighbor-centric view 
includes mainstream environmental approaches, such as conservation and 
preservation. However, the neighboring self, when guided by the Protection 
Principle, maintains a balance between conservation and preservation which 






















Comparative environmental philosophy is an important development for 
viewing the environment from cross-cultural perspectives and for suggesting a 
solution to the environmental problems by analyzing traditions, values, and 
different attitudes. This thesis has identified some common core values in the 
Western and Asian traditions by comparing their environmental philosophies. 
Common core values may underpin a framework for a comprehensive 
environmental ethics. Suggesting the right attitudes toward nature in the 
context of the self-nature relationship is another basic aim of the study. 
In Western traditions, human beings are given the highest priority. 
Other environmental elements are seen as serving human interests. Since 
human beings alone are intrinsically valuable, the promotion of human 
interests or well-being is considered the chief value axioms in the West. 
Anthropocentrism, the view that only human beings are intrinsically valuable, 
or that human interests are overriding, has been justified by the Western 
classical philosophers.   
However, there are other earlier Western philosophers (e.g. the ancient 
Greeks) who view nature from an integrated perspective, rather than a 
separation based on the anthropocetric value axioms. After surveying the 
historical roots of Western traditions, Lynn White Jr. has challenged the 
anthropocentric view and recommended a radical change in Western values 
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and human-nature metaphysics. He argues that there is a strong link between 
Christianity, Western traditions, and the Western view of nature.  
One might yet question whether White’s perception regarding Western 
traditions is correct. Are anthropocentrism and Christianity really responsible 
for the global ecological crisis? This thesis does not discuss such questions in 
detail. Rather, it indicates that White’s analysis raises the issue that there is a 
deeper metaphysics rooted in the human-nature relation. White insists that for 
overcoming the ecological crisis we need a new set of values and an attitude 
that we are part of nature rather than the masters of nature. 
Arne Naess and John Passmore, are the two notable Western 
environmental philosophers who were considered here in more detail. They 
critically reflected on the Western traditions and values. Both of them 
discussed the nature of ecological crisis, reasons for the ecological crisis, and 
how to overcome them within the Western context. Nonetheless, they 
suggested different approaches in environmental philosophy. Their 
comparison shows that we should recognize some core values which are 
ignored in Western traditions. While I am aware that these two environmental 
philosophies may not be the complete representation of Western traditions, 
they reasonably contained certain core Western values and have profound 
influence on other environmental philosophers.   
Naess introduced the term “ecosophy” in the Western context. He 
supported White’s observation that the West needs a set of values and a 
radical change in human-nature metaphysics. His deep ecology is an 
environmental movement against shallow ecology which basically aims at the 
protection of human beings, their lives and health. He views nature as a single 
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community to which human beings belong. Apparently, Naess’s deep ecology 
identifies several values, such as diversity, wilderness, respect for life forms, 
interrelatedness, and interconnectedness. However, by analyzing Naess’s own 
distinction between “norms” and “values” and his ecosophy, this thesis has 
shown that Naess advocates three fundamental values, identification, self-
realization and spirituality.  
Naess claims that his own ecosophy T has “only one ultimate norm: 
Self-realization”. It is argued that Naess’s norm internalizes the fundamental 
value of identification. Naess’s suggestion of expanding our “egoistic self” to 
a “comprehensive Self” is also articulated by a process of identification. So, in 
sketching his ecosophy Naess clearly admits identification.  
For a deep ecologist, Self-realization is the feeling that a smaller self is 
a part of a bigger Self, that is, “self-in-Self”. The small self here is the 
individual self, while the big self is the comprehensive Self. Self-realization 
refers to a type of development. More clearly, a special type of development 
that Naess conceptualizes as a development in personhood or the “maturity of 
self”. 
I have tried to show that by introducing “maturity of self” Naess 
recognizes the value of self-realization. In other words, one can gain 
ecological consciousness through continuous self-examination, self-mastery or 
self-controlling. That is to say, Naess is not rejecting the value of traditional 
self-realization, but he suggests expanding it to a maximum level. The 
consciousness originates from intra-personal communication and then finally 
ends at trans-personal consciousness. 
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Naess’s ecosophy promotes “totality” or “unity”. Nature is a “total-
field image” which is indivisible in Naess’s view. Generally, people are not 
ready to embrace such a worldview. But when they acquire some kind of 
spiritual consciousness they would be motivated to see themselves in relation 
to other natural elements. So, Naess’s ecosophy is a development of “spiritual 
personhood”. This spiritual personhood will consider nature as integrated with 
a strong feeling to nonhuman elements, or intimate spiritual belongingness 
with them. 
In this way, I have drawn some main values from Naess’s ecosophy. 
One important point is that Naess is somehow reluctant to apply ethics or 
ethical principles to solve the ecological crisis. He differs from others who 
think that moral principles can guide our behavior toward nature. Although I 
do not think that Naess completely ignores ethical principles, his view is 
largely based on ontology.  
In contrast to the ontological solution, Passmore suggests that Western 
ethical values are sufficient to solve the ecological crisis. He praised Western 
traditions as innovative, rich, and rational rather than mystical. He relies on 
science and technology and argued that, like other social problems, the 
ecological problems can be solved by survey, data analysis, the testing of 
hypotheses, and formulating appropriate policies. The philosophy of 
wholeness or ecosophy makes environmental decision-making process 
complex, and is inappropriate in solving the ecological crisis.  
Despite a highly positive attitude toward Western traditions, science 
and technology, Passmore thinks that the Western perception of nature is 
incorrect. He argues that we must realize that nature is not just a resource to 
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use. Human beings have to adopt a different attitude rather than the masters of 
the universe. Chistianity does support dominion over nature, but it also 
recommends a stewardship attitude toward nature.  
Passmore supports the view that human beings are unique. Being 
unique they have responsibility toward other natural elements. Their 
uniqueness may not detach themselves from nature. Instead, uniqueness 
should make human beings more caring and prudent managers of natural 
resources. This thesis shows that Passmore maintains both the higher status of 
human beings and a scientific-utilitarian approach to solve the ecological crisis. 
Self-realization appears in Passmore’s environmental philosophy in the 
sense of realizing rationally. It is a realization that rational human beings have 
an enormous capacity to make rational decisions. They cannot surrender 
themselves to nature whether in the form of worship or blindly taking nature 
as sacred. Human beings can tackle the ecological crisis through scientific 
research. They can make rational decisions in a systematic way and formulate 
effective moral principles to be followed.  
Passmore’s worldview has two aspects. First, he accepts the scientific-
utilitarian method to use nature. But secondly, he views nature as “God’s 
handiwork”. Those who love God should care for nature, since as stewards 
they are entitled to preserve it in the perfect condition. Passmore made a 
deeper claim for spirituality without considering nature as sacred. 
The emphasis on some core values is evident from Western classical 
philosophers to notable modern environmental thinkers, like Naess and 
Passmore. In particular, this thesis highlights three values namely, 
identification, self-realization, and spirituality, in Naess’s and Passmore’s 
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environmental philosophy. However, they have maintained different senses of 
these values. Apart from personal and cosmological senses, a neighboring 
sense of identification can be constructed. We can perceive the environment 
from a neighboring viewpoint, referring to the Earth’s evolutionary history. 
The Earth’s evolutionary history shows a high probability that our ancestors 
maintained a neighboring relation with the natural elements.   
Appeal to nature in various aspects of human life produces a more 
intimate relation in Asian traditions. Nature is mysterious, powerful, a source 
of knowledge, balanced and harmonious to the Asian people. In most Asian 
cultures, respecting nature was historically evident. We have concentrated 
here on three major traditions in Asia, that is, Chinese, Indian, and Japanese, 
by reflecting on their accounts of the human-nature relation in more detail. It 
seems that Asian traditions generally adopt a nonanthropocentric 
environmental value, a value system which rejects the view of human beings 
as the centre of the universe. Alternatively, nature is intrinsically valuable 
according to this value system. But anthropocentrism in a few traditions has 
also been exposed. 
The Chinese perceive nature in relation to cosmic harmony and 
ecological balance. Human being’s role and their responsibility in the family, 
society and government was the focus of Chinese thinkers. They encouraged 
self-cultivation. The goal of self-cultivation is harmony. This thesis argues that 
the worldview Chinese scholars portrayed is not entirely anthropocentric. 
Most of them, including Confucius, have suggested that human beings are 
required to live in relation to Heaven and Earth. So, human’s personal, social 
and political responsibilities are not limited to other human beings alone. They 
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are the main elements but there are other elements in nature which they need 
to consider. Human beings cannot isolate themselves from these natural 
elements.  
Daoist philosophers developed a more nature-centric view where an 
organic continuum between human beings and natural elements is emphasized. 
Nature is seen through an interaction of Dao (the Way), De (integrity), and the 
ten thousand things. The principle recommended for preservation of the 
naturalness of ten thousand things is Wu-wei. Interestingly, this principle could 
provide a complete guide for human-human and human-nature relations. By 
introducing the principle of Wu-wei the Chinese philosophers have removed 
the ontological hierarchy found in the Western traditions. The Chinese through 
the interaction of microcosm and macrocosm view nature as a “seamless 
whole”.   
Identification with nature makes Indian philosophy, theology and 
cultures unique. Viewing nature as a single community, where both organic 
and inorganic elements are members, is the basic foundation of Indian 
traditions. Human lives are celebrated with the sacredness of nature and 
spiritual association with trees, rivers, and animals. The emotional aspects of 
human-nature relation inspired people to environmental protections. For a 
good human being realization of Atman (Self) and being selfless is important. 
Bhakti or spirituality encourages human beings to maintain a principle of 
Karma. Ashimsa or nonviolence is the key to Indian perception of preserving 
harmony in nature. 
Like the Indian, the Japanese view of nature is also deep rooted in their 
religious and cultural traditions. Mountains occupied a special place in 
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Japanese traditions. They also believe in spirituality or kami in nature. Heaven 
and Earth are significantly important in Japanese traditions, but they received 
a considerable modification from Chinese discourse. They were blended into 
Shintoism and Buddhism. The Japanese traditions emphasized correctness and 
uprightness of heart. A bright heart (or mind) is a heart which establishes 
spiritual bonding with all natural elements. The Japanese philosopher Kinji 
Imanishi calls it “self-completeness”. Buddhist traditions in Japan developed a 
conception of “Buddhahood”, or “Buddha-nature”. The Buddhist monk Kukai 
views nature as a total interdependence. The term “buddha-nature” is 
synonymous with sympathy, nonviolence, wisdom and compassion. It 
motivates human beings to act compassionately to all sentient and non-sentient 
elements. An aesthetic appreciation of nature made Japanese traditions unique.  
So, in Asian traditions, there is a diversity of thoughts. These 
diversities are mainly in religious beliefs which helped to shape people’s 
perceptions of their lives and of nature. I have argued that despite these 
differences, there are some common values in Asian perceptions of the 
human-nature relation. Overall, Asian traditions exhibited that there is an 
ontological “continuity” between the Creator, human beings, and natural 
elements.  
Both Asian and Western traditions ultimately recognize a few basic 
issues which are vital for environmental philosophy and ethics. I have focused 
on three main areas, the uniqueness of human beings, the distinction between 
living and nonliving elements, and nature’s sacredness. In Western traditions, 
two prominent theories, the dominion theory and the mechanistic theory, 
provided the bases for human uniqueness.  
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Darwinism, as a notable example of the mechanistic theory, holds that 
everything in nature is sustained by an evolutionary process. The nonliving 
elements in nature are simply material forces. They are like machines which 
keep the continuation of natural selection process. Western traditions 
developed the ideas of autonomy, moral responsibility and human dignity. 
Human beings as persons are responsible and have duties toward others. 
However, the motivation and inspiration for dutiful, responsible human 
beings is differently based in Asian traditions. In the Chinese traditions, by 
maintaining the great cosmic balance, human beings can achieve moral 
excellence. Indian traditions, on the other hand, invite submission to nature 
and required human beings to realize themselves as parts of a bigger Self. The 
Japanese view is that compassionate behavior toward all elements in nature 
can develop an enlightened self, dutiful and responsible human beings.  I have 
noted that while Western traditions view uniqueness of human beings in 
relation to liberty, equality, rights and autonomy, the Asian traditions suggest 
gaining it by becoming a human being who perceives nature through a lens of 
interrelations. 
Western traditions divide sharply living and nonliving elements in 
nature. Among human beings, they refer to some criteria of personhood. 
Duties toward nonhuman elements are derived from the distinction of sentient 
and nonsentient beings, or whether they have interest. So, in Western 
traditions consciousness was somehow given priority. 
Asian traditions, rather than focusing on the distinction between living 
and nonliving elements, encourage constructing a normative system which is 
mainly virtue-based. But there are also right-based and care-based approaches. 
 309
Asian traditions exhibit that some ideas, such as feeling, intimacy, kindness 
and sympathy, are morally important. I have argued that Asian normative 
systems rarely encourage a distinction between living and nonliving elements. 
Nature need not necessarily be sacred in the religious sense in Western 
traditions. Nature can be sacred in a sense of God’s art or in a sense of 
aesthetic beauty. Most Asian traditions, believe in sacredness in nature. Indian 
and Japanese traditions associate the sacredness of nature with love, sympathy, 
compassion, devotion and spirituality. The Chinese do not believe in sacred 
nature, but they believe in a cosmic balance of material force and spontaneity 
of nature. After comparing Western and Asian traditions in different 
perspectives, I located their differences in the different senses of identification, 
self-realization and spirituality on which they relied. 
Finding some common core values was one of the main goals of this 
thesis. The common core values are important for formulating local and global 
environmental policies and to overcome the environmental crisis. The first 
three chapters of this thesis showed that the three values, identification, self-
realization and spirituality, are predominant in both Western and Asian 
traditions. These values are to be found in Naess’s ecosophy and Passmore’s 
environmental philosophy. They are also vivid in Chinese, Indian and 
Japanese traditions. These values are therefore common.  
Are they core values? What would justify them as core values? I have 
offered some criteria based on the basic components shared widely in both 
traditions. These are influential in the traditional value systems, beliefs, and 
thoughts. The standard criteria I proposed for core values include motivational 
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force, non-separation, ecologically imaginative, and preservation of balance 
and harmony. 
The main task of environmental philosophy and ethics is to rethink our 
existing human-nature relation and recommend the environmental values 
which should be protected and promoted. There are two main aspects of 
common core values: policy and theory. This thesis has analyzed two 
influential policy recommendations on the environment, The Earth Charter 
and the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights. Although the 
importance of identification, self-realization and spirituality were recognized 
here these values should be widely accepted and incorporated in the local and 
global environmental policies.  
From the theoretical point of view, I argued that the common core 
values are important in developing a comprehensive environmental ethics. 
Some basic features of a comprehensive environmental ethics outlined in this 
thesis are, firstly, a comprehensive environmental ethics that values nature 
beyond its instrumental use. Secondly, a comprehensive environmental ethics 
considers the whole cosmos and natural system as the objects of moral 
consideration. Thirdly, a comprehensive environmental ethics does not focus 
on mere human interests, but rather considers the interconnectedness, 
sacredness, beauty and sustainability of nature. Fourthly, a comprehensive 
environmental ethics should consider identification, self-realization and 
spirituality as common core values. Fifthly, human’s interests must be 
modified in accordance with the balance and harmony of nature. Finally, 
providing an action-guiding moral principle for a harmonious human-nature 
relation is one of the key features of a comprehensive environmental ethics.  
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An ongoing debate on the nature of a comprehensive environmental 
ethics focuses on whether such an ethics should be an articulation of ethical 
norms and principles, or a collection of traditional environmental wisdom 
found in different cultures. After discussing the advantages and disadvantages 
of both sides, I suggested that none of them separately is plausible for 
overcoming the ecological crisis. A modification of both sides is necessary. 
The former lacks proper wisdom, whereas the latter lacks action-guidingness. 
So, a complete theoretical reconstruction has been proposed.  
Our emotional attachments with the surroundings should be taken into 
consideration for a viable theoretical guidance. Local affection motivates 
human beings to develop a powerful ecological consciousness. A place-based 
responsibility, rather than a humanistic responsibility, seems to be more 
appropriate to preserve the environment. This kind of responsibility 
demonstrates that some moral norms can spring from identification with 
nature. We must therefore value ecological relationships, our home, our 
neighborhood, and our locality. “Sustainable biosphere” and “the love of a 
place or home” are two recent developments in the idea of a place-based 
responsibility.  
Naess thinks that maturity of self or developing an ecological self is 
more important than our emotional attachment with nature. His ecological self 
and nature are identified. That is, the ecological self cannot destroy nature 
because a destruction of nature will be considered its own destruction. What is 
most important to Naess is ecological consciousness. But I have argued that 
just focusing on the ecological consciousness without the emotional 
attachment to nature is a mistake. Indeed, Naess’s standard example of 
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identification and his example of Norwegian settlers initially admitted the 
emotional attachment with place but he ignores this belongingness in his 
formulation of the ecological self.  
Another model of ecological self was proposed by deep ecologist 
Freya Mathews. She invokes a “self-maintenance” system, equally applicable 
to both living and nonliving elements. Fox’s reformulation of the ecological 
self into “the transpersonal self” has also been discussed. After examining 
various notions of the ecological self, I argued that we should abandon the 
idea for some basic reasons. The most important reason is that the idea of the 
ecological self can hardly motivate people who do not support the deep 
ecological platform. Secondly, the notion of the ecological self is unhelpful in 
making practical decisions, or in formulating effective environmental policies.  
A feminist approach to nature is popular in both Western and Asian 
traditions. This approach argues that a personal relation to nature may generate 
love and devotion to other natural entities. Gaia, a Greek mother goddess, is 
identical with Earth. Similarly, in Indian traditions, viewing nature as a mother 
is prominent. Is there any advantage in seeing the Earth as “Mother Nature” or 
“Mother Earth”? If this perception is associated with some religious 
background, then it could contribute to the protection of the environment. But 
in the absence of some religious support, the motivation might not be 
sufficiently strong.   
It seems that a plausible option could be to view nature as a mother 
who carries our future generations. Then a further issue is that the mother-
child relation may not be absolutely positive. There are bad mothers in our 
societies too. One answer is that if we are inspired by love, respect and 
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devotion we should be caring even for a bad mother. Analyzing this complex 
issues of surroundings, emotion and ecological consciousness, I have noted 
that an emotional attachment with our surroundings is required. 
I have attempted to develop a distinctive sense of common core values, 
that is, the neighboring sense. We have seen that the evolutionary history of 
the Earth indicates a high possibility of a neighboring relation at the primitive 
time. Concern for the neighbors has a social as well as a religious appeal. 
However, these neighbors are usually seen as human neighbors. I have 
endorsed a neighboring relation to the natural elements. These neighbors are 
therefore the ecological neighbors. Our communities are not limited to social 
communities. The idea of neighbor can be expanded further to accommodate 
our surroundings. I suggest that our community should be a “natural 
community” instead of a “social community”. 
In a natural community, humans and nonhumans are conceived in 
terms of members rather than elements. They engage one another in a locality 
as ecological neighbors. Neighboring relationship is intimate and responsible 
because of place. The key strength of identification-as-neighborhood is the 
awareness of the Earth’s neighborly ordering. Neighborhood self-realization 
promotes a duty to other ecological neighbors.  
Neighborhood spirituality enables our consciousness to view natural 
elements as our ecological neighbors. It helps us to conceptualize the 
remarkable unity of nature. A reverence for life is spiritual. Similarly, feeling 
nature as ferocious, mysterious is spiritual. Loving and enjoying the beauty of 
nature may also be spiritual. Thus, the neighboring senses of the three 
common core values would entail a new version of self, namely, the 
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neighboring self and constitute a neighbor-centric approach in environmental 
philosophy. A neighboring self develops when individuals are motivated by 
the emotional belongingness to their local surroundings and become 
ecologically conscious, and adopt the three common core values, identification, 
self-realization and spirituality. 
To a neighboring self expanding awareness, empathy, and compassion 
to other neighborhood members is primary. By contrast, for an ecological self 
growing ecological consciousness, and then expanding it unto the maximum 
level is primary. The neighboring self is no longer selfless whereas becoming 
selfless at a certain level is essential for the ecological self.  
A neighbor-centric approach to the environment comprises the 
neighboring self and a guiding moral principle, “The Protection Principle”. 
The neighboring self neither subscribes to a dominating worldview nor a 
totally cosmological worldview. What is plausible in the account of 
neighboring self is protecting the neighborhood, not the whole biosphere, by 
maintaining the Protection Principle. 
The Protection Principle is the moral guideline which states that 
neighbors have an obligation to protect their neighborhood. Destruction is 
only permissible for fulfilling their basic needs, significant interests and 
ecological benefits. The Protection Principle allows using nature to some 
extent and support a policy that benefits human beings.  
Only fulfilling basic needs are not enough for human beings. As a 
creative and innovative species human beings need satisfaction of mind. For 
this reason, human beings share their emotions, joys and happiness through 
Arts and cultural activities. We should also promote medical and health 
 315
research, scientific experiments and innovations which are consistent with 
ecological benefits and harmonious living.  
However, I do not support perfecting nature by enormous alternation, 
redesigning forests, natural reservoir and wilderness, for the satisfaction of 
human beings. Neither conservation nor preservation alone is accepted. 
Conservationists need a neighboring self while the preservationists need a 
neighborhood management policy. The management policy proposed here is, 
“protect your neighbors”. 
Naess and most deep ecologists think that indigenous people’s 
worldview is cosmological. However, it is more plausible to say that the 
indigenous people through out the Earth adapted the neighbor-centric view. 
Indigenous people maintain an absolutely local bonding without having an 
idea of preserving wilderness. 
Since the neighborcentric approach incorporates both ecosophy and 
ethics, conservation and preservation, it can provide a framework for a 
comprehensive environmental ethics. The right attitude to nature is neither 
being an ecological master, nor being an ecological slave. 
Now, one could raise the question whether the neighbor-centric view is 
able to solve the main worries regarding the environment, such as climate 
change and global warming. These problems may not be created by a 
neighboring country, society or group. For the same reason, neighbor’s 
decisions or activities for protecting the environment may be useless. 
Environmental decisions and hazardous activities may come from far away. 
Moreover, it may be argued that the idea of neighboring self is conceptually 
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narrow because neighbor requires a place and a social relation between the 
inhabitants. 
In response to these objections, we need to look back carefully to the 
origin of environmental problems. Environmental problems are created by 
human beings, consciously or unconsciously. Every human being lives in a 
place, country, and region. People must be thoughtful if they want to save their 
future generations, reduce natural disasters, and keep this Earth livable for all. 
The most sensible way to show one’s ecological consciousness and ensure his 
or her participation in a global responsibility is to engage in responsible 
behavior toward his or her own surroundings.  
A collective effort should start from one’s neighborhood with which 
one identifies most. When people are concerned about their neighborhood, 
they can put pressure on the government to make plausible environmental 
policies and to co-operate with global environmental organizations. A 
neighboring self is essential to be motivated for protecting one’s neighborhood.  
Let us look at our neighborhood once again in a beautiful morning, 
with caring eyes and an open heart-mind. Protect the Earth—our neighboring 
vicinity—by protecting the neighbors.  
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